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 ABSTRACT 
 
Fiscal Decentralization and Poverty Reduction Outcomes: Theory and Evidence 
 
By 
 
Guevera Assamoi Yao 
 
December 2006 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge Luis Martinez-Vazquez 
 
Major Department: Economics 
 
 
This dissertation examines the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty 
reduction and explores potential transmission channels through pro-poor sectoral 
outcomes such as basic education, basic healthcare and agricultural productivity. We first 
develop a theoretical model to explain the interaction between decentralization and 
poverty reduction outcomes. In particular, we show that the marginal effect of fiscal 
decentralization on pro-poor sectors depends largely on the outcome of the trade-off 
between potential benefits derived from better matching of local preference due to local 
proximity, and the lack of technical capacity at the local level. This finding provides, in a 
way, a theoretical explanation of the different outcomes observed in fiscal 
decentralization programs around the world.   
This inconclusive theoretical result motivates an empirical analysis to assess 
whether there is any statistical significant relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
poverty. We implement this estimation using the Generalized Method of Moment 
Instrumental Variable (GMM-IV) methodology on 97 countries spanned over the period 
1975-2000. Our estimation results reveal a statistically significant, but non-linear 
         xiii 
 relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty. In addition, we empirically 
explore potential transmission mechanism of the effect of fiscal decentralization on 
poverty through three sectors (basic education, basic healthcare and agricultural 
extension) that have been shown in the literature on basic needs and also by development 
practitioners to have significant bearing on the well-being of the poor. 
Finally, given the relatively high level of poverty in addition to the fact that most 
African countries are far behind in attaining their Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) targets, we  investigate whether the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty 
will be greater in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) relative to other regions.  
         xiv 
  
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation develops both a theoretical and an empirical framework to 
examine the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty reduction. We first develop a 
simple theoretical model to explore potential interaction between decentralization and 
poverty reduction outcomes. Building on models developed by Kanbur and Feroni 
(1991), Besley and Coate (2003) and Faguet (2004), we postulate that the marginal effect 
of fiscal decentralization on pro-poor sectors may largely depend on the net effect of the 
trade-off between benefits derived from better matching of local preference resulting 
from local proximity, and the lack of technical capacity at the local level. In particular, 
we show that an optimal mix of pro-poor goods and services is obtainable under an 
economic structure that is neither highly centralized, nor fully decentralized. Indeed, this 
particular form of decentralization is more and more advocated by practitioners and 
development institutions, which recommend stressing on local capacity building, while 
maintaining a sound coordination by central government agencies.  
Furthermore, we conduct an empirical analysis to not only assess the overall 
impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty, but also to explore potential transmission 
channels—basic education, basic healthcare and agricultural productivity—through 
which fiscal decentralization may improve poverty reduction outcomes.  We conduct this 
empirical study using the Generalized Method of Moment Instrumental Variable (GMM-
IV) methodology on 97 countries spanned over the period 1975-2000.  
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We also investigate whether the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
poverty reduction outcomes is non-linear, in an attempt to verify our theoretical postulate 
relative to the fact that full decentralization may not guaranty the optimal mix of pro-poor 
goods and services necessary to reduce poverty. We employ a quadratic model 
specification to derive the optimal level of fiscal decentralization needed to achieve 
poverty reduction outcome in developing countries.  
Finally, given the relatively high level of poverty in addition to the fact that most 
African countries are far behind in attaining their Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) targets, we investigate whether the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty 
reduction outcome will be greater in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) relative to other regions.  
 
Motivation 
Poverty reduction has been for decades at the center of important debates in the 
international community. Historically, poverty reduction strategies have relied on the 
indirect effect of growth-led policy in a manner consistent with macro-economic stability. 
Proponents of this view mainly advocated a central government-led effort that could 
initiate a national plan for investing in key economic sectors which may have a 
sufficiently positive impact on the wellbeing of the poor. However, this approach proved 
to be somewhat successful in most developing economies. In general, these countries 
were unable to sustain growth and presented some common “symptoms,” such as lack of 
civil liberties, environmental deterioration, corruption, and a very poor record of 
delivering local public goods and services; that is, poor performances in providing basic 
public services such as clean water, sanitation, primary education, basic health care and 
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shelter.  Most of these failures occurred in an era when the scope of central government 
was expanding enormously (Ebel and Yilmaz 2002). 
However, in September 2000, the world leaders adopted at a Summit initiated by 
the United Nations, new resolutions and strategies about poverty reduction, with a set 
targeted quantifiable measures referred to as Millennium Development Goals.1 Thus, 
recent issues of the World Bank’s development report (World Bank 2001) have focused 
on poverty. Even few years earlier, the United Nation Development Program’s Human 
Development Report started to publish an index on human poverty.2 Also, in September 
1999, the notion of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) was introduced as an 
integrated part of a national plan of action to reduce poverty, which later becomes the 
main approach adopted by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to provide 
development assistance.  
It is worthwhile noting, however, that the origins of the PRSP process also relies 
on the search for solutions to a series of problems confronting the World Bank, IMF and 
many bilateral donors during the 1990s, when their mandates were being challenged 
(Driscoll and Christiansen 2004). For instance, the IMF was blamed for contributing to 
the Asian economic crisis and that led to internal and external reviews of their main 
lending instrument, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). On the other 
hand, the World Bank was under pressure over deteriorating economic growth in Sub-
                                                 
1 The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) are an ambitious agenda for reducing poverty and 
improving lives that world’s leaders and experts from the United Nations Secretariat and IMF, OECD and 
the World Bank agreed on at the Millennium Summit in September 2000. For each goal one or more 
targets have been set, most for 2015, using 1990 as a benchmark (See Table A2). 
2 The human poverty index (HPI) was created in 1997 and measures deprivation in basic human 
development in the same dimensions as the Human Development Index (HDI). The variables used are the 
percentage of people expected to die before age 40, the percentage of adults who are illiterate, and overall 
economic provisioning in terms of the percentage of people without access to health services and safe water 
and the percentage of under-weight children under five (see UNDP 1997). 
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Saharan Africa. Indeed, there was a general perception of a lack of trust and poor 
coordination between the World Bank and IMF in this region.  
In March 2002, the World Bank and the IMF completed an extensive review of 
the PRSP process, consulting with governments, in-country stakeholders, international 
NGOs, other aid donors, and a specific review of civil society participation. Although, 
this internal review concluded that it was too early to know if the process was having an 
impact on poverty, there were some critiques who argued that PRSP’s principles that the 
program is nationally owned and based on broad participatory processes, were marred by 
important flaws in practice. In particular, the World Bank and the IMF are still charged 
with endorsing the poverty reduction strategies, which in turn become a condition for 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) eligibility and further concessional lending. As 
a result, the PRSP is still viewed by many outsiders as donor conditionality to developing 
countries (Trocaire 2004). Thus, an overarching recommendation from outsiders has been 
the adoption of the development forum as the structure within which to take key 
decisions on the PRSP framework. This would facilitate broader stakeholder 
participation, including government, parliament, civil society, donors and the IFIs.3  
From the perspective of this dissertation, an important point to note with the 
PRSP process is the little attention that has been given to the decentralization processes 
currently ongoing in most of the countries covered in the PRSP initiative. Despite the fact 
that PRSP process prescribes decentralization and participation as an integrated part of 
“bottom-up” approaches in a framework for action that links local governance to poverty 
                                                 
3 See, for example, CISDSE/CI (2005). Generally speaking, NGO reviews reveal a sense of frustration that 
their input is not having the impact that the World Bank and IMF seemed to have promised. While some 
NGO reviews remark that the PRSP approach has given civil society more participatory power than old 
processes (2001), others conclude that the PRSP approach is essentially a fraud (Guttal et al. 2001). For 
other PRSP reviews see CIDSE/CI (2004a and 2004b), Trocaire (2004) and Panos (2002). 
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reduction, only few country PRSPs so far have discussed the PRSP process in the context 
of decentralization.4  In fact, internal reviews have been greatly criticized for choosing to 
ignore the PRSP process in the context of decentralization (IMF 2003).  
Meanwhile, in the economics literature, greater attention is being paid to 
decentralization as an instrument in development policy. Thus, local governments have 
emerged as central players. Typically, there is some form of transfer of political and 
fiscal authority from central to local governments. At least in theory, decentralization 
makes it possible for people to have greater influence on government’s decisions that 
affect their lives (Martinez -Vasquez, Charles McLure, and Wallace 1999). In principle, 
decision-making at the local level gives more responsibility, ownership, and thus 
incentives to local agents; and local information can often identify cheaper and more 
appropriate ways of providing pubic services (Bardhan 1997). While different goals are 
pursued with decentralization reforms in different countries, decentralization reforms 
commonly aim to improve the delivery of key public services, such as education and 
health care; to democratically empower local communities through their local 
governments; and to increase the transparency and equity with which public resources are 
allocated across the national territory.  
Despite the obvious importance of understanding the exact impact and interaction 
of fiscal decentralization on poverty reduction, relatively little is known about the 
intersection of these two topics. Although a few empirical studies have analyzed the 
impact of decentralized financing on poverty reduction efforts in developed countries, the 
traditional public finance literature dealing with fiscal decentralization has not dedicated 
                                                 
4 Some of the PRSPs that discuss the process in the context of decentralization are Republic of Guinea, 
Uganda, Philippines, Indonesia, Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua.  
 
 6
much attention to studying the impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty in developing 
economies. In fact, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty is not 
straightforward and not always well understood. For instance, the traditional literature on 
local public finance has long viewed poverty reduction policy as mainly a redistributive 
matter that needed to be exclusively addressed by central government on the justification 
of mobility and adverse externality issues. On the other hand, fiscal decentralization was 
associated with the concept of efficiency and was largely ignored in poverty reduction 
strategies (Tiebout 1956; Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972). However, the recent trend in 
donor-supported development activities and poverty reduction programs have now 
embraced the view that poverty is first a local phenomenon and that poverty reduction 
policies require involvement at the local level, including adopting sound fiscal 
decentralization program (World Bank 2000). Thus, fiscal decentralization is seen as a 
policy with the greatest potential for improving public service delivery and contributing 
to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of reducing poverty. 
To date, however, there have been only a few serious attempts to systematically 
consider the impact of the different dimensions of fiscal decentralization on poverty 
reduction. A number of cross-disciplinary studies that span economics, political science, 
public administration and sociology attempted to evaluate the impact of decentralization 
policy on poverty reduction strategy. Unfortunately, much of these findings fail to be 
grounded either on theoretical models or on sound empirical methodology. These studies 
often fall into anecdote and description from selected case studies. Hence, there is a need 
for both theoretical and empirical studies to address this issue in a more systematic way. 
Thus, the overarching goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the relatively little work 
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that has been done in form of literature to date by analyzing, both theoretically and 
empirically, the impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty reduction outcomes. As 
mentioned above, this study also looks at a possible transmission mechanism of the effect 
of fiscal decentralization on poverty through three pro-poor sectors; that is, basic 
education, basic healthcare and agricultural productivity.    
Although, the substance of this study is in the realm of academic research, we 
hope to obtain conclusions and policy implications that will provide a better 
understanding of the interaction between fiscal decentralization and poverty reduction. In 
particular, we hope to inform or help policy makers in their design and implementation of 
more pro-poor fiscal decentralization reforms. 
 
The Need for Theoretical Analysis 
The theoretical literature explaining the interaction between decentralization and 
poverty are quite recent and few in numbers. In the current literature, there has been some 
attempt to examine some aspects of decentralization, mainly political decentralization, on 
specific anti-poor programs. Although, these studies have provided valuable insights on 
the hypothesized relationship between decentralization and specific anti-poor programs, 
more need to be done to explain the interaction between fiscal decentralization and 
poverty reduction outcomes.  For example, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005) proposed a 
theoretical model to examine the consequence of elite capture from a decentralized versus 
a centralized administration of potential anti-poor programs. They found that centralized 
delivery system is more prone to captured due to lack of monitoring of bureaucratic 
performance. Moreover, they found that decentralizing the delivery system promotes 
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cost-effectiveness and improves intraregional targeting at low program scales. In the 
same line, Galasso and Ravallion (2000) proposed a model of decentralized targeting of 
an anti-poverty program with application to the Bangladesh’s Food-for-Education 
Program. They also found that within village targeting improved with program size, 
lower land inequality, less remoteness, fewer shocks, and less private redistribution. 
Other studies have focus on the role of local government in the provision of local public 
goods, without any particular attention on the pro-poor nature of these goods. For 
instance, Besley and Coate (2003) and Faguet (2004) developed models of 
responsiveness of local government to the provision of public goods. In particular, Besley 
and Coate (2003) found decentralization to be welfare enhancing in the absence of 
spillover effect, while Faguet (2004) showed that the tradeoff between central and local 
government provision depend on the relative advantage over information and technical 
capacity of each level of government. Thus, there is an apparent need to develop a simple 
theoretical framework that can explain the potential outcome of (fiscal) decentralization 
on poverty reduction in a more systematic way. 
Hence, our model attempts to contribute to the literature in this direction. It seeks 
to explain the interaction between decentralization and the delivery of pro-poor social 
services at the local government level. We explicitly introduce a generic class of poverty 
indicators to assess the marginal effect of decentralization on pro-poor services delivery.  
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The Need for Empirical Analysis 
Although there is a large number of studies and research papers that have 
considered the impact of specific aspects of fiscal decentralization on poverty reduction, 
surprisingly there have been very few attempts to bring the two sets of issues together in 
a comprehensive manner. The current literature has approached the interaction between 
decentralization and poverty from a number of different angles, each of which has its 
particular strengths and weaknesses. There are a relatively limited number of empirical 
studies that explore the direct relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty 
reduction using country-level data sets. In general terms, the approach of these studies 
has been to use regression analysis to estimate the impact of different measures of (fiscal) 
decentralization on some national poverty indicator.5 Shortcomings of this approach 
include limitations caused by the incomplete nature of the measures used for both poverty 
and decentralization; the challenges of constructing a data set which is comparable across 
countries; as well as the difficulty of dealing adequately with endogeneity and other 
econometric issues. These weaknesses limit somewhat the validity of the findings. In 
addition the results have not always been clear cut. For instance, Von Braun and Grote 
(2002) conclude that decentralization does indeed serve the poor, although the impact 
depends on the interaction of political, administrative and fiscal decentralization systems.  
Other empirical studies have considered the impact of regional poverty rates on 
regional expenditure patterns, while simultaneously considering the impact of 
government expenditures on regional poverty rates.  For instance, two comparable studies 
for China and India find that subnational spending has a significant impact on poverty 
rates, although their results suggest that the pro-poor nature of sectoral spending is quite 
                                                 
5  For example, see Von Braun and Grote (2002). 
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country specific (Fan, Hazell and Thorat 1999; Fan, Zhang and Zhang 2000; Fan, Nyange 
and Rao 2005). While these studies are noteworthy, they do not necessarily examine the 
impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty reduction outcomes in a direct or 
comprehensive manner.  
Our analysis improves on the existing literature in at least four ways: first it uses a 
comprehensive panel data setting of 97 countries, spanned over the period 1975 to 2000 
(five years average), to provide a comparative study that takes into account countries’ 
specific effects. Second, we address some empirical issues that were not considered in 
previous studies such as endogeneity issues, serial correlation, and heteroskedasticity of 
unknown among others, using the Generalized Method of Moment Instrumental Variable 
(GMM-IV) approach. Third, we empirically investigate potential transmission 
mechanism of the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty through pro-poor sectoral 
outcomes. Finally, we provide specific results for Sub-Saharan Africa due to the fact that 
it is far away from meeting its Millennium Development Goals’ (MGDs) targets.   
 
Overview of the Dissertation 
   The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: In chapter II, we first present 
the conceptual framework by providing working definitions of poverty and fiscal 
decentralization, and then we provide a brief review of the existing literature on the 
intersection of these two themes. Chapter III develops a simple theoretical model 
explaining the interaction between decentralization and poverty reduction.  In chapter IV, 
we describe the empirical methodology and the data; while chapter V presents the  
discussion of our empirical results. Finally, chapter VI offers the concluding remarks.
 
    
 
CHAPTER II 
DEFINITIONS, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND EXISTING LITERATURE 
  
In this chapter we first define poverty and decentralization in some depth, 
consider the shortcomings of the various measures used in the literature and suggest 
possible refinements. Next, we provide a parallel review for the concept of 
decentralization. Then we show how the evolution of thinking about poverty has affected 
the policy environment for poverty reduction.  Next, we develop a conceptual framework 
that allows us to examine the different links between fiscal decentralization and poverty 
reduction. The section ends with a survey of evidence, both empirical and theoretical, that 
is now available on the link between decentralization and poverty reduction. 
 
Defining and Measuring Poverty 
 
Evolution of the Concept of Well-being and Poverty 
 
Current thinking on what constitutes poverty and wellbeing has come a long way 
since the 1970s, when poverty was simply understood as low income and failure to 
satisfy basic needs.6 Since then, the concept of poverty has expanded to include other 
aspects of human wellbeing. The meaning of poverty has widened progressively in the 
debates of the 1980s and 1990s. During that period, the concept of poverty gradually 
evolved from the notion of “minimum level of subsistence” to the notion of “relative
                                                 
6 The main focus of poverty in the 1960s was on the level of income such as Gross National Product per 
head, reflected in macro-economic indicators. In the 1970s, poverty became prominent, notably as a result 
of Robert MacNamara's celebrated speech to the World Bank Board of Governors in Nairobi in 1973. 
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deprivation,” which defines poverty as the failure to maintain the standards prevailing in 
a given society. Accordingly, poverty measure has been broadened to include, in addition 
to income, a broad set of non-income basic needs, like primary education, basic health, 
and access to basic social services. More recently, other elements have been added to the 
poverty measure, including intangibles such as “capabilities,” dignity, autonomy, 
vulnerability, voice, empowerment and participation.  
The evolution process can be described in terms of a pyramid of poverty concepts 
(see Figure 1). Each concept represents a dimension of wellbeing; and each 
conceptualization, a different combination of dimensions, with the combination getting 
even broader and more complex over time. Sen (1999), among others pioneered this 
approach with his suggestion to include basic capability in the definition of poverty. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of the Poverty Concept 
     PC 
      PC + CPR 
      PC + CPR + SPC 
      PC + CPR + SPC + As. 
       PC + CPR + SPC + As. + Dignity 
        PC + CPR + SPC + As. + Dignity + Auto.  
           PC + CPR + SPC + As. + Dignity. + Auto. + Pol. Inst 
 
Note: PC = Private Consumption;  
CPR =Common Property Resource;  
SPC = State Provided Commodities. As = Assets;     
Auto = Autonomy; Pol. Inst = Political Institution. 
 
Source: Adapted from McGee and Brock, 
 
 
 
Given the proliferation of definitions, it is helpful to group them by school of 
thought. The first class of definitions belongs to the “utilitarian” approach, which is based 
on a ranking of preferences defined in terms of commodities (goods and services). More 
precisely, this approach stipulates that all poverty comparisons should be made with 
reference to the satisfaction of the individuals under consideration, or using the 
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economics jargon, according to their “utility” levels. The theoretical basis for the 
utilitarian approach is thus closely related to modern microeconomic theory. This 
explains why a fundamental feature of this school of thought is the need to avoid 
conclusions that contradict individual behavior. This school of thought is challenged by 
those who believe that poverty should be a function of an “elementary” bundle of goods. 
These goods may be seen as the minimum requirements in terms of food, shelter, or even 
social rights. The “non-utilitarian” approach, as this approach can be called, provides for 
a flexible identification of the poor by allowing greater variety in the goods admitted to 
the basic consumption bundle.7 
It is also important to note that the concept of poverty is very likely to be 
multidimensional, encompassing both monetary and non-monetary aspects. An important 
implication is that any attempt to define poverty by focusing only on one aspect of this 
concept runs the risk of underestimating its richness and complexity.  
 
A Multi-dimensional Definition of Poverty 
 
 Poverty is a multidimensional concept and as such it can be defined in many 
ways: Poverty is lack of income, food, shelter, job opportunities, or physical asset bases 
such as livestock and land. Poverty is also not having access to safe drinking water, 
health facilities when needed or not being able to read and write. Poverty is also about 
being at risk, uncertainty about the future, vulnerability, powerlessness, lack of voice, 
representation or freedom (World Bank 1990 and 2001).  
 Thus, alternative definitions of poverty focus on various aspects of deprivation in 
wellbeing, both income and non income. The definition of poverty may also vary with 
                                                 
7 A caveat to bear in mind about this school of thought on poverty is that it ignores any notion of utility 
(Ravallion 1996). 
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values and attitudes of the society under consideration and with its characteristics and 
choices as a whole. Therefore, poverty can be seen partly as a value judgment, based on 
criteria that differ from society to society. In this sense, conditions that define poverty can 
differ quite significantly across countries and cultures. Nevertheless, the analysis of the 
causes of poverty and the design of poverty reduction policies require some level of 
standardization.  
  
Absolute versus Relative Poverty and the Use of Poverty Lines 
 
 Poverty can be viewed in absolute and relative terms. Absolute poverty refers to 
subsistence below some absolute standard of socially acceptable minimum standard, 
usually based on basic needs or nutritional requirement. Relative poverty compares the 
bottom strata of a population to the upper strata, usually divided in fifths (quintiles) or 
tenths (deciles). Therefore, in terms of income, a person is absolutely poor if her income 
is less than the defined income poverty line, while she is relatively poor if she belongs to 
a bottom income group (for example, the poorest 10 percent of the population).8
 The simplest measure of poverty in a country or region is the share of the 
population that falls below a certain income-poverty threshold. The computation of the 
poverty rate, as well as the computation of more complex measures of poverty and 
income inequality is discussed in Appendix B. 
 A poverty line set at $1 (1985 PPP$) a day per person has been used by the World 
Bank for international comparison purposes.9 However, other poverty lines have been 
                                                 
8 A drawback of relative measures of poverty is that there will always be (relatively) poor people no matter 
how well off this group may be in an absolute sense (Ravallion 1994).   
9 Note that this measure of poverty is based on consumption ability. The “one-dollar-a-day at purchasing 
power parity at 1985 ($1 a day-1985 PPP) was developed by World Bank analysts in an attempt to link 
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used in practice by the World Bank and the United Nation Development Program, to 
differentiate between poverty levels in developing and transition countries. For example, 
poverty lines of $2 (PPP$) a day has been suggested for Latin America and the Caribbean 
which have a higher per capita income than countries in Asia and Africa; and $4 (1990 
PPP$) for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries (World Bank 
1990; UNDP 2000). On the other hand, for comparison among industrial countries, a 
poverty line corresponding to the US poverty line of $14.40 (1985 PPP$) a day per 
person has been used in the literature (UNDP 2000; Eurostat 2000). 
 Many developing countries that have set national poverty lines have generally 
used the food poverty method. This method relies on some notion of the insufficiency of 
economic resources to meet basic minimum needs in food. There are two approaches to 
measuring food poverty: the cost of basic needs approach (CBN) and the Food Energy 
Intake approach (FEI) (Ravallion 1994; Wodon 1997). 
 Both approaches are sensitive to the price level used to determine the cost of the 
bundle of goods and concentrate mainly on calories or dietary energy counts. In industrial 
countries, national poverty lines are also being used to measure relative poverty. For 
example, the European Commission has suggested a poverty line for these countries of 
half the median adjusted disposable personal income (Eurostat 2000; UNDP 2000).  
 The Cost of Basic Needs (CBN) approach sets the poverty line at the cost of a 
basic diet for the main age, gender and activity groups, plus a few essential non-food 
items. Survey data then establishes the proportion of people living in households with 
consumption (or sometimes income) below this line. The basic diet may consist of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
poverty line and poverty measures across countries. It was first used in the 1990 World development 
Report.  
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least expensive foods needed to meet basic nutritional requirements, the typical adult diet 
in the lowest consumption quintile or the investigator’s notion of a minimal but decent 
diet (Ravallion 1994). The choice of both the food and the non-food components included 
is necessarily arbitrary. 
The Food Energy Intake (FEI) method focuses on the consumption expenditure at 
which a person’s typical food energy intake is just sufficient to meet a predetermined 
food energy requirement. Dietary energy intake, as the dependent variable, is regressed 
against household consumption per adult equivalent.  The poverty line is then set at the 
level of total consumption per person at which the statistical expectation of dietary 
energy intake exactly meets average dietary energy requirements (Ravallion 1994; 
Wodon 1997). 
 
Other Concepts of Poverty 
 
 Transient poverty, chronic poverty and the poverty trap 
 
 Transient poverty refers to short-term poverty status due to temporary or seasonal 
causes, while chronic poverty is caused by long-term or structural causes (Cruses and 
Wodon 2003). The conventional rule of thumb is that poverty is chronic if the average 
consumption of household over time falls below the poverty line; otherwise, poverty is 
referred to as transient.  
 The notion of poverty trap is associated with the idea of persistence in poverty in 
a dynamic or temporal context. Indeed, in many cases poverty has a tendency to persist 
and this has given rise to the idea of poverty as a stable low-income equilibrium; even if 
there are episodes away from poverty, there are forces at work to bring individuals back 
to this point (Chen and Ravallion 2001; Bowles et al. 2004). 
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Human development and poverty: functioning and capability.10 
The human development approach to poverty tries to assess poverty in terms of 
achievement or outcomes. This approach perceives poverty as deficiency in human 
capability to function at a minimum acceptable standard in a given community. The 
concept of human development stems from Amartya Sen’s notion of “functionings” and 
“capability.” The functionings of a person refer to the valuable things the person can do 
or be (such as opportunity to enjoy long, healthy lives, to be literate and able to freely 
take part in the life of a community). The capability of a person stands for the different 
combinations of functionings the person can achieve; it reflects the freedom to achieve 
functionings.  
 
Vulnerability, empowerment and participation  
The concept of vulnerability is often associated with poverty. Vulnerability has 
two facets. The first relates to external exposure to shocks, stress and risk, while the 
second relates to internal defenselessness and the lack of means to cope without suffering 
damaging loss (Streeten 1994). Given the high degree of correlation between 
vulnerability and poverty, the former has been used as proxy for poverty by development 
practitioners. The notion of empowerment is often identified as the recourse to 
vulnerability as it refers to the expansion of poor people’s capabilities and choices by 
increasing their ability to exercise those choices free of hunger, want and deprivation. It 
also increases their opportunity to participate in, or endorse, decision-making affecting 
their lives. Thus, through participation, all layers of the population would have a voice in 
decision-making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that 
                                                 
10 For more discussion, refer to Sen (1984; 1993; and 1999). 
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represent their interests. Such broad participation is built on freedom of association and 
speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively (World Bank 2002). 11
 
Causes of Poverty 
 
The previous paragraphs illustrate how both the perception and definition of 
poverty may vary according to the perspective taken of the issue. Likewise, the causes of 
poverty may be attributed to different processes and social factors. In what follows we 
review some of the most commonly suggested determinants of poverty in the literature, 
which include regional, demographic and cultural factors, as well as institutional and 
socio-economic factors.12
 
Regional, Demographic and Cultural Factors 
 The root of poverty appears to be often region specific. Developing countries 
often suffer more extensively from acute environmental degradation and natural disasters, 
with which they are inadequately equipped to cope. These are important contributing 
factors for many households, in particular the most disadvantaged stratum of the 
population, to be trapped in harsh poverty.  
 In general, poor people rely on basic agricultural products and natural resources, 
such as public water and firewood for cooking, to meet and maintain their daily 
household needs. Thus, the depletion of forests and the contamination of water due to 
environmental degradation pose an immediate and disproportionate threat to the 
                                                 
11 See World Bank (2002) for further discussion.  
12 For further readings, refer to Forsyth et al. (1998). 
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livelihood of the poor who are more exposed to hazardous sites and live mostly in 
countries with lack of environmental regulation (Forsyth et al. 1998).   
 Another important source of poverty is the occurrence of natural disasters. For 
example, the recent Indian Ocean tsunami devastated many areas of South-East Asia and 
took the lives of around 300,000 people. Millions of individuals, especially the poor in 
those areas, were deprived from access to food, water and shelter. Houses, school and 
transportation system were destroyed. Due to lack of access to information to pre-and 
post-disaster protection resources, the most vulnerable groups of the population, which in 
developing countries tend to be women and children, are also likely to be the most 
affected. These conditions tend to deepen the impact of natural disasters by 
disproportionately harming the most vital population groups that are likely to contribute 
to long-term development. Moreover, the added menace of malaria infestation, intestinal 
parasites, and other diseases in the aftermath of disasters also contribute to worsen the 
overall condition of the poor. Indeed, according to the World Health Organization 
(WHO), over one-third of Africa's malaria deaths are due to natural disasters and 
conflicts (Greenwood 1999). 
 The high prevalence of poverty in developing countries is attributable in part to 
the demographic trap. Impoverished families with many children often cannot afford to 
invest consistently in the care of each child in terms of nutrition, health and education. 
They may only be able to afford to send one child, usually one son in school. As result, 
girls stay at home or work in the fields and are thus denied access to education, even 
when these services are available. Cultural values about the relative worth of females and 
males lead families to invest the scarce resources available on males rather than females. 
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For instance, in societies where sons bring their new spouses to live with the family after 
marriage, and daughters move away to live with their husbands, sons often receive a 
disproportionate amount of the family resources, reflecting the fact that sons will 
contribute more to the preservation of the family tradition than daughters. Therefore, as is 
often the case, measurements based on the assumption that family members have equal 
access to resources, including income, can be misleading.  
 Recently, in order to address the gender inequality issue, the UNDP has created 
two measures that focus specifically on how poverty may affect women and men 
differently within countries: The Gender-Related Development Index (GDI), which 
compares women's and men's well-being, and the Gender Empowerment Measure 
(GEM), which measures women's participation in each country's political and economic 
systems (UNDP 1997).13
 
Institutional and Socio-economic Factors 
Poor governance practices as manifested by the presence of corruption and the 
lack of rule of law and government accountability tend to be detrimental to the material 
and social conditions of the poor because of their lack of private alternatives and their 
vulnerability to abusive power. Indirectly, corruption inhibits development because 
leaders misuse the limited available resources that could otherwise be used for 
development projects to reduce poverty. As part of corrupt systems lacking 
accountability, leaders may provide services and reward exclusively their political 
supporters, which in turn may lead to social instability due to rebellion and internal 
                                                 
13 These two measures, GDI and GEM are discussed in Appendix B.  
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conflicts. The material and human destruction caused by warfare is a major source of 
poverty (Treisman 2000a; UNDP 2005).  
Finally, lack of employment opportunities is generally identified as a major 
source of poverty, and the long term poor tend to be unskilled and vulnerable to any 
small shock to the market economy (World Bank 2001). More recently, the phenomenon 
of jobless economic growth that increases income inequalities and generates too few jobs 
for low income groups poses a new serious threat to addressing the issue of poverty in 
many countries (UNDP 1990 and 1997).14
 
Definitions and Measures of Decentralization 
 
Defining Decentralization 
 
According to Litvack and Seddon (1999), fiscal decentralization is the transfer of 
authority and responsibility for public functions to subordinate or quasi-independent 
organization or the private sector. More recently, Bahl (2006, forthcoming) defined 
decentralization as the empowerment of people by the empowerment of their local 
governments. Three dimensions of decentralization are commonly used in the literature, 
political decentralization, administrative decentralization and fiscal decentralization. 
Political decentralization seeks to provide political power to subnational 
governments that are politically accountable to their local constituents. However, sub-
national governments are expected to act within the legal and administrative framework 
set by higher level government, usually the central government. To a great extent, 
                                                 
14 For the United States, empirical evidence suggests that although the relationship between labor market 
opportunities and poverty rates has weakened since 1980, changes in unemployment rates, median wages, 
and inequality predict changes in poverty rates rather well (Hoynes et al. 2005).
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political decentralization requires a combination of statutory reforms, development of 
pluralistic political parties, strengthening of legislatures and encouragement of effective 
public interest group (Litvack and Seddon 1999). 
Administrative decentralization is the transfer of authority or control over local 
civil service, local regulatory framework and subnational financial management of 
certain public functions to lower levels of governments or semi-autonomous public 
authorities. Essentially, this dimension of decentralization seeks to assess the autonomy 
of lower levels governments in managing local affairs (for example, their ability to hire 
and fire staffs working for local governments). 
Fiscal decentralization is the empowerment of people through the fiscal 
empowerment of their governments. It is mainly the transfer of fiscal decision-making 
power and management to lower levels of governments (Bahl 2006, forthcoming).  
A successful fiscal decentralization program should encompass four building blocks 
commonly referred to as the four pillars of fiscal decentralization: the assignment of 
expenditures responsibilities, the assignment of revenues sources, the allocation of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers or grants and subnational borrowing. 
The first pillar of fiscal decentralization, Expenditures Responsibilities is 
concerned about assessing the functions and expenditures responsibilities of each level of 
government. It recommended that the assignment of expenditures responsibilities be 
guided by the subsidiary principle, which suggests that government good and service 
should be provided at the lowest level of government with capacity to efficiently 
providing this good or service (Martinez-Vazquez 1998).  
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The second pillar of fiscal decentralization, Revenue Assignment deals with the 
question of which revenue sources local government should receive. That is, which taxes 
and non-taxes revenues should be made available to local government? The main idea of 
the assignment of revenues, in the context of fiscal decentralization, is to give some 
revenue discretion to local governments to implement some social programs relevant for 
their constituents. To achieve the revenue assignment process, some taxes are assigned to 
local governments. The general principle is that local government revenue sources need 
to be as stable as possible. In addition, local taxes should be easy to administer and 
related to the benefit received by local residents.  
The third pillar of fiscal decentralization, Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers  is 
necessary to ensure that local governments have sufficient revenue to fund their 
expenditure responsibilities. These transfers are usually in form of grants from higher 
level of government to fund activities of subnational governments. There are different 
forms of grants or transfers used for a wide variety of purposes from vertical to horizontal 
fiscal imbalance. Vertical imbalance occurs when there is a gap between the fiscal need 
and the resources available to different level of government; whereas horizontal 
imbalance refers to a situation where the resources allocation between government units 
at the same level is not equal. Moreover, transfer can be unconditional or conditional, 
made in a form of a block grant or matching grant. 
The fourth pillar of fiscal decentralization is Subnational Borrowing is the last 
pillar of fiscal decentralization. This pillar is important in the sense that often sub-
national governments do not succeed in balancing their budget with their own revenues 
sources and transfers received from higher level of government; this is a situation of 
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fiscal deficit, which calls for the incurrence of subnational debt or borrowing. In 
principle however, efficient fiscal decentralization policy requires subnational to act 
responsibly by adopting a hard budget constraint.  
There are also three alternative forms of decentralization are commonly 
mentioned in literature: deconcentration, delegation and devolution.  
Deconcentration is considered the weakest form of decentralization in the sense 
that central government body grants only a relative autonomy to its appointed field 
offices that ultimately report to him. Delegation is one of most observed form of 
decentralization around the world. In this setting, local government officials have some 
discretion over responsibilities but are subject to strict control of higher-level 
government. Devolution represents the most complete form of decentralization, since a 
great deal of autonomy is given to locally elected government bodies to manage 
programs and adopt policy of relevance to their constituents.15  
 
Measures of Fiscal Decentralization 
The two measures of decentralizations most commonly used in the literature are 
decentralization ratios calculated for government revenues and expenditures respectively. 
Thus, on the expenditure side, decentralization is measured as a ratio of local government 
spending to general government spending (Oates 1972; Zhang and Zou 1998; Davoodi 
and Zou 1998). Essentially such a ratio measures the relative responsibility of local 
governments for administration and delivery of public services.  It represents the share of 
public expenditures in a particular sector that falls under the authority of local 
                                                 
15 See Bird (1993); Bird and Vaillancourt (1998); ack and Seddon (1999) nd Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab (2003). 
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governments, and is therefore subject to the merits and dangers of decentralized decision-
making.  
However, local expenditures result from an interaction of the scope of 
responsibilities devolved to local governments, on the one hand, and local demand for 
these services and efficiency of their provision, on the other hand. A ratio of local/central 
expenditures can be misleading if local governments simply act as spending agents of the 
upper-level governments and are constrained by conditionalities attached to 
intergovernmental revenue.  
 As an alternative, decentralization can be measured as a ratio of local government 
revenues to the general government revenue (Oates 1985; Woller and Phillips 1998; and 
Akai and Sakata 2002). This second measure of fiscal decentralization complements the 
first in a sense that it shows whether taxation powers allow local governments to 
discharge their functions independently. Essentially it measures relative power of local 
governments to finance their services. However, this measure can overstate the role of the 
central government if a large portion of its revenue is transferred to fund administration 
and delivery of public services by subnational governments. 
 Hunter (1977) recognized the important role of the transfer system in determining 
the level of fiscal dependence or autonomy of subnational government, as the design of 
transfer system determines the degree to which subnational governments have control 
over the resources at their disposal. Although transfer schemes are generally designed to 
address vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances,16 different transfer types gives central 
                                                 
16 Vertical fiscal balance is said to exist when there is a broad correspondence between the expenditure 
responsibilities assigned to each level of government and the fiscal resources available to them to carry out 
these responsibilities. Horizontal imbalances arise because of differences in fiscal capacity and/or 
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government officials varying degrees of control over local resources. Based on the 
presumption that conditional transfers, unconditional transfers (including 
intergovernmental borrowing) and shared revenues provide local governments with 
increasing levels of fiscal control, Hunter defined a set of three coefficients of vertical 
fiscal imbalance (VFI).17 The coefficient is calculated as the share of subnational 
expenditures that are financed from sources not controlled by subnational governments. 
The difference between the three coefficients is that they apply incrementally narrow 
definitions of what resources are under the control of subnational governments18 so that: 
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this approach are still used despite the inherent subjectivity (e.g., Stein 1999).  
                                                                                                                                                
 
By construction, the coefficient takes on a value between zero and one, with values closer 
to one indicating larger fiscal imbalance and values closer to zero indicating greater fiscal 
balance. Of course, the narrower the definition of local control that is applied, the greate
the resulting fiscal imbalance, so that we generally expect VFI 3 > VFI 2 > VFI 1. While 
Hunter’s judgments as how to assess budgetary control could be questioned, var
 
expenditure needs across jurisdictions, which may lead to the implementation of equalization schemes. For 
a more comprehensive discussion of fiscal imbalances, see Bird and Tarasov (2004).  
17 There are slightly different applications of Hunter’s original formulation. For instance, see Martinez-
Vazquez and Boex (2001) and Bird and Tarasov (2004).  
18 As specified here, VFI 1 supposes that local governments have no budgetary control over conditional 
transfers, but are able to exert budgetary control over all remaining local fiscal resources; VFI 2 supposes 
that local governments have no budgetary control over either conditional or unconditional transfers, while 
VFI 3 presumes local governments essentially only have control over own locally generated revenue 
sources. 
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 Besides the shares of different levels of government in total public revenues and 
expenditures, empirical studies also measure the number and average size of jurisdictions 
at each level. All other things being equal, a larger number of smaller local governments 
would imply higher fiscal decentralization. This can have several interpretations: degrees 
of freedom for tailoring public goods to heterogeneous preferences; intensity of 
competition among jurisdictions; concentration of bargaining power, and so on.  But, the 
issue of the number of local government units is also connected to economies of scale, 
inter-jurisdictional disparities and volatility of local revenues. This aspect of an 
intergovernmental finance system has been measured as the absolute number of local 
jurisdictions, which can be normalized by population or land area.19 Thus, while the share 
of state governments in India’s total revenue and expenditures is significant, the number 
of states relative to the national population is not large, suggesting a high degree of 
centralization. 
 
Issues in Measuring Fiscal Decentralization 
 
As we remarked above, a single decentralization ratio cannot capture the entirety 
of powers assigned to the subnational level. This is because different aspects of 
government activities (regulation, financing, administration, and delivery) cannot be 
captured with the same indicator. In fact, regulation, while being the most common form 
of government intervention, cannot be measured by any indicators constructed from fiscal 
data.20 Setting aside the regulation aspect, we can use fiscal data to separately 
                                                 
19 See, for example, Oates (1985), Nelson (1986) and Eberts and Gronberg (1990). 
20 Among other things, delineation of the power of regulation also includes what is referred to by some 
scholars as administrative decentralization (Litvack and Seddon 1999). 
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approximate other aspects of fiscal decentralization by properly modifying the 
decentralization ratio technique. 
 A number of decentralization practitioners (for example Prud’homme 1995 and 
Tanzi 1996) have pointed out several other institutional factors that may affect the 
outcome of fiscal decentralization: 
The accountability of subnational governments to constituents: In many countries, 
local officials are not elected by popular vote, but are appointed. In this case, voters may 
not express their preferences through elections, and may not replace those who do not 
represent their views. The impact of this factor is often referred to as “political 
decentralization.” 
The possibility for people to choose where to reside: This enables people to “vote 
with their feet,” but requires developed housing and labor markets. 
Social capital: If local social customs entrench economic backwardness of some 
groups (e.g., women), decentralization might make things worse. Also, transitional 
countries have extremely atomized societies after decades of citizens’ passivity prevailing 
under the communist regime.  It will take some time and experience of civic participation 
for local residents to build social capital, including positive beliefs about their neighbors 
and local community, and willingness to cooperate in order to improve the community.  
A certain degree of independence of the subnational governments from the 
national government: Local governments should have some freedom to choose how they 
will allocate their revenue resources among competing expenditure demands. This is not 
always the case. Compensation rates for public employees are often fixed and beyond the 
control of local governments. In some countries, local governments must seek approval 
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of their budgets from higher level governments. All this is related to the central 
government’s regulatory powers over local affairs (or “administrative centralization” as 
often referred to in policy literature).  
The availability of qualified and integral staff at the local level: It is argued that 
skilled fiscal managers are too scarce in developing countries to be shared between the 
central and local governments. 
A minimum of fiscal management and budgeting institutions: Clear rules of 
financial accounting and budgeting at all levels of government ensure some transparency 
of public finances and thus accountability to constituents. 
The preceding discussion has several practical implications for assessing the 
impact of decentralization. First, fiscal decentralization unfolds along several dimensions 
at different paces and thus the progress should be measured separately for each of them. 
Second, when trying to explain the variation in the outcome of interest (e.g., poverty), we 
need to include the measures of all aspects of decentralization as explanatory variables. 
Finally, in addition to the attributes for regulation, financing, and administration of public 
goods, we also need to control for other institutional arrangements such as: vertical 
structure of subnational jurisdictions, political arrangements including legal status of 
local authorities, clarity in the delineation of powers among levels of government, or 
subnational borrowing powers and financial infrastructure.  
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Reducing Poverty under Fiscal Decentralization 
 
 Although several past studies have attempted to link poverty and decentralization, 
most of these studies have relied on individual country cases and anecdotal evidence. In 
addition, these studies often lack clear definitions for the variables being used on the 
poverty and decentralization sides. In the previous sections of this study we have 
attempted to provide clear definitions for the various dimensions of poverty and 
decentralization. In this section we will attempt to develop a conceptual framework to 
guide our thinking on how these two variables interact. 
 
Conceptual Linkages: The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on Poverty Reduction  
 Because poverty is best defined as deprivation of various aspects of well-being, it 
is logical to seek conceptual linkages via the direct and indirect impacts that 
decentralization may have on these well-being components: private income, basic needs, 
and security. In the subsequent chapters, detailed discussion of separate elements of 
decentralization suggests that satisfaction of the basic needs of the population is the area 
of poverty reduction where most benefits of decentralization are likely to occur. 
However, in an indirect way, decentralization also affects generation and redistribution of 
income and vulnerability of the poor to economic downturns. 
 There are several potentials ways in which decentralization may affect basic 
needs of the population through the provision of services in areas such as primary 
education, basic health and social services. Essentially, these impacts can take place at 
the various stages of government action aimed toward satisfaction of these basic needs. 
Clearly, decentralization policies can affect the level of public resources that are allocated 
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to these expenditure areas; it can affect the way these expenditures translate into 
government programs and the manner in which these programs are implemented; finally 
decentralization can also affect whether these program actually reach the targeted 
population groups. 
 More generally, decentralization can bring an improvement at each of these stages 
by promoting good governance. Good governance has been found to improve a variety of 
outcomes, such as school achievement, quality of life indicators, or even GDP growth 
(Kaufmann et al. 2000). Decentralization and good governance are in many ways 
symbiotic and reinforcing processes, especially when political decentralization (with 
local elections and participation) is present (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2005; Blair 
2000; and Manor 1999). To the extent that decentralization and better governance 
improve local services and outcomes that are related to the wellbeing of the poor, 
reductions in absolute poverty should follow. Relative poverty may also be reduced if the 
improvements in the quality of services are in those areas that are more than 
proportionally consumed by the poor.21  
 Decentralization can also improve the prioritization of budget allocations (leading 
to the more effective allocation of programs favoring the poor) through better access to 
information about needs and costs. Thus, it seems to be the case that the composition of 
budgets tends to be different in decentralized versus centralized systems, with 
decentralized systems spending relatively more on social services, which have the 
potential of benefiting the poor (Arze et al. 2005). 
                                                 
21 Note that even Pareto-improving growth can increase inequality and thus measures of relative poverty, 
despite the fact that income for the poor has increased (see Ravallion 2004). 
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 Other stages of the budgeting process may be positively impacted by 
decentralization. Decentralization may also make a difference in the implementation of 
budgeted priorities by ensuring that resources budgeted for the poor reach their intended 
destination. More effective implementation of the programs may be the result of local 
input and participation, improved quality of the information used for implementing 
programs, and by enhance accountability of local officials to their constituencies. Better 
accountability and improved flows of information may also create incentive for service 
providers (public entities or private contractors alike) to deliver services effectively and 
efficiently.  
 Enhanced efficiency in service delivery can directly improve access by the poor to 
basic services, such as education, health, water, sewage and electricity. For example, 
under the EDUCO program in El Salvador, empowering community associations to hire 
and fire teachers in community-managed schools resulted in increased net enrollments 
and significantly improved standardized test scores, while teacher absenteeism fell. These 
improvements in service delivery performance have been attributed to the fact that local 
communities have more information and a greater stake in monitoring service delivery. 
Similarly, parent-teacher associations, water user associations, community health groups, 
and so on can play an effective role in encouraging suppliers, tailoring services to needs 
identified by communities, and holding providers accountable for service delivery.22  
 However, as suggested by Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998), these benefits of 
decentralized service delivery can depend critically on the level of capture by local elites 
and on the level and nature of local inequality. If there is local capture and the interests of 
                                                 
22 The World Bank’s (2004) World Development Report provides many examples and substantial evidence 
on how these mechanisms actually work.  
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the local political elites are not aligned with those of the local poor, decentralization may 
work against the wellbeing of the poor.23 Similarly, in situations with pronounced 
inequality in local relations of power and authority, decentralization, and in particular the 
decentralization of poverty programs in such contexts can worsen local inequality and 
reproduce or entrench local power relations (Conning and Kevane 2002; and Galasso and 
Ravallion 2005).24  
Besides non-income basic needs, decentralization can also enhance economic 
opportunities for the poor. There are four ways in which decentralization may affect 
private income. First, decentralization may facilitate economic growth through its impact 
on macroeconomic stability (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2005; and Agenor 2004). 
Macroeconomic recessions decrease the probability of finding new employment and the 
level of earnings for those already employed. Second, decentralization can enhance 
economic growth through the level and quality of economic infrastructure (roads, ports, 
and so on) as we explained earlier. Third, decentralization can promote the inclusion of 
poor people in the growth process by removing constraints and empowering them to take 
control of their own development (through better education and health) and to take 
advantage of existing economic opportunities (Stern et al. 2005). Finally, private income 
can be affected through redistributive policies both via taxation and allocation of public 
resources. We further develop these themes in subsequent sections chapters of this study. 
                                                 
23 Inherited social institutions might conflict with the participation of excluded groups. The literature shows 
that pro-poor decentralization programmers in some countries (e.g. Malawi, Sri Lanka) have been 
compromised by the existence of traditional power structures and the presence of local patron-client 
relationships that have been perpetuated after the implementation of reform programs.  
24 Note that democratic governance does not guarantee by itself the implementation of pro-poor policies at 
the local level. This would require the majority of local population to favor pro-poor expenditures and to 
participate in the political process at least by voting. However, the poor are less educated and have a lower 
propensity to vote or to register to vote, and generally to participate in political process. 
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The third aspect of poverty that can potentially be affected by decentralization 
relates to vulnerability. Economic instability tends to affect the poor more directly 
because of their higher vulnerability to economic turmoil due to the lack financial 
cushions and personal assets, diminished access to safety nets, and so on (Skoufias 2003). 
Because poor households mostly rely on informal insurance arrangements through their 
extended family and community, they are insecure in the face of an economic crisis 
affecting the entire community. Moreover, the kind of coping strategies they have to rely 
on in those circumstances can entrench poverty and transmit it to other generations 
(selling productive assets, reducing healthcare and nutrition for their children, 
reallocating their time from schooling to earning income, etc). Depreciation of currency 
associated with an economic crisis can increase the relative price of staple foods, which 
usually account for a large share of poor household budget. Moreover, fiscal 
retrenchment pursued by the government during an economic crisis usually involves cuts 
in social programs, which are critically important for the poor. Also there are theoretical 
arguments and empirical support to the notion that inflation hurts the poor relatively more 
than the rich (Easterly and Fischer 2001).  
Also civil conflicts are associated with a rise in poverty due to population 
displacement and destruction of infrastructure. Potentially, decentralization can reduce 
vulnerability of the poor to such external shocks (Spoor 2004). Improved representation 
and organization of formerly excluded groups through decentralized governance can 
enable the poor to have better access to safety nets and social security schemes, reducing 
their vulnerability and insecurity (Jutting et al. 2004). Also, by establishing grounds for 
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political consensus in ethnically divided societies, decentralization can reduce instability, 
to which the poor are most vulnerable (Bird et al. forthcoming). 
 
The Risks of Fiscal Decentralization for Poverty Reduction 
Decentralization, as we have seen above can be quite instrumental in the fights 
against poverty. However, if decentralization is not done right, there is the risk that those 
potential benefits not only will not materialize but also that it will tend to aggravate the 
poverty problem. On the macroeconomic side, a “botched up” decentralization process 
can easily lead to economic macroeconomic instability, an inefficient allocation of 
resources, and slower economic growth. On the microeconomic service-delivery side, 
there are three specific ways in which decentralization can fail to translate into better 
services for poor people (see Keefer and Khemani 2003): 
First, governments may misallocate budgets by spending resources on the wrong 
groups of people. Second, even when resources are allocated correctly, they may not 
reach their intended destinations if organizational and incentive problems in public 
agencies lead to misappropriation or theft. Third, even when resources reach a school or 
health clinic, providers may have weak incentives, motivations, or capacities to deliver 
services effectively. 
 These risks become more eminent, of course, as the particular decentralization 
design deviates from the maxims of local discretion, voice, and accountability. On the 
other hand, the risks are minimized when certain institutional conditions, such as political 
freedoms, adequate human and physical capital bases, or free information flows are 
present. 
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 Many empirical studies, some of which are surveyed immediately below, show 
that practically all countries in which decentralization has had a positive impact on 
poverty can be categorized as “free,” following the Freedom House index.25 Also 
countries in which decentralization has had a positive impact on poverty have a literacy 
rate of over 70 percent, in sharp contrast with the bad performers, where the rate lies 
below 50 percent (Jutting et al. 2004).  
 To be effective, political accountability requires public access to information. 
Besley and Burgess (2001) find that in India, states that are more responsive to food 
shortages tend to also be those with higher levels of newspaper circulation, electoral 
turnout, and literacy. In contrast, these authors also find that richer states do not tend to 
be more responsive than poorer states. In Uganda, when evidence of leakage of public 
school resources emerged following the implementation of “expenditure tracking” 
exercises, the central government launched an information campaign. It began publishing 
monthly transfers to school districts in newspapers, broadcasting them on radio, and 
requiring primary schools to post the information. As a result the information on leakage 
became a powerful driver of public action, and the level of leakage fell significantly 
(Reinikka and Svensson 2004).  
 Other preconditions for a successful impact of decentralization on poverty are in 
the realm of fiscal institutions. For example, local governments might be unable to act on 
their superior knowledge of local needs and costs if they are bound by financial 
regulations imposed by the central government. Moreover, citizens may be more 
reluctant to engage in local budget issues if local governments are not delegated enough 
                                                 
25 An exception may be China, where decentralization may also have had a somewhat positive impact on 
poverty despite being “not free.” See Jutting et al. (2004). 
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fiscal autonomy. We provide further discussion of these risks and conditions necessary to 
mitigate them in subsequent sections. 
 
 Existing Literature on the Study of Decentralization and Poverty 
 
In this subsection we will first review the recent trends in poverty and 
decentralization in different regions of the world and whether these trends have been 
moving together or apart. Next, we review the literature, both theoretical and empirical to 
see what has been found in previous studies on the relationship between decentralization 
and poverty. 
 
Global Trends in Poverty and Decentralization  
Figure 2 illustrates current poverty trends around the world. An important 
observation is that, on average, poverty, as measured by the headcount ratio has 
decreased dramatically over the last two decades.26 Most of this reduction occurred in the 
early eighties with some further improvement in the mid-nineties. The most remarkable 
change was experienced by East Asian countries, which moved from the largest poverty 
headcount (63 percent) in 1981 to one of the smallest in 2001 (20 percent). South Asian 
countries also show a similar reduction in poverty headcount (from 58 percent in 1981 to 
31 percent in 2001). At the same time the poverty headcount in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Latin America mostly remained flat at 50 percent and 40 percent, respectively. On the 
other hand, Eastern European and Central Asian countries experienced a dramatic 
                                                 
26 Recall that the headcount ratio is defined as the share of the population with below $1 per day. 
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increase in poverty headcount to 22 percent in 1993 from around 7 percent in the 
previous decade.  
 
Figure 2: Trend in Poverty in the World 
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As the year 1990 constitutes the beginning of intensive poverty reduction policy 
reforms
Sahara African countries have experienced a slight increase in the level of poverty.  In 
Eastern Europe and pse of the 
communist regime was followed by further deterioration until 1999 when the trend 
appears to have turned around. 
, it has been identified as the benchmark-year for the monitoring of the 
millennium development goals. Overall, since 1990 poverty reduction has been less 
dramatic than in the 1980s. Again, we observe significant improvements in East and 
South Asia. A slight improvement is also registered in Latin America. However, Sub-
Central Asia the poverty hike associated with colla
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Using a non-income poverty approach as measure by Human Development Index 
(HDI), the story is slightly different.  While, it is recognized that there is a link between 
income and other potential measures of the quality of life, it is also easy to show that 
across countries or regions at a single time, that link is far from linear and universal.  
 
 
Figure 3: Expenditure Decentralization Ratio 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations using data from International Monetary Fund (2005). 
 
The Indian state of Kerala is perhaps the best-known example.  This state has an 
income per capita below $300 yet a life expectancy of 72, an infant mortality rate of 13 
per 1,000 and only a 9 percent illiteracy rate—far better than a number of other wealthier 
states in India and countries around the world. Preston (1975), estimated that between the 
1930s and the 1960s income could only account for around 10–25 percent of the 
improvement in life expectancy in the world as a whole. Similar to poverty, 
decentralization is also a world phenomenon. A recent World Bank study notes that out 
of 75 developing and transitional countries with populations greater than 5 million, all but 
12 claim to be embarked on some form of transfer of political power to local units of 
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tude, a recent increase in integral decentralization 
atios is evident for all geographic regions. Again we see that Latin American and 
                                                
ment (Dillinger 1994).These decentralization processes have been motivated
diverse reasons spanning from democratization to economic reforms to preventing 
growing ethnic conflicts (Zeikate 2004).  
As illustrated in Figure 3, since 1990 the expenditure decentralization ratio 
increased throughout the world.27 However, this follows a period of centralization in the
eighties. Despite the recent trend, the geographical differences in the role of local 
government remain virtually unchanged. Thus, the decentralization ratios in developing 
and transitional countries throughout the world are below the level observed in OECD
countries. The only exception is India, where states—which are larger than most 
countries—have significant expenditure responsibilities with little decentralization below 
the state level.  Recently the decentralization of
Caribbean countries approached the OECD level. At the same time, the share of 
government expenditures accounted for by local governments in the Middle East and East
Asia is still only one third of the OECD level. 
 According to the “integral decentralization ratio” depicted in Figure 4, the role of 
subnational governments is smaller than what would be suggested by the share of public 
expenditures they formally undertake (again with the exception of India’s states).28
Thus, the process of decentralization is not that pronounced outside the expenditure sid
of the budget. Despite its small magni
r
 
27 The expenditure decentralization ratio is defined as public expenditures at the subnational level divided 
by total government expenditures.  
28 The integral indicator of the extent of decentralization is defined as a ratio of completely decentralized 
expenditures to completely centralized expenditures. 
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Caribbean countries have achieved most progress and approached the OECD level of 
decentr
Figure 4: Integral Decentralization Ratio 
alization by the late nineties.  
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ithout any pretension at this stage of implying statistical causation, it is quite 
interesting to investigate the simple corr een fiscal decentralization (measured 
a
reduction outcomes (as captured by HDI) measured in 1975-2000 country average figures 
(see Figure 5). In this sample of countries, a number of developing countries, such as 
Argentina, Colombia, Brazil and South Africa appear to present the best scenarios for a 
positive association between the process of fiscal decentralization and poverty reduction 
outcomes. This is in contrast to what took place in a number of other developing 
countries, such as Kenya, Gambia, Malawi and Ethiopia, where high poverty is 
associated with little decentralization.  
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Figure 5: 
Graphical illustration of the link between Decentralization and Poverty, 1975-2000 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations using data from UNDP (2004), and International Monetary Fund (2005). 
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poverty reduction outcomes, the transmission mechanism and the exact magnitude can 
                                                
The negative relationship between decentralization and poverty is captured by t
fitted line on the left panel of Figure 5, having a downward slope for low to m
levels of decentralization. The reverse of the relationship at the high level of 
decentralization is due to a special case of India, where high degree of decentralization 
was not associated with substantial improvement in human development over the sam
period. However, as discussed below, Indian states have undergone diverse form of 
decentralization method and the evidence within states is mixed.29 Thus, although it 
appears that there may be a positive relationship between the level of decentralization an
 
29 A basic failure of India decentralization has been that most decentralization has taken place at the 
federal-state level with little decentralization taking place at the state-local level, at the same time many 
states in India are larger than most countries in the world (Bahl et al. 2005). 
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only be determined by a sound empirical analysis. The next subsections focus on these 
particular issues. 
 
Theoretical Literature on the Study of Decentralization and Poverty 
There are a number of theoretical models that have indirectly attempted to study 
the interaction between decentralization and poverty. In fact, it is fair to say that the 
theoretical literature on the direct link between decentralization and poverty reduction is 
still at its infancy. The majority of these researches approach the issue on the political or 
institutional angle, without any particular attention to the fiscal aspect of decentralization.   
Moreover, the focus of these papers is often on some country specific anti-poor 
programs. Although, these studies have provided valuable insights on the hypothesized 
relationship between decentralization and anti-poor programs, more researches need to be 
done to examine the direct interaction between the fiscal dimension of decentralization 
and indicator of poverty at the subnational level. Among the few studies, we note the 
very insightful piece by Bardhan and Mookerjee (2005), who proposed a theoretical 
model to examine the consequence of elite capture from a decentralized versus a 
centralized administration of potential anti-poor programs. They found that centralized 
delivery system is more prone to captured due to lack of monitoring of bureaucratic 
performance. They also note that decentralizing the delivery system promotes cost-
effectiveness and improves intraregional targeting at low program scales. In the same 
line, Galasso and Ravallion (2000) proposed a model of decentralized targeting of an 
anti-poverty program with application to the Bangladesh’s Food-for-Education Program. 
The conclusion of their findings is that within village targeting improved with program 
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size, and also with lower land inequality, less remoteness, fewer shocks, and less private 
redistribution.  
Another strand of the theoretical literature has been geared toward the role of 
local government in the provision of local public goods, with this time minor emphasize 
on the pro-poor nature of the public goods. For instance, Besley and Coate (2003) and 
Faguet (2002) developed a model of responsiveness of local government to the provision 
of public goods. One the one hand, Besley and Coate (2003) found that decentralization 
enhances welfare in the absence of spillover effect, while on the other hand, Faguet 
(2002) showed that the tradeoff between central and local government provision depends 
on the relative advantage over information and technical capacity of each level of 
government.  
The theoretical model proposed in this dissertation seek to contribute to the 
existing literature by bringing together these two strands of literature in order to develop 
a simple theoretical framework that can explain the direct interaction between 
decentralization and the delivery of pro-poor social services at the local government 
level.  
 
Cross-country Empirical Studies on the Study of Decentralization and Poverty 
Only quite recently, a number of cross-disciplinary studies that span economics, 
political science, public administration and sociology have attempted to evaluate the 
impact of decentralization policy on poverty reduction outcomes. A main difficulty all 
these studies have faced is that both decentralization and poverty are complex and multi-
faceted; this has required the consideration of a variety of explanatory variables and 
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measurements of dependent variables in order to fully assess the potential linkages 
between these two processes.  
 Several studies have attempted to examine poverty reduction and decentralization 
through the efficient provision of basic needs programs, accountability and 
responsiveness of lower level of government. However, most of these works are 
anecdotal or descriptive, while the findings are not very precise and diverse. For example, 
Rao (2002) examines a set of conditions for general and specific purpose transfer to 
effectively influence poverty outcomes. Crook and Manor (1998) and Crook and 
Sverrison (2001) use case studies for some selected developing countries to investigate 
the impact of political and administrative decentralization on poverty reduction 
outcomes.30  
Other recent studies have used a more systematic approach to estimate the 
potential effect of decentralization on poverty reduction outcomes. The few studies that 
have followed this approach show somewhat mixed results. For convenience we have 
grouped these studies in two categories: those that have found a “positive impact” and 
those that have found a “negative impact” of decentralization policies on poverty 
reduction outcomes. 
 
 The positive impact 
 Von Braun and Grote (2000) performed a cross-country analysis with a sample of 
50 countries and concluded that decentralization (defined as a combination of political, 
                                                 
30 In their study, decentralization is taken to mean a transfer of power away from a central authority to a 
lower level in a territorial authority. It can take the form of deconcentration and devolution, defined earlier.  
Poverty reduction outcome, on the other hand, defined in terms of participation as citizens’ active 
engagement with public institutions also defined over three modes: voting, election campaigning and 
individual or group ability to pressure government authority.   
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administrative and fiscal decentralization), serves the need of the poor, as captured by the 
composite index of human development (HDI). These authors emphasize the need to 
consider simultaneously political, administrative and fiscal aspect of decentralization 
process in order to truly assess the impact on the poor. Along this line, Lindaman and 
Thurmaier (2002) also use a cross-section analysis to examine the impact of 
decentralization on HDI and find evidence of positive and significant relationship 
between different measures of fiscal decentralization and basic needs in education and 
health.  Galasso and Ravallion (2005) use the Bangladesh’s Food-for-Education program 
dataset and find that pro-poor program benefits increased with decentralization. In a 
similar study, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2004) find that decentralized management 
advanced poverty alleviation goals in West Bengal, India.  
 
The negative impact 
Several other studies have concluded that decentralization can negatively impact 
poverty and pro-poor service delivery. Using cross-section and time series data for the 
period 1975–2000, on a large number of countries, Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2003) 
find that political decentralization, captured by whether or not state executive officials are 
elected, worsen public goods provision (immunization and under-five mortality rate) in the 
long run in developing countries. These authors also find that the presence of municipal 
elections significantly hurts the results of decentralization for the long run provision of some 
public goods. West and Wong (1995) find that in rural China, decentralization resulted in 
lower level of public services in poorer regions and, Jalan and Ravallion (1999) find that 
decentralization generated substantial inequality in public spending in poor areas in 
Argentina. Similarly, Azfar and Livingston (2002) find no evidence of improved 
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efficiency and equity of local public service provision from decentralization in Uganda. 
Khaleghian (2003) uses a broader dataset for 140 countries and finds mixed result. He 
concludes that decentralization appears to improve the coverage of immunization in low-
income countries but that the opposite holds for middle-income countries.   
Some of the differences in results and conclusions can be explained by the different 
empirical models used as well the cross-country data and the time periods studied. In 
addition, we would not expect that the results for particular countries and times period 
need to hold true for other countries and time periods where decentralization may have 
taken very different shape. Undoubtedly this form of empirical analysis is still in its 
infancy and significant progress needs to be made with data and the measurement of 
decentralization in order to clearly establish the causal link, if any, between 
decentralization and poverty outcomes.
 
   
CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter develops a theoretical framework for assessing poverty reduction 
outcome outcomes in a decentralized provision of pro-poor public good and services, 
accounting for different institutional settings. Our model built on Kanbur and Feroni 
(1991), Faguet (2004) and Besley and Coate (2003), but explicitly introduces the poverty 
dimension. Kanbur and Feroni (1991) uses a basic need approach to analyze poverty-
conscious restructuring of public expenditure, but not in the context of fiscal 
decentralization. On the other hand, Faguet (2004) and Besley and Coate (2003), analyze 
decentralization provision of public goods, without introducing poverty reduction 
aspects. The model below provides a generic theoretical framework to understand the 
interaction between decentralization and poverty reduction outcomes. In what follows, 
we present the basic framework of the model and proceed to the analysis of the potential 
effect of decentralization policy on the provision of the optimal mix of pro-poor service 
and productive investment.  
 
The Basic Framework 
 
Consider two types of economies, k = (c, d), a centralized country (c) and a 
decentralized economy (d). Type (d) economy is composed of (J) local jurisdictions or 
regions of equal size, denoted by j = (1, 2,…, J) and are each administered by a local 
government (LG). For analytical simplicity, we assume that there is odd number of
 48
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jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction has (mj) members, consisting of poor and non-poor 
households, uniformly distributed. There is no mobility in the sense that individuals are 
assumed to have already been stratified and sorted according to their preference and/or 
their social affinity and norms.31 
In type (c) economy, there is only one government, the central government (CG), 
which provides pro-poor goods and services financed by general taxation. Centralized 
decision making generates outcome, which does not necessarily reflect local population’s 
needs because of potential lack of information on local need preference by central 
officials. However, central government is assumed to have a cost advantage in the 
production of the public good. This benefit is drawn from its ability to access superior 
technology and skilled labors, in addition to its ability to generate savings from providing 
goods and services on a large scale in all jurisdictions (economies of scale).32  
 
The Household Standard of Living 
Let us now focus on a typical household or individual in a given jurisdiction. 
Following Kanbur and Ferroni (1991), we assume that each household is characterized by 
a standard of living (W), continuous and twice differentiable (C2), defined over two 
attributes—a basic need achievement (B) and a valuation of non-basic needs (I):33 
                                                 
31 This assumption is more relevant in the context of developing countries where mobility is associated with 
high cost, both monetary and cultural attachment. This cultural adjustment cost can be justified by the high 
degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalization observed in most developing countries. In the context of 
developed economies, the literature pioneered by Tiebout (1956) provides the theoretical foundation of this 
assumption. Although criticized on several grounds, the Tiebout hypothesis has found empirical support 
(Hamilton 1975; Borjas 1995). 
32 Risk pooling, economies of scale, for example in the production of electrical and water centrals (Faguet 
2003). 
33 The standard of living is defined by a given consumption that a household derive from the basic needs 
achievement and the valuation of his or her consumption of non-basic needs. An individual standard of 
living also determines his status on the continuum of poverty schedule.  
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( )IBWW ,= ;         
  
   (3.1) 
Where ( ) ( )0≤000 >≤> IBBB WandWandWandW  
;  > ggg BandB
;  
II .  
The basic needs (B) is a set of physical and physiological requirements that an 
individual is required to fulfill in order to have a minimum acceptable standard of living. 
It usually includes basic goods and services such as food, water, sanitation shelter, basic 
education, health services and public transportation.34 In other words the basic needs 
approach mainly favor indicators of achievement and access over indicator of income or 
expenses.35 Thus, basic needs (B) are function of pro-poor goods and services (g): 
( )gBB =  Where 0≤      (3.2) 0
On the other hand, the valuation of non-basic needs is essentially the consumption 
of all other productive investment or private goods. Thus, non basic needs (I) is a 
function of all other goods (x).  
(=  Where 0)xII 0 ≤> xxx IandI
j
                                                
    (3.3) 
Moreover, each jurisdiction (j) is characterized by a need parameter (θ )>0, which 
provides information about the optimal mix of pro-poor public good (g*) and productive 
investment (x*) needed to lift individuals or household out of poverty.36 Because of its 
proximity advantage, local governments are expected to have better information about 
this need parameter than a remote central government. In other words, compare to local 
 
 
34 It can therefore be noticed that basic needs go beyond the notion of minimal needs which in only comprise adequate 
nutrition, shelter and clothing (Asselin and Dauphin 2001). 
35 For instance, indicator such as infant mortality rate, life expectancy, and illiteracy will be preferred to indicator of 
social expenditure which says little about the extent of accomplishment in improving the well-being in literacy and 
health deemed important in reducing poverty. 
36 The question of what and who is to determine basic needs is subject to debate in the literature. Basic needs can be 
interpreted objectively in terms of physiological and physical requirements; but it may be defined subjectively as the 
satisfaction of household’s wants. To determine the basic needs, the former rely on physiologists, doctors and other 
specialists while the latter refer to individuals themselves who in this case are assumed to have the knowledge and will 
to choose what is deemed appropriate, in the society’s perspective, to improve their standard of living.   
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governments, central government perceived local needs with a substantial absolute 
margin of error (ε ). The central government is assumed to either overshoot or 
underestimate the true need-parameter (θ). Thus, ( ∞<<∞− ε ) measure the mismatch 
value in the perception of local needs. We normalize this parameter to ( 11 <<− ε ). 
However, given that our ultimate interest is on the absolute mismatch, we further re
the mismatch parameter to 1
strict 
   0( << ε ).   Thus, as ( 0→ε ), central officials 
underestimate the need parameter of local population, wheras when ( 1→ε ), they 
overest
o (3.3) and the above information we obtain the true 
v
imate.  
Combining equations (3.1) t
aluation of the standard of living: 
( ) ( )[ ]xIgBWW ,θ= ;       
Where W (.
  (3.4) 
) is continuous and twice differentiable (C2) in its 
arguments: ( ) ( )0000 ≤>≤> IIIBBB WandWandWandW . 
That is, an increase in basic needs (B) and productive investment (I) increases the 
standard of living, but at a decreasing rate.  
The Bu
nts, 
tment 
 
dget Constraint 
The benevolent government chooses the level of (g) and (x) to be provided and 
spends on behalf of individuals. In return, individuals are supposed to select by majority 
voting, government officials who better satisfy their wants and needs.  The governme
either central or local, are assumed to have a balanced budget such that revenues (T) 
equal expenditure (E): T = E; where expenditure (E), in per capita term, is fixed and has 
to be allocated between pro-poor public goods and services (g) and productive inves
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(x). In addition, the price of the pro-poor public good (g) in terms of the productive 
investment (x) is given by (τ >0). That is, to produce one unit of the pro-poor public 
good, it requires (τ) units of productive investment. Thus, the budget constraint is given 
by: 
kkk gx τ+         
Under type (c) economy, centralized regime, there is one representative 
benevolent government which decides on the level of ( cg ) and ( cx ). In addition, the 
central government is assumed to have advantage over the production of both pro-poor 
public goods and productive investment. As discussed earlier, this benefit is derived from
its ability to access superior technology and skilled labors in addition to its economies of 
scale advantage. Thus, central government is assumed to provide goods and services of 
better quality and relatively cheaper than decentralized economy, type (d). Hence, the 
normalized parameter (0<
E = (3.5) 
 
σ < 1) captures the central government technological 
ation, we get the following generic 
government’s objective function: 
advantage or superior technical capacity.  
 Putting together the above inform
[ ]
;
.
)(),(
⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ += gx τ ⎩ = economdcentralizec
=
kkk
kkkk
Ets
xIgBWWMax θ ==
y
economyzeddecentralid
kwhere    (3.6)  
 
en as: 
⎨⎧
Thus, the problem solved by the policy maker can be rewritt
( ) ( )[ ] { }⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ =−= cdkgEIgBWMaxg kkkkkgk k ,,,arg τθ      (3.6)’ 
Assuming interior solution, the first order condition yields: 
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∂= ,,     
Equation (3.7) shows the tradeoff between the provision of basic needs (B) and 
re 6 below, any linear combination of (B) 
 focusing either 
productive investment (I). As illustrated in Figu
and (I), (point K); will be “living standard superior”, as opposed to solely
on Basicneeds, (point L), or on productive investment (Point N). 
 
Figure 6: Tradeoff between Basic needs (B) and Productive investment (I) 
 
 
Solving for  yields: kg
       [ ] ;)(),(1
B
I
k
kkk
W
WIgBwheregBg ⋅⋅=′′= − τ              (3.8) xkθ
N
K
L
W
I
B 
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k
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economydcentralizeck
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g
k BgBwith ==)( ⎨and  
Equation (3.8) suggests that the composite pro-
investment 
  
poor local public good is a function of the 
tradeoff between the marginal benefit derived from basic needs and productive 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
B
I
W
W as well as the tradeoff between central government’s technological 
advantage ( k ) and local government proximity advantage( k 37   
 
                    (3.9) 
τ θ ).
To assess the poverty reduction outcome, we consider a poverty line (z) that 
delineates the poor from the non-poor households.38 Given the poverty line (z) and the 
standard of living (W) defined earlier, consider now a poverty measure characterized by:
( )WzP ,Φ=   Such that:    
( ) }{
⎩⎨
=Φ
otherwise
h
1
.        
Where; Ф(.): Index function that aggregates the multidimensional aspects of 
function assumes a positive value when the individual is poor, but is invariant when the 
⎧ ∈∀≥ mhzWif ,...2,1,0
poverty and satisfies some desirable axiomatic properties discussed in Appendix B. This 
individual is above the poverty line (z). 
                                                 
37 Note that by duality approach, ) can be determined using the budget constraint.   
 
38 The poverty line (z) is usually calculated based on two methods, the cost of basic needs methods (CBN) 
and the food Energy requirements method (FER). As a result, there are two possible ways of defining 
poverty line. According to the CBN, poverty line is a minimum level of basic needs that a household is 
supposed to have in order to avoid being classified as poor. It usually uses a consumption bundle of $1 or 
$2 a day as a threshold.  On the hand, the FER defines poverty line in terms of minimum level of caloric 
requirement, usually 2100 calories of food a day as a benchmark. There is a growing literature on poverty 
line measurement. For more details see (Ravallion 1994; Ravallion 1996; Wodon 1997). 
 
( kx
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Clearly, the choice of Ф(.) will ultimately depend  the class of poverty indices 
(P)used and the underlying axiomatic property which need to be verified.
on
e is to compare poverty reduction outcomes in a decentralized regime 
versus a centralized economic setting. In doing so, we shall be able to derive some policy 
implications on the optimal economic and institutional setting in reducing poverty. We 
use the
ving of 
 effect on this outcome on 
poverty reduction: 
 That is, 
39 As stated 
earlier, our objectiv
 following two steps:  
First, we determine the impact of pro-poor good ( kg ) on the standard of li
household ( kW ), in type (k) economy. Then, we evaluate the
k
kW
k
k
k
k
gW
P
g
P
∂
∂⋅∂
∂=∂
∂
;   for { }cdk ,=      (3.10) 
The following section turns to the analysis of the potential effect of type (k) 
economy on the provision of the optimal mix of pro-poor service and productive 
investment, and their ultimate effect on poverty reduction.  
 
Comparison of Poverty Outcomes 
Re
 
Characterization of Type (k) Economy 
call from (3.8) that ( g ) is given by: 
      [ ]
k
;)(),(1
B
I
k
kkk WIgBwheregBg ⋅⋅=′′= − τ        
                                                
xk Wθ       
 
39 For a comprehensive literature review on different class of poverty measures and their underlying 
axiomatic properties, see Ravallion (1994) Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984),  Sen (1997) and Shorrock, 
(1997). 
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As discussed earlier, the central government incurs an informational cost from th
misperception in the local need parameter, captured by the a
gBgBwith ==)(   kand  
e 
bsolute mismatch parameter 
⎨
( 10 ≤≤ ε ). Again, we focus on the absolute mismatch because our interest is solely on 
ude of the d ection The ra ionale f this 
argume t t be 
achieve rn  
the magnit  the misperception, but not on ir . t  o
nt is tha  the optimal composite of pro-poor goods and services may no
d if central gove ment either underestimate or overestimate the local need
parameter. Moreover, the standardization will help in making comparison between the 
central government cost advantage ( 10 ≤< σ ) and the local government proximity 
10 ≤≤ ε ), central to our discussion. Onadvantage (  the other hand, local governments 
lack technology and skilled labor to efficiently produce pro-poor goods and services. 
hese cT osts differential can be summarize as follows:  
( )kk τθ ,  such that ⎪⎨⎧ =θ k⎪⎩ = τστ
θε
α
α
k ;          (3.11) 
here W is a parameter that measures the degree of decentralization.  )1,0(∈α
Specifically, as α  approaches the value zero (0), the higher the degree of 
decentralization in th y. Conversely, a highly centralized economy will be 
represented by the cas
e econom
e where α  get closer to the value one (1). Formally stated, 
⎧ →==⇒=
→ my
economyzeddecentralimoredkthuskk ;),(),()1,1(),(lim
1
τθτθσε
α
 
With the above specification, we can now explicitly characterize the pro-poor 
goods and services for type (k) economy. 
⎪⎨ →==⇒=
→
econodcentralizemoreckthuskk ;),(),(),(),(lim
0
τσθετθσεσε αα
αα
α
⎩
⎪
 
  57  
Comparing the Outcome of Pro-poor Public Good Provision by Type (k) Economy 
 
 
In type (d) economy, decentralized governments have the informational advantage 
over centralized government from being closer to their constituents, but do not possess 
the required “technical capacity” and technology to efficiently produce the pro-poor 
goods and services. This outcome is obtained by solving for type (d) economy in the 
optimization problem given in (3.6). Using the above characterization for decentralized 
economy (k = d); i.e. good knowledge of local needs ( 1=ε ) and lack of technical 
capacity ( 1=ς ), we get:   40
[ ] ;0)(),(1 >⋅⋅=′′= −
B
I
x
ddd
W
WIgBwithgBg θ
τ
   (3.12) 
learly, the amount of pro-poor public goods and services provided by 
decentralized local governments is an implicit function of the trade-off between 
informational advantage and lack of technical capacity, as well as the trade-off between 
pro-poor public good and productive investment.41  
 On the other hand, in type (c) economy, the centralized provision of pro-poor 
public goods and services is given by: 
C
[ ] ;0)(),(1 >⋅⋅=′′= −
B
I
x
ccc
W
WIgBwithgBg θε
τσ
 (3.13) 
 
As stated before, the provided level of pro-poor public good in centra
economy is subject to information bias such that local needs are perceived with a 
                                                
lized 
 
40 This assumption is an extreme case, since in the real world it is nearly impossible to know or fulfill with 
exactitude the needs of a group of individuals. Even in majority voting, just over half, but not all, of the 
wishes expressed by individuals are taken into account.  
41 Note that the amount of productive investment, given the fixed revenue, could be derived using the 
budget constraint in (3.6).  
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m ch factor ( 10 <<ismat ε ), thought the  central government has the ability to produce 
them relatively cheaper ( 10 << σ ). 
Hence, the provided level of pro-poor public good, in both type of economy, can 
be rewritten in compact form as follows: 
[ ]
B
I
x
dd W⎤⎡− τ1d
W
IwithgBwheregBg ⋅=>⋅⎥⎦⎢⎣=′′= ηηθ ;0)(),(  (3.12)’ 
[ ]
B
x W
IwithgBwheregB ⋅=>⋅⎥⎦⎢⎣
=′′ ηηθε ;0)(),(     (3.13)’
  Next, we need to identify the type of government which is likely to provid
the public goods and services of relevance to the poor. To address his issue we 
equations (3.12)’ and (3.13)’: 
Iccc Wg
⎤⎡= − τσ1  
e best 
 t compare 
ε′
′
)(
)(
d
c
c
d
gB
gB
g
g
Using the ratio in (3.14) to compare these two outcomes yield:  
σ=⇒         (3.14) 
1>
<⇔>⇒> << ε
σεσcd gg                  (3 5) .1
One possible way to address this issue will be to derive the resulting dominant 
effect from comparing the ratio of the cost advantage factor to the misperception 
parameter. In other words, if central government cost advantage (σ ) is exactly 
counterbalanced by its mismatch of individual needs for public goods (ε ), then the effect 
will be neutralized [ ]. Thus, the source of provision of the pro-poor public 
route 2
cd gg =
service will not be relevant for citizens,  (Figure 7), and there would be no 
l government 
cost and technological advantage (
advantage to either centralization or decentralization. However, if centra
σ ) is outweighed by its inability to identify accurately 
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individual needs (ε ), then local constituents will be better-off by having the local public 
services provided by their respective governments [ cd gg > ], route 1 (Figure 7).   
Finally, if central government’s lack of information (ε ) is dominated by its 
ability to better access technology and skilled labor (σ ) to provide the PPG, then 
individual would substantially gain from the centralized provision of the service 
> ], route 3[ dc gg  (Figure 7). Analytically, this can be summarized by the following: 
 
Figure 7: Analytical illustration of Pro-poor basic needs provision  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This comparison results in the following proposition:  
Proposition: If the central government misperception of local need (ε  ) more than offset 
its organizational and technology advantage (σ ), then the decentralized provision of 
[ ]10,10 ≤≤<< εσ  
1=ε
σ    1<ε
σ  
dc gg <  dc gg =  dc gg >  
1>ε
σ  
Preferred Local Gov. 
provision of pro-
poor basic needs  
Indifference 
between central and 
local Gov. provision 
Preferred Central 
Gov.  provision of 
pro-poor basic needs  
Route 1 Route 2 Route 3 
Assumption 
Outcome 
Level of 
Provision 
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basic n be 
    dc
then
 
eeds is “living standard superior”; Otherwise, a centralized delivery will 
preferred. 
⎪⎩
⎪⎧
>
>> cd
ggOtherwise
ggif ;σε⇒ ⎨
( )σε , : ) is characterized by the pairTypically, a given level of ( kg
( ) gg k =σε , where  00 >< σε gandg ;    (3.16) ,  
Let us now consider an indirect standard of living achievement function, 
continuous and twice differentiable, (.k )ψ  associated with a given level of PPG, 
characterized by the argument ( )σε ,  and the degree of (de)centralization ( )α  .42 In othe
words, (.)k
r 
ψ  is a function of the pair ( )σε , as well as ( )α :  
[ ]ασεψψ );,(gk = ; Where 00 <′′>′ ψψ and ; and 00 >< σε gandg  
ψασεψ =];,[ ;        k  (3.17) 
c
43 o  
                                                
Using the indirect standard of living achievement function, it can easily be shown 
graphically that an optimal level of PPG ( *g ) exist and is associated with an 
intermediary type of economy. This optimal economic setting is neither highly 
centralized, nor fully decentralized. That is, the economi  structure that will produce a 
better mix of pro-poor public goods and service is likely to be between these two 
economic environment.  This optimal economy could be, as it is usually adv cated in
 
42 We normalize the argument of the standard of living to only pro-poor public good (PPG) to simplify and 
make the model more tractable. Thus, we implicitly postulate that the productive investment (x) is also a 
function of the pair ( )σε ,  and is inversely related to PPG (g). 
43 The magnitude of the optimal level of decentralization is not determined here, but relegate to the 
empirical section in chapter 4 and chapter 5.   
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developing countries, a system of d ralization with good coordination by central 
government officials.  
For illust tion purpose, let’s consider the case where individuals ar ndifferent 
between central and local government provision, as the resulting outcome from cost 
advantage is identical to the outcome from information advantage, ( gg = ), 
ecent
ra e i
dc Route 2 
(Figure 7). As discussed earlier, decentralized provision ( )dg  is tailored on household 
needs, where the perception parameter closer to unity, ( 1→ε ); but at a relatively highe
cost with lower discount price or higher value of the cost differential parameter ( 1→
r 
σ ), 
point ( dg ), Figure 8. In contrast, central government produces ( cg ) cheaper becau
its cost advantage, higher price discount ( 0→
se of 
σ ), though the provision is not well 
targeted, lower perception of people wants and need ( 1→ε ), point ( cg ), Figure 8. 
an optimal economic state ( *g ) could be found, using a c
 Thus, 
ination of states 
tting, lo rnments’ perception 
advantage; that is lower misperception (
onvex comb
( dg ) and ( cg ). At this new state of economic se cal gove
0→ε ), will b bined with central 
government organization and know-how or high discount price (
e com
0→ς ) in the delivery 
of pro-poor goods and services, point ( ), Figure 8. This particular form of 
decentralization is the most advocated by practitioners and development institutions, 
which recommend stressing on local capacity building and better central coordination in 
the implementation of decentralization policies. An example of such an economic system 
will be a decentralized provision of PPG with trained local personnel, who deliver goods 
and services according to the national strategy of poverty reduction.  
 
*g
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Figure 8: Optimal provision of PPG 
 
 
Summary of the Theoretical Analysis 
  
Overall, this chapter has developed a theoretical model to explain the interaction 
between decentralization and poverty reduction outcomes. We show that the marginal 
effect of fiscal decentralization on pro-poor sectors depends largely on the outcome of the 
trade-off between potential benefits derived from better matching of local preference due 
to local proximity, and the lack of technical capacity at the local level. In particular, we 
proved that if central government cost and technological advantage are outweighed by its 
inability to identify accurately individual needs, then local constituents will be better-off 
by having the local public services provided by their respective governments.   
This finding provides, in a way, a theoretical explanation of the different 
outcomes observed in fiscal decentralization programs around the world. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to develop an empirical framework to examining 
the impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty reduction outcomes.  First, we analyze 
the direct effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty using both income-based and non-
income-based poverty measures. Then, we explore possible channels, through pro-poor 
services such as basic education, basic health care and agriculture extension, over which 
fiscal decentralization may affect poverty reduction outcomes. In addition, given that 
Africa is far behind in attaining its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) target, we 
also investigate whether the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty are greater in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) relative to other regions.   
This chapter begins with the description of the empirical methodology. First, we 
use the standard panel data, fixed effect–random effect, and then employ the Instrumental 
Variable (IV) estimator, related to the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) 
framework, to deal with potential endogeneity problem associated with our regressors 
and control for unknown form of heteroskedasticity in the errors. 
 In the second section, we discuss the rationale for the inclusion of the explanatory 
variables used in our estimation and provide the source of the data. In the third section, 
we develop the empirical model and specify the estimation equations used to test our set 
of hypothesis. The last section presents our estimation models used to evaluate the impact 
of fiscal decentralization on respective poverty reduction outcomes.
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Empirical Methodology 
 
 
To examine the influence of decentralization on poverty reduction outcomes, we 
adopt the panel data framework and use several estimation procedures in an attempt to 
deal with potential econometric issues, given the multidimensionality of both poverty and 
decentralization variables. Indeed, panel data analysis allows us to control for unobserved 
countries’ heterogeneity in our sample. Moreover, panel data analysis enables us to 
decompose components of variance and to study the dynamics of change contained in 
both the endogenous and exogenous variables from our sample. Furthermore, the 
combination of time series with cross-sections enhances the quality and quantity of our 
dataset in ways that would be impossible using only one of these two dimensions. Indeed, 
we believe that panel data analysis is appropriate given the complexity of the process that 
may arise over time and across countries when studying multidimensional phenomena 
such as poverty and decentralization.  
 The general formulation of panel data model used throughout this study is as 
follows:  
 ;,...,1,...,1; TtNivxy itiitit ==++′= ηβ       (4.1) 
Where is the dependant variable, is the vector of explanatory variables, ity itx β  is the 
vector parameters to be estimated. The error term is decomposed into iη , countries’ 
heterogeneity or countries’ fixed effect, and   is the random disturbance.itv
44 For standard 
                                                 
44 For simplicity and for exposition purpose, we consider the one-way error component model: 
itiit vu +=η . This analysis could easily by extended to a two-way error component model given by 
ittiit vu ++= λη ; where tλ is the time specific effect. 
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form of statistical inference, as well as the efficiency properties of our estimates, we 
make use of the exogeneity assumption, stated in terms of the idiosyncratic error as:  
0),...,,( ,21 =iiTiiitvE ηxxx ,   t = 1, 2, …, T 
N is the number of cross-sectional units (countries) and T is the number of time periods 
(years). 
 
Random Effects and Fixed Effects Estimators 
 We note that running the standard Ordinary Least Square (OLS) on the pooled 
data, using the above set of assumptions, will generate the following two undesirable 
outcomes: 
 First, the simple OLS estimator will be unbiased but inefficient in the presence of 
unobserved countries fixed effects, assuming that 0)( =iti xE η . Second, the standard 
OLS estimator will be all together biased and inconsistent if the unobserved country 
specific effects are correlated with the explanatory variables; that is 0)( ≠iti xE η .   
Panel data framework provides a solution for these two set of issues. The first problem 
can be resolved by using the random effect model, while the second problem can be 
addressed by adopting the fixed effect model.  
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The random effect model (RE) assumes that both the country specific effect iη  
and the explanatory variables are uncorrelated, itx 0)( =iti xE η . As a result, the standard 
OLS estimator on the pooled dataset is unbiased, but inefficient. The source of the 
inefficiency comes from the fact that the standard errors ignore the resulting correlation 
over time of the composite error term ( itiit vu +=η ) within countries. Hence, the 
estimated standard errors are inaccurate for statistical inference. To address this 
shortcoming, the random effects procedure uses the following within individual variance-
covariance matrix that account for the particular error structure at hand: 
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Where  )...( 21, iTiii uuu=u
This within variance – covariance is applied in a general Feasible Generalized 
Least Square (FGLS) framework to generate the random effect estimator as follows: 
                      (4.2) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ Ω⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ Ω= ∑∑
=
−
−
=
− N
i
ii
N
i
iiRE yXXX
1
1'
1
1
1' ˆˆβˆ
Where )...()...( 2121 iTiiiiTiii yyyyandxxxX ==  
Thus, the random effects estimator is efficient if the countries-specific effects are 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. However, if this is not the case, the random 
effects estimates are inconsistent, while the fixed effects estimator is consistent.  
The fixed effects (FE) model is less restrictive and allow the country specific 
effect to be correlated with the regressors, 0)( ≠iti xE η . Indeed, this assumption is more 
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likely and an interesting case to consider since in many empirical works, panel data 
analysis is primarily used under the presumption that the country specific effect iη  is 
correlated with the explanatory variables . Under the fixed effects assumption, the 
standard OLS and the random effects estimates are not valid as they are biased and 
inconsistent. A natural and straightforward solution would be to include an intercept for 
every country before estimating the model by OLS. This is done by expressing. 
itx
iiii vxy −−= βη ' , which is also equivalent to estimating the parameter estimates by 
OLS from the transformed within group model below, commonly referred to as the within 
transformation.   It is derived as follows: 
 )()( iitiitiit vvxxyy −+−=− β         (4.3) 
Where ∑
=
−=
T
t
iti yTy
1
1 , ∑
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t
iti xTx
1
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t
iti vTv
1
1  
Clearly, this transformation “wipes out” the unobserved country specific effect 
before applying OLS estimation to derive consistent estimates of the parameter vector,β . 
Note however that all inferences are based on the original model, equation (4.1). The 
model described in equation (4.3) is simply an estimating equation. 
However, fixed effects models are not without costs. First, they incur significant 
loss of degrees of freedom because they estimate (N-1) additional parameters 
corresponding to all but one country dummy. This situation may increase the likelihood 
of multicollinearity issue, which usually increases the standard errors and thereby weaken 
the model’s statistical power to test parameters. The second disadvantage of the fixed 
effects model is its inability to estimate the effect of time invariant explanatory variables 
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such as regional dummies and religious or ethnic fractionalization variables that may be 
used to capture within countries heterogeneity.  
In the next section, we present a formal test for choosing between the random and 
the fixed effects models since there have different implications for our parameter 
estimates.   
Choosing Between Fixed Effects and Random Effects 
Statistically, the fixed effects model seems to be the reasonable procedure to 
adopt since it always provides consistent estimators. However, as discussed above, they 
may not be the most efficient model to estimate. To check for the appropriate model 
between the random effects and the fixed effects model to adopt, we perform the 
Hausman test (Hausman 1978). The Hausman test compares the fixed effects to the 
random effects models by testing the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by 
the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent 
fixed effects estimator. In other words, the Hausman test verifies whether the unobserved 
countries effects are correlated with the regressors. Formally, the test is specified as 
follows: 
Ho: No correlation between individual effects and explanatory variables47  
Ha: Individual effects are correlated with the regressors. 
Under the null hypothesis (Ho) of orthogonality, both random effects and fixed 
effects estimators are consistent, but the random effects estimator is more efficient than 
                                                 
47 This is the case of  Hausman’s test for two ways model which compare two estimators, one which 
assumes assuming that both the iα and tλ  are fixed and another that assumes. 
0)/()/( == itiitt XEXE αλ . The test is based upon ). ( WGLS ββ ˆˆ −
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the fixed effects. On the other hand, under the alternative Hypothesis (Ha), fixed effects 
estimator is consistent and efficient, while random effects estimator is inconsistent.  
The Hausman statistic, H is described as: 
2
KREFEREFEREFE arVAarVAH χββββββ ~)ˆ()](ˆ)ˆ(ˆ[)ˆ( 1
))) −−′−= −     (4.4) 
Where,  is a vector of fixed effects estimates, and  is a vector of random 
effects estimates. 
FEβˆ REβˆ
)var(βA represents the asymptotic variance of the estimates. The 
Hausman statistic, H, is asymptotically distributed as ; with (k) denoting the number 
of explanatory variables in the model estimated. Usually, a large value of the Hausman 
statistic is interpreted as evidence for the rejection of the null hypothesis thereby 
indicating the presence of fixed effects in the model.  
2
Kχ
It is worth noting that the consistency of the parameter estimates (random effects and 
fixed effects) is conditioned on the exogeneity assumption that the error term is 
uncorrelated with any of the regressors in our model. However, in many econometrics 
applications, including studies on decentralization and poverty, the problem of 
endogenous explanatory variables is present.  
 In the next sub-section, we discuss an estimation procedure that uses a set of 
moment conditions to handle the problem of endogeneity in the right-hand-side variables: 
the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimation.  
 
Panel GMM- IV Estimation 
A violation of the strict exogeneity assumption mentioned above leads to 
inconsistency of the coefficient estimates. A standard way to threat endogenous 
explanatory variables is to use instrumental variables (IV) procedures to produce 
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consistent estimators. However, as noted by Baum et al. (2003), in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, the IV coefficient estimates are consistent, but their standard errors 
are invalid for statistical inference. Currently, the common approach used to deal with 
heteroskedasticity of unknown form is the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), first 
developed by Hansen (1982).48 Although, GMM uses orthogonality conditions to produce 
efficient and consistent estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form, 
it may suffer from poor finite sample performance.  Note that the standard IV estimators 
may be preferable than the GMM estimators if in fact heteroskedasticity is not of a 
concern. 
 
Test of Overidentifying Restrictions 
Let’s assume a set of instruments ][ LT ×iZ , where KL ≥  is the number of 
instruments satisfying moment’s conditions . Using the sample 
counterpart, this is equivalent to the following sample moments conditions: 
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The panel GMM estimator is then derived by minimizing the corresponding 
quadratic form equations given by:49  
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48 Note that OLS and IV procedures are special case of GMM since they both use a set of orthogonality 
conditions to derive the parameter estimates. 
49 We make use of the fact that βii Xyu −=  in the expression of the quadratic form equation (4.6). For 
more in-depth discussion on Panel GMM estimation, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005), Wooldridge (2002), 
Hansen (2000), Hayashi (2000), Greene (2000) and Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). 
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Where represents a weighting matrix. The sample analog can be 
expressed as: 
][ LLN ×W
  )()()ˆ( βββ )) NNNN gWgJ ′⋅=       (4.6b) 
Thus, equation (4.6b) is the GMM objective function that is minimized to produce 
the GMM estimatesβ) . If the number of equations to be estimated (L, the moments 
conditions) is equal to the number of parameter estimates (K, coefficient inβ) ), then the 
model is exactly identified. In this case, the weighting matrix equals , and 
the GMM estimator is equivalent to the standard IV estimator. On the other hand, 
if
1][ −= ZZWN
KL ≥ , it is not possible to derive the vector β)  that will set all the L moment condition 
to zero; the model is said to be over-identified. In other words, there is more instruments 
available than the number of regressors. In this case a more complex weighting matrix is 
called for to generate the quadratic form equation (4.6).  The panel GMM estimator is 
derived by setting the sample average analog of equation (4.6b) to zero.  This is done by 
solving 0J =∂
∂
β
β)
)
)( . After algebraic manipulation, we get: 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ′⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ′⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ′⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ′= ∑∑∑∑
==
−
==
N
i
iiN
N
i
ii
N
i
iiN
N
i
iiPGMM
11
1
11
ˆ yZWZXXZWZXβ    (4.7a) 
Rewriting the Panel GMM estimator given in equation (4.7a) in matrix form 
yields: 
yZWZXXZWZX ′′′′= − NNPGMM 1][β)       (4.7b) 
As noted in Baum et al. (2003), an important issue to address when the model is 
overidentified, is to test for the overidentifying restrictions in the model. This is 
equivalent to testing the validity of the instruments; i.e., testing whether the instruments 
72 
    
considered are uncorrelated with the error term. This test is commonly known as the 
Sargan (1958) test for standard IV estimation, but referred to as the Hansen (1982) test in 
the context of GMM models. The Hansen test is a general case of the Sargan test and is 
conducted using the Hansen  statistic evaluated at the efficient GMM estimator.  )ˆ(βJ
The Hansen  statistic is asymptotically distributed as a , under the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid and suitable for the model being estimated. 
Formally, it is expressed as follows: 
)ˆ(βJ 2 kL−χ
21 ~)()()ˆ( KLNNNN −
−′⋅= χβββ ))) gSgJ       (4.8) 
Where  is a Chi-Square distribution with (L-K) degree of freedom 
corresponding to the number of overidentifying restrictions. This is a joint test of valid 
orthogonality conditions and correct model specification. A large  statistic casts 
doubt on either or both set of assumptions and can be interpreted as a rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the orthogonality conditions are satisfied.  
2
kL−χ
)ˆ(βJ
 
Variables Description and Data Sources 
 
 
This study uses a comprehensive dataset compiled from various sources that 
include variables measuring poverty reduction outcomes, fiscal decentralization, political 
institutions and several control variables for over 150 countries span over the years 1975-
2000. Specifically, out of 177 countries originally in our sample, only 97 countries have 
data on both HDI and fiscal decentralization. Of these, 70 countries are from developing 
economies and the remaining 27 are higher income countries. When we use the FGT 
class of poverty indicators, the sample is only composed of 44 developing countries out 
73 
    
of the 66 developing countries that initially have information on FGT poverty measures 
in our dataset.50 In terms of coverage period, our original dataset spans from 1975 to 
2000, with a five years interval. However, due to missing values, not all countries have 
information on all variables for every year. Thus, the resulting dataset used in our study is 
a typical unbalanced panel data, for which our empirical estimation is accordingly 
adjusted for. The summary statistics and the definition of all variables are presented in 
table C1 and table C5 of appendix C, respectively.  
 
Dependant Variable 
Our dependant variable is the measure of poverty derived from different sources 
in an attempt to capturing the multifaceted aspects of poverty phenomenon. One set of 
variables used to capture poverty in our model is the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) 
generic class of additive poverty indicators ( ), measured alternatively by the poverty 
headcount (H), the poverty gap (PG) and the square poverty gap (SPG).
αP
 51 The general 
formulation of this index is given as follows: 
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Where (yi) represents the income of individual (i), ranked in increasing value of 
income, (q) is the number of poor in the total population (n), and (α) is the aversion for 
                                                 
50 Note that the FGT class of poverty indicator is not available for higher income countries and therefore do 
not exist in our sample. The list of countries classified by income level and by region is reported in the 
appendix D.   
 
51 Ideally, we would like to use other poverty measures such as the Watt’s index and the Sen Poverty index 
for comparison purpose. However, these indices do not exist for most countries because of their 
computational difficulties. Thus, we use the Foster-Greer-Thorbeck class of poverty indicator, accessible 
at: http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp (accessed March 2004). Moreover, as mentioned 
in Section 2, this class of poverty has some desirables axiomatic properties and present several advantages. 
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poverty. As α increases, more and more weight is given to the poorest of the poor. In 
addition, the FGT poverty index is decomposable or additive.52  Note that when α = 0, α 
is reduced to the widely used headcount poverty index (H), defined as the proportion of 
the population living in household with income or consumption per person below the 
poverty line (Ravallion, 1992).  When α =1,  becomes the poverty gap index (PG), 
defined as the mean distance below the poverty line as a proportion of the poverty line 
(Ravallion and Chen, 2005). Typically the poverty gap gives an indication of how far 
below the poverty line a person is. As such the poverty gap index is more informative 
than the Headcount poverty index; as it gives an idea of the depth of poverty, while the 
former is merely a crude indicator of the state of poverty in a country or a community. 
The third index, the square poverty gap (SPG), is obtained from α, when α = 2 and was 
first proposed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) to address the shortcomings of the 
previous poverty indices relative to the issue of inequality among the poor. The SPG 
index provides information on the severity of poverty in a population as it allows 
comparison among the poor. The dataset on all these three indices are drawn from the 
World Bank’s PovcalNet.
P
αP
P
53  
The second set of poverty indicator used in this study is the UNDP’s Human 
Development Index (HDI). The HDI is a composite index that utilizes an arithmetic 
average of three standard human development indicators: life expectancy at birth, 
educational attainment and per capita income. Formally, HDI is given by:  
                                                 
52 Additive decomposability, require that aggregate poverty be equal to the population weighted sum of 
poverty levels in the various sub-groups of society (Ravallion (1996)). 
53 PovCalNet is an interactive computational tool developed by staff of the Bank’s research group to allow 
users to replicate the calculations made by the Bank’s researchers in estimating the extent of absolute 
poverty in the world. The dataset is available at: http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp 
(accessed March 2004). 
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HDI = 1/3 (life expectancy index) + 1/3 (education index) + 1/3 (GDP index). 
Typically, this index is used to assess the multidimensionality aspect of poverty 
and may be considered a good proxy of the extent and the quality of pro-poor services 
available in a given country. Indeed, the HDI measures the well-being of individuals as 
the average overall achievements in three basic dimensions: longevity measured by life 
expectancy, knowledge, captured by educational attainment (adult literacy and combined 
primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment), and a decent standard of living, represented 
by the real GDP per capita (in PPP$). In practice, expenditures on social services may not 
necessary translate into poverty reduction outcomes since corruption or local elite capture 
has been found to dampen the intended benefit of these services to the poor.54 Thus, the 
rationale for using the HDI is to assess the real picture of the quality and the effectiveness 
in delivering pro-poor services in those countries.55 Data on the trend in HDI is reported 
in the UNDP’s Human Development Report, (2004).56 Nevertheless, the HDI also has 
some limitations and has been subject to some criticisms. For example, the normalization 
assumption, which gives equal weight to achievement along the three dimensions of the 
index, may be challenged. In addition, the HDI views achievement relative to the best 
country in the sample. For these reasons, we disaggregate the HDI index into its 
individual components and use them alternatively to check the robustness of our results.  
 
 
                                                 
54 See Bardhan and Mokerjee (2005), Besley and Coate (2003) for a theoretical discussion.  
 
55 The Human Development Index presents some advantages as mentioned in chapter 2 and is available on 
the UNDP website. The HDI has been used to capture poverty in several studies (see among others, Von 
Braum and Grote 2002; Lindaman and Thurmaier 2002). 
56 A five-years-average trend, from 1975 to 2003, is available in the UNDP’s (2004) “Human Development 
Report.” 
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Independent Variables 
 Our main regressor of interest is the fiscal decentralization variable. The Fiscal 
decentralization variable is measured by the share of sub-national expenditures 
(revenues) in total government expenditures (revenues).57 The data is drawn from the 
IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS 2005). It is worth mentioning that the 
measure of fiscal decentralization entails some flaws and has been criticized in the 
literature on several grounds. First, this measure may not necessarily convey information 
on the actual decision-making autonomy over expenditure or revenue of the different tiers 
of local governments (Prud’home 1995; Ebel and Yilmaz 2002). For instance, it is not 
clear from this measure what levels of activities are under the direct control of 
subnational governments, especially when they are funded by central government. 
Second, it says nothing about the revenue collection source and the extent and nature of 
the grant received by local governments. In fact, these measures only provide information 
about the relative level of countries’ fiscal decentralization. Nonetheless, they have been 
recognized as “second best” indicators and have been widely used in several empirical 
studies on fiscal decentralization (Pryor 1967; Kee 1977; Pommerehne 1977; Oates 1972; 
Bahl and Nath 1986; Zhang and Zou 1997; Davoodi and Zou 1998; and Martinez-
Vazquez and McNab 2002, among others). The data are from the IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics (2005) CD-Rom. 
                                                 
57 Theoretically, we would like to construct a measure of fiscal decentralization which clearly isolates local 
government decision-making over revenues and expenditure by netting out all activities controlled by the 
central government. Such a measure will require a comprehensive knowledge about the structure of the tax 
system and information on the type of grant and transfer received by sub-national governments in each 
country. Unfortunately, the data set provided by the IMF’s GFS does not permit to do this exercise. Ebel 
and Yilmaz (2002) have used a dataset from the OECD countries to construct a more accurate measure of 
fiscal decentralization. However, their dataset includes only six OECD countries, from 1997 to 1999. 
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Other variables of interest include key predictor of poverty such as basic 
education, basic health and agricultural extension. In order to explore potential channels 
through which decentralization may affect poverty reduction outcomes, we conduct 
sectoral analyses on three key pro-poor areas, basic education, basic health and 
agricultural extension.58 Specifically, we use life expectancy at birth and under-five 
infant mortality rate, immunization against diphtheria or measles, as proxies for heath 
outcomes. The data for health outcomes are primarily drawn from the World 
Development Indicator (World Bank 2005).  For basic education outcomes, we use 
alternatively, youth literacy rate, repeater rate at primary school, the percentage of 
primary school completion in the population, teacher-pupil ratio, the school drop-out 
ratio. The primarily source of the education data is from Barro and Lee (1996) and 
(2000). Finally, we use agriculture value added per worker, a measure of agricultural 
productivity, to proxy for agricultural extension. The data is also compiled from the 
World Development Indicators (World Bank 2005).   
Other regressors used in this study include pro-poor social expenditure, captured 
by spending on social sectors that have been recognized by development practitioners and 
by the literature on basic needs, to benefit the poor. It usually includes expenditure on 
primary education, basic health care, water and sanitation, agriculture research and 
extension, labor intensive jobs and rural roads (Gomanee et al. 2002; Mosley et al. 
2004).59 However, due to data availability, we only use public expenditure on education, 
                                                 
58  For evidence on the role of basic education and basic health care in reducing poverty see, World Bank 
(1995); Gomanee et al. (2002); Mosley et al. (2004), Gupta, Davoodi, and Tiongson (2002); For the benefit 
of agriculture extension in reducing poverty refer to Binswanger and Von Braun (1991); Ravallion and Datt 
(1995); Bourguignon and Morrison (1998), and Hazell et al. (2000). 
59 Refer to Gomanee et al. (2003) for the original methodology on the construction of the Pro-Poor 
Expenditure index (PPE). 
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health and social security and welfare. This indicator is computed using the arithmetic 
average of these three variables, expressed as a ratio of GDP adjusted for PPP. The Data 
for pro-poor social expenditure come from several sources, the IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics (GFS 2005) for the data on social security and welfare, education 
expenditure and health expenditures; the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI 2005) for the agriculture productivity and the GDP data.   
We also control for the quality of governance using several variables drawn from 
different sources. The data include Political right, civil liberties and freedom; the latter 
computed as the arithmetic average of the first two measures. These variables are used to 
assess not only how individuals participate in the political process in their countries by 
freely electing their representative, but also capture how individuals are free to voice their 
opinion and develop personal autonomy without the government interfering. This set of 
data is drawn from the Freedom in the World Country Scores of the Freedom House. 
These variables range from one to seven, with seven representing lower degree of 
freedom and one greater degree of freedom.60 We also use measures of rule of law, 
quality of bureaucracy, ethnic tensions, corruption, risk of repudiation of contracts by 
government and risk of expropriation of private investment, compiled from International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG).61 Variables on rule of law, corruption and the quality of the 
bureaucracy range from 0 to 6, with a 0 representing lower performance and 6 meaning 
better performance.  The other two indicators, risk of repudiation and the risk of 
                                                 
60 For more information on the methodology used in deriving the score, refer to 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/reseach/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm. (accessed May 2005). 
61 The ICRG data is a rich dataset that covers 90 countries spanned over the period 1982-1997, and is 
compiled by the Political Risk Services (PRS) group, a commercial service that provides financial, 
economic and political risk assessment for investors available at http://www.icrgonline.com(accessed May 
2005). 
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expropriation are scaled from 0 to 10, with a lower number indicating lower performing 
government institutions.  
Other socio-demographic and economic control variables used in this study are 
population density, fertility rate, age dependency ratio, initial GDP per capita PPP, and 
openness to trade. These data are compiled from World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI, 2005). In addition, we use as control variables the absolute latitude of a 
country, the legal origin of company law and commercial code of a country are from La 
Porta et al. (1998).  We also used the Gini coefficient of income inequality to assess the 
state of the distribution of individual well-being in terms of income.62 The income 
inequality data come from the new World Income Inequality Database (WIID2a) of the 
United Nation University’s World Institute Development Economic Research’s (UNU-
WIDER).63 
The Hypothesis Framework 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and poverty is not straightforward and not always well understood. The 
traditional literature on local public finance has long viewed poverty reduction policy as 
mainly a redistributive issue that needed to be exclusively addressed by central 
government on the justification of mobility and externality considerations. On the other 
                                                 
 
62 There is a variety of inequality measures, but the most widely used is the Gini coefficient. For a 
comprehensive review of inequality measures refer to chapter 2.  
 
63 The UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID), collects and stores information on 
income inequality for developed, developing, and transition countries. The new Version 2.0a of June 2005, 
also referred to as WIID2a consists of a checked and corrected WIID1, a new update of the Deininger & 
Squire database from the World Bank, new estimates from the Luxembourg Income Study and 
Transmonee, and other new sources as they have became available. This dataset contains in addition to the 
Gini coefficient and quintile and decile shares, survey means and medians along with the income shares of 
the richest 5% and the poorest 5% have been included in the update. The database and its documentation 
are available on the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database website (UNU-WIDER 2005). 
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hand, fiscal decentralization was associated with the concept of efficiency and was 
largely ignored in poverty reduction strategies (Tiebout 1956; Musgrave 1959; and Oates 
1972). However, the recent trend in donor-supported development activities and poverty 
reduction programs have now embraced the view that poverty is first a local phenomenon 
and that poverty reduction policies require involvement at the local level, including 
adopting sound fiscal decentralization program (World Bank 2000). Thus, fiscal 
decentralization should be seen as one of the policies with the greatest potential for 
improving public service delivery and contributing to the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) of reducing poverty. In particular, local governments may 
play a critical role in a country’s poverty reduction efforts in several ways. Consider the 
following:  
First, local governments have been found in a number instances to be critical in 
providing an enabling environment to ensure local economic growth, by promoting and 
providing both physical and human capital development. It is widely agreed that 
economic growth is the key to long term poverty reduction at the local level. As such, 
extensive local involvement is require to accurately identify pro-poor investment 
strategies that remote central government bureaucrats, situated in a distant capital, would 
be generally less capable of doing. Second, local governments usually deliver key public 
services (access to safe drinking water, basic education, basic health care, and 
agricultural extension services) that are important for improving the quality of life of all 
residents. As a result, local governments’ entities can constitute a quite helpful element in 
the institutional framework for poverty reduction. Indeed, the Millennium Development 
Goals recognize that many social services are critical ingredients in a comprehensive 
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poverty reduction strategy. Third, decentralization in its entire dimension, including local 
empowerment, brings government closer to the people by enhancing their representation 
and voice, which ultimately enhanced the accountability of government officials to the 
people. In other words, accountability and good governance are important preconditions 
for assuring a pro-poor -growth economic environment in which government basic 
services can be delivered in an effective manner. While decentralization is likely to 
generate the above-mentioned benefits, issues such as inadequacy of locally generated 
revenues, inexperience of local officials, an underdeveloped system of public account 
ability with elite capture and corruption and poorly educated citizenry can seriously 
undermine the benefits of decentralization to translate into poverty reduction outcomes.64  
As illustrated in our theoretical model presented in chapter 4, there is an apparent 
trade-off between potential benefits derived from a fiscal decentralized system (better 
matching of local preference and enhanced accountability due to local proximity) on the 
one hand, and possible risks due to lack of capacity building (due to poorly educated 
citizenry) and the need for policy coordination at the central level (scale economies and 
externality) on the other hand. The magnitude of these two opposing effects may vary 
over time and space, so that it is difficult to appropriately assess the net outcome on 
poverty without undertaking an empirical investigation.  
This dissertation explores the impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty in two 
ways: 
                                                 
64 See Bardhan and Mokerjee (1998), Prudhomme (1995), Besley and Coate (2003) for  theoretical 
evidence on this literature. 
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First, we investigate whether there is any causal effect of fiscal decentralization 
on poverty. Second, we explore a potential transmission channel of these poverty 
effects from fiscal decentralization.   
As discussed above, fiscal decentralization may affect poverty through many 
different channels. These may include channels through increased transparency or 
quality of governance (Fisman and Gatti 2002); or through enhancing growth 
(Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2003; Akai and Sakata 2002; Davoodi and Zou 1998; 
Zhang and Zou 1998, among others).  In this dissertation, we explore one other 
transmission channel—fiscal decentralization effect on pro-poor sectoral outcomes. 
These include outcome in basic education (youth literacy rate and repeater rate at 
primary school), basic health care (child mortality rate and immunization against 
measles, diphtheria) and agricultural productivity (agricultural value added per worker).  
In addition, we also investigate whether the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty 
are greater in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) relative to other regions. This later analysis 
finds its justification on Africa’s relatively higher level of poverty and the fact that 
Africa is far behind in attaining its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) target.  
 As such, we formulate the following set of testable hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Holding everything else constant, an increase in local government 
spending power, as measured by fiscal decentralization leads to an improvement in the 
standard of living of the poor, as proxy either by the Human development index (HDI); or 
inversely by income poverty indicators (Poverty Headcount, Poverty Gap or Square 
Poverty Gap). 
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This postulate stems from the rationale that local self-governing institutions and 
greater community involvement can provide good incentive to improve the material 
conditions and autonomy of the poor (Von Braum and Grote 2002; Oates 2004). 
Hypothesis 2: On average, Sub-Saharan African countries will benefit more from 
fiscal decentralization than countries from other regions, ceteris paribus.  
This hypothesis finds its justification on the classical fiscal decentralization 
theorem proposed by Oates (1972), which advocates a provision of local public goods 
and services by local government’s body because of their ability “to tailor outputs to local 
circumstances,” given their informational and proximity advantages. This hypothesis may 
hold because the Sub-Saharan African countries are highly heterogeneous both within 
and across boundaries, with a high level of language, ethnic and religious 
fractionalization compared to other regions. Furthermore, Sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
region has the highest level of poverty and present the slowest growth toward its 
Millennium Development Goals (MGDs), UNDP (2004). Thus, ceteris paribus, if fiscal 
decentralization is to help reduce poverty, it is more likely to do so for SSA than any 
other region, at least in nominal term.  
Hypothesis 3: Fiscal decentralization will have a statistically significant effect on 
pro-poor services delivery, which in turn may translate into poverty reduction outcomes. 
This hypothesis attempts to link the two isolated empirical evidence that decentralization 
increases pro-poor spending (McNab 2001; Arze Del Granado 2003) on the one hand; 
and that pro-poor expenditures significantly reduce poverty (Gupta, Davoodi, and 
Tiongson 2002; Mosley et al. 2004) on the other hand. 
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Model Specifications 
 
To test our first hypothesis relative to the effect of fiscal decentralization on 
poverty, we use the following general baseline equation, drawn from the literature on the 
determinants of poverty:65 
itititititit uinitginiSSExpDecfPov += ),,,( X ;   Ni ,...,1= ;   (4.24) 
Where 
Tt ,...,1=
itiit vu +=η   is composite error of unobserved country-specific effects ( iη ), and a 
vector of idiosyncratic disturbances ( ). The functional relation between poverty 
outcomes and fiscal decentralization is represented by the function (f) such that the 
marginal impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty is given by:
itv
66 
 
Dec
f
f
Pov
Dec
Pov
DecDec ∂
∂⋅∂
∂=∂
∂
=
          (4.25)  
Pov is poverty measured alternatively by the FGT additive class of poverty 
indicator (H, PG, and SPG) or by the HDI; Dec is the fiscal decentralization measure, 
captured either by the share of subnational expenditures to total government expenditures 
(Subexp), or by the share of subnational revenues to total government revenues (Subrev).  
As shown in equation (4.24), poverty is regressed on pro-poor social expenditure 
(SSExp), the initial value of the Gini coefficient of income inequality (initgini) and a set 
of control variables (X) that includes, indicators of health, education, and agriculture 
                                                 
65 See Ahluwalia et al. (1979); Ravallion and Chen (1997); Collier and Dollar (2001); Deaton (2001); 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) among others. 
66 This general specification will allow us for example to test for a potential inverted U shape relationship 
between poverty and decentralization, as suggested by the graphical analysis discussed in figure 4.1. That 
is, an increase in fiscal decentralization is likely to generate a positive poverty reduction outcome up to a 
certain level of fiscal decentralization, beyond which, any increase lead to negative impact of poverty. This 
non-linear relationship between decentralization and poverty could also be modeled alternatively using a 
log-linear specification.    
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productivity outcomes, as well as socio-demographic and government institutional 
quality variables. All these variables are described above and summarized in appendix C.  
Figure 9 below shows the partial correlation between fiscal decentralization 
(DecExp) and poverty (HDI) for developing countries (Panel A) and higher income 
countries (Panel B). There is an apparent positive relationship between reduced poverty 
and fiscal decentralization as hypothesized, but the relationship is non-monotonic.  
 
Figure 9: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization and Poverty in         
  developing countries and higher income countries 
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B) Higher Income Countries A) Developing Countries 
 Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
While the sample for developing countries seems to support an inverted U-shape 
relationship, the trend for higher income countries is steadily increasing. In other words, 
there is a non-linear but increasing relationship between poverty and fiscal 
decentralization for developing countries. These observations have some important 
implications for both our model specification and the interpretation of our results, at least 
for developing countries.    To ascertain the consistency of this non-linear relationship 
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between poverty and fiscal decentralization in developing countries, we employ other 
measures of poverty. In Figure 10 below, Panel A illustrates the partial correlation 
between fiscal decentralization and poverty in developing countries using the HDI, while 
in Panel B through Panel D, this relation is shown using the poverty headcount (H), the 
poverty square (PG) and the square poverty gap (SPG) respectively.  
 
Figure 10: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization and different    
  measures of Poverty in Developing countries. 
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       D) Decentralization and Square Poverty Gap  C) Decentralization and Poverty Gap 
     B) Decentralization and Poverty Headcount A) Decentralization and HDI 
Source: the Author.  
 
In all cases, there is a persistent quadratic pattern between the two variables, 
though a somewhat weak quadratic trend is observed when more and more weight is 
given to the poorest fraction of the population; that is, when using the poverty gap and 
the square poverty gap as indicators of poverty. Moreover, it is worth noting that this 
non-linear relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty holds even when we 
87 
    
use the share of subnational revenue in total revenues as fiscal decentralization measure; 
or when we classify the dataset by sub-samples of income level.67 Given the above 
discussion, we adopt the following model specifications: 
ititititit uInitginiSSExpDecPov +++++= tiControlγββββ 3210 log    (4.26) 
itititititit uInitginiSSExpDecSqDecPov ++++++= tiControlγβββββ 43210  (4.27) 
Where Pov is the poverty measures discussed earlier, Dec is fiscal decentralization 
measured either by the share of subnational expenditure or by the share of subnational 
revenue. To capture the non-linear relationship discussed above, we use a semi-log 
specification (log Dec) in equation (4.26) or include the square of fiscal decentralization 
(DecSq) in equation (4.27) to capture the quadratic fit suggested in Figure 10.  SSExp is 
the share of pro-poor social expenditures in total government expenditure. Initgini is the 
initial value of the gini coefficient of income inequality and control is a vector of control 
variables discussed earlier in the variable description sub-section.  
Our coefficient of interest in equation (4.26) is 1β , the marginal effect of decentralization 
on poverty. In equation (4.27), this effect is given by the expression 
[ Dec⋅+ 21 2ββ ],where Dec represents the mean value of fiscal decentralization in our 
sample.68 Thus, the critical level of fiscal decentralization beyond which the sign of the 
marginal effect is reversed, is given by
2
1
2β
β−=Dec .  
                                                 
67 Figure D5 through Figure D11 in Appendix D show the other set of scatter plots using revenue 
decentralization and the FGT class of poverty measures. The correlation between fiscal decentralization 
and poverty is also shown by region and by level of income rank.    
68 This expression is obtained by simply taking the partial derivative of equation (2.27) with respect to 
fiscal decentralization (Dec): Dec
Dec
Pov ⋅+=∂
∂
21 2ββ . Note that we could also use other value of fiscal 
decentralization, say the median fiscal decentralization, to evaluate the marginal effect in equation (4.27). 
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 To test our second hypothesis relative to the impact of fiscal decentralization on 
poverty reduction outcomes in Sub-Saharan African region, we introduce an interaction 
term between fiscal decentralization and the SSA dummy variable DecSSA. The resulting 
specification is as follows: 
itititititit uInitginiSSExpDecSSADecPov ++++++= tiControlγβββββ 43210 log   
(4.28) 
The expected sign of these coefficients depends on the poverty measure being 
used in the regression. According to our hypothesis, we expect 2β  to be positive since 
higher level of fiscal decentralization will be associated with higher quality of human 
development in SSA. In contrast, 2β  is expected to be negative if poverty headcount (H), 
poverty gap (PG) or square poverty gap (SPG) is used as dependant variable in the 
estimation regression. Higher level of fiscal decentralization is hypothesized to decrease 
income poverty in SSA.  
Finally, we test our third hypothesis regarding the possible channels through 
which fiscal decentralization may impact poverty using the following methodology. 
However, before developing this methodology, it is worth explaining the rationale behind 
the selection of the channels used to investigate the effect of fiscal decentralization on 
poverty.  
In the previous section, fiscal decentralization is found to be associated with 
poverty reduction, as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI) and a set of 
income poverty indicators such as the Headcount poverty (H), the Poverty Gap (PG) and 
the Square Poverty Gap (SPG). However, given that both poverty and fiscal 
decentralization are multi-faceted, the resulting relationship between these two 
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phenomenons may be indirect. For instance, fiscal decentralization may improve 
institutional quality (Fisman and Gatti 2002), and better institution may in turn lead to 
economic growth (Mauro 1995; Gyimah-Bempong 2002) and eventually reduce poverty 
(Olson 1996; Chong and Calderon 2000; among others).69  Moreover, fiscal 
decentralization may affect the functional composition of public expenditures to key 
social services that are likely to improve the standard of living of the most vulnerable 
layer of the population. These spending are commonly referred to as pro-poor 
expenditures, though the issue of which expenditure types should be included in a pro-
poor expenditure index is often subject to debate. Indeed, depending on countries’ 
characteristics which differ across time and space, poverty reduction strategy may require 
different types of spending. Besides, the choice of key variables to capture this 
differential effect is sometimes unobservable to practitioners or constrained by data 
availability. However, in the literature on basic-needs and among development 
practitioners, certain categories of public spending are generally believed to have a 
bearing on human development, and, consequently on the poor. These pro-poor social 
spending are generally basic health care, primary education, water and sanitation, rural 
roads and agricultural extension services (Gomanee et al. 2002 and 2003). In the same 
line, Gupta et al. (2002) note that ‘Greater public spending on primary and secondary 
education has a positive impact on widely used measures of education attainment, and 
increased health care spending reduces child and infant mortality rates. Similarly, 
Gomanee et al. (2002) shows that public expenditures on “social services” (sanitation, 
                                                 
69 Note that other studies, mostly theoretical, have shown that fiscal decentralization is less likely to 
improve institutional quality because of possible rent extraction at the local level (Shleifer and Vishny 
1993; Bardhan and Mookerjee 2000). In this case, the poor quality of local institutions will increase 
inequality and relative poverty (Pedersen 1997; and Bourguignon and Verdier 2000). 
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education and health), are the most likely to provide benefits to the poor. Although, fiscal 
decentralization may positively affect the functional composition of public spending 
(Arze Del Granado 2003); its impact on human development indicators may not be 
substantial.  The empirical literature on the relationship between pro-poor expenditure 
and indicators of pro-poor services delivery outcomes has shown a weak linkage 
(Hanushek 1995; Gupta et al. 1999, among others). In other words, pro-poor social 
expenditures may not necessarily translate into pro-poor outcomes. In light of these 
findings, we explore possible channels between fiscal decentralization and poverty 
through pro-poor services delivery outcomes such as basic education, basic health care 
and agriculture productivity indicators.70 Furthermore, this analysis will allow us to take 
into account the traditional criticism about the weighting issue in the computation of the 
Human Development Index (HDI).  
Figure 11 below illustrates possible channels through which decentralization may 
affect poverty.  The top left Panel (A) shows a strong positive relationship between 
decentralization and poverty reduction, measured by the HDI.  
In this dissertation, we propose three possible channels through which this broad 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty may be decomposed into. The 
first proposed channel is through basic education outcomes (youth literacy rate), Panel 
(B). The second channel explored is through basic health care outcomes (Child 
Mortality), Panel (C).  The third transmission mechanism considered is through 
agricultural extension captured by agricultural productivity per worker, Panel (D). There 
is some evidence of positive correlation between fiscal decentralization and poverty 
                                                 
70 We do not explore the channel through government institutional quality as it has been extensively 
investigated by several studies among which Treisman (2000a); Fisman and Gatti (2002); and Enikolopov 
and Zhuravskaya (2003). But, we control for the quality of government institutions in our estimations. 
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reduction outcomes, measured either by basic education, basic heath care provision or 
agriculture productivity indicators.  
Again, there appears to be a strong and consistent non-linear pattern between 
fiscal decentralization and poverty reduction outcomes. These results are consistent with 
our earlier findings when poverty indicators were used. However, these results do not 
establish any direction of causality and the significance of the transmission mechanisms 
and the exact magnitude can only be determined through a sound empirical analysis. In 
this subsection, we empirically investigate these channels in turns and use the following 
sectoral specifications to achieve this goal. 
 
Figure 11: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization and different    
 measures of Poverty in Developing countries. 
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 D) Decentralization and Agricultural Output  C) Decentralization and Child Mortality 
 B) Decentralization and Literacy Rate A) Decentralization and HDI 
 Source: The Author 
 
Our education outcome specification follows a variant of standard education 
models used in several studies by Hanushek (1995); Barro and Lee (1996) and Gupta et 
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al. (2002). Specifically, we regress fiscal decentralization Dec, education inputs EduInp 
and a set of commonly used control variables X1 on education outcome EduOut, 
measured alternatively by youth literacy rate and repeater rate at primary school. The 
education specification can be written in general form as: 
 ititititit uEduInpDecfEduOut 111 ),,( += X   
Similarly, following Gupta et al. (2002), Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2003); 
and Mobarak et al. (2004), we adopt the following specification for the health outcome: 
 ititititit uHelfInpDecfHealthOut 222 ),,( += X  
Where HealthOut is the health outcome; Dec is the fiscal decentralization 
variable, HealthInp is an indicator of health input like birth attended by skilled health 
staffs, hospital beds per 1000 people, and X2 is a set of control variables such as the 
percentage of primary school complete in the female population and the quality of 
government institution captured by the level of corruption and the quality of bureaucracy.  
 Finally, we evaluate the impact of fiscal decentralization on agricultural output 
using a variant of the empirical specification by Fan et al. (2004) in who assess the 
impact of various public investments in agriculture on poverty. 
 ititititit uAgrInpDecfAgriOut 333 ),,( += X  
AgrOut is the agriculture output measured as agricultural productivity; Dec is the fiscal 
decentralization variable; AgrInp capture a set of agriculture inputs such as agriculture 
machinery, amount of fertilizer used; and X3 is a set of control variables.  
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CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This chapter reports the empirical results derived from our three main hypotheses 
regarding the impact of decentralization and poverty. For each testable hypothesis, we 
first estimate the parameters using the standard panel data Fixed Effect (FE) and Random 
Effect (RE), and report the result of the Hausman specification test. Next, we use the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) instrumental variable estimator to deal with 
potential endogeneity in our regressors. In the first section, we present the results of the 
empirical investigation of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty 
reduction outcomes. In the second section, we report our findings regarding the potential 
transmission channel of fiscal decentralization impact on poverty reduction outcomes, 
through pro-poor services. Our hypothesis to investigate whether the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on poverty are greater in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) relative to other 
regions is examined in each of the sub-section.  
Descriptive statistics as well as simple correlation between the variables are 
reported in Table C1 through Table C3 of appendix C. The description and the data 
source for the variables are shown in Table C5 of appendix C. Finally, Table 1 through 
Table 6 present the estimation results.
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Fiscal Decentralization and Poverty Reduction Outcomes 
 
 To assess the impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty, we use a variant of the 
empirical specification discussed in the previous chapter. For illustration purpose, we 
report results for the three panel data estimation procedure discussed in the methodology 
section. Table 1 presents results for our baseline panel data regression (4.26) using the 
HDI as dependant variable. The fist two columns report the fixed effects and random 
effects models respectively. 
 
 Table 1: Regression estimates for the Standard Panel Data+. 
 
Dependant Variable Human Development Index (HDI) 
Specifications FE RE 
   
Fiscal Decentralization  0.094* 0.114** 
(Expenditure) a, b (0.054) (0.049) 
   
Pro-poor Expenditure b 0.018 0.058** 
 (0.027) (0.029) 
   
Population Density a 0.065*** 0.011 
 (0.014) (0.007) 
   
Immunization Diphtheria 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Fertility rate -0.009** -0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
   
% Population with  -0.001 -0.002** 
Primary school (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Initial Value of  -0.002*** -0.002*** 
Gini Coefficient (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Observations 201 201 
   
 
Hausman Test
Chi-sq (11) [Pvalue ] 
 
5.98 [0.8747] 
 
  Robust Standard errors in parentheses    
  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
  Note: a Variable in logarithm 
   b Variable expressed as a ratio of total expenditure                  
    + Year dummy included 
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Moreover, we conducted the Hausman test for these two specifications, and failed 
to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between the country unobserved fixed 
effects and the regressors. The Hausman statistic (H), which asymptotically follows a chi-
square distribution (with 11 degree of freedom) is 5.98. Therefore, the p-value of 0.874 
suggests using the random effects model.71 However, we also report the results for the 
fixed effects model for completeness. In general, the results support the hypothesis that 
fiscal decentralization exerts a positive effect on poverty reduction, irrespective on the 
poverty indicator used.  
As discussed earlier, in case the fiscal decentralization variable or one of our 
regressors is endogenous, the parameter estimates are inconsistent and the instrumental 
variable (IV) estimation procedure is called for, using appropriate set of instruments. For 
instance, endogeneity in our pro-poor expenditures and fiscal decentralization variables 
may occur under the following circumstances: first, it may be argued that shocks such as 
unexpected wars, military coups or unexpected change in donor’s policy on aid in 
developing countries, are likely to affect the degree of expenditure decentralization and 
pro-poor social expenditures as well as the level of poverty in those countries. Indeed, in 
the case of unexpected change in donor’s policy on aid, which is theoretically lumped in 
our random error terms, the resulting effect of these shocks on the composition of pro-
poor expenditures is a potential source of endogeneity that needs to be deal with. Second, 
as discussed in our data section, fiscal decentralization as well as pro-poor public 
expenditures indicators may suffer from measurement error, source of biasness in our 
coefficient estimates. To correct for these potential issues, we adopt the instrumental 
                                                 
71 The same analysis is done using other measures of poverty (the FGT class of poverty indicator) and the 
Hausman test also supports the random effects model specification (See table 1). 
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variables procedure. However, in the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form, 
the standard errors of the IV parameter estimates are inconsistent and therefore invalid 
for any statistical inference. To address these problems, we estimate our baseline using 
the GMM-IV procedure discussed in our empirical methodology. Furthermore, given that 
we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation at 10% level of 
significance, using the Wooldridge autocorrelation test for panel data, the lag value of the 
independent variables can be used as internal instruments when appropriate.72    
Table 1 reports results for the GMM-IV estimation using the HDI as the 
dependent variable. In general, these results show that fiscal decentralization has a 
positive and strongly significant effect on HDI, suggesting that countries with more 
expenditures decentralization are likely to have a better standard of living (captured by 
the HDI) and thereby a better poverty reduction outcomes. Moreover, in all our 
specification, the Hansen test (generalized Sargan test) of overidentifying restrictions, fail 
to reject the null hypothesis of joint validity of the instruments used for our model. Note 
that the Hansen  statistic is asymptotically distributed as a , where [L-K] is the 
number of overidentifying restrictions. We report the results of these tests in the last two 
rows of each table. With respect to the magnitude of the effect, one standard deviation 
increase in fiscal decentralization (about 14.58 % point increase) will lead to an 
)ˆ(βJ 2 kL−χ
                                                 
72 The Wooldridge autocorrelation test for panel data model is discussed in Wooldridge (2002) pp. 282–
283. Drukker et al. (2003) provides simulation results showing that the test has good size and power 
properties in reasonably sized samples. David Drukker has also proposed a user-written program, called 
xtserial to perform this test in Stata. It is also important to note that other studies have used similar 
methodology to address the issue of endogeneity in the regressors. 
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improvement in human development (reduction in poverty) by about 7.64 % of a standard 
deviation, ceteris paribus.73 
Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in pro-poor social expenditures 
(around 16% point increase) improves the standard deviation of the HDI by around 12 %, 
holding everything else constant. Furthermore, agriculture productivity, measured by the 
agriculture value added per worker, seems to be a significant predictor of poverty 
reduction. On the other hand, as expected, higher infant mortality rate is associated with 
high poverty (Ravallion 2003; 2005) and (Galasso and Ravallion 2005). 
In column 2 of Table 2, we control for region specific effects and the results 
indicate that the sign and the statistical significance of our findings are not affected, 
though the magnitude is slightly modified.  More interestingly, we include an interaction 
dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to measure the difference in effect of the impact of 
fiscal decentralization on poverty. Our results reveal that the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on poverty is reinforced in SSA. Specifically, one percentage point 
increase in fiscal decentralization, increase the HDI by 0.086 (0.081+0.005) point in 
SSA, while for the rest of developing countries, this effect is 0.005 point less. As argued 
before, these findings may be explained by the high heterogeneity in individual 
preference due to the higher language, ethnic and religious fractionalization observed 
both across and within African countries. 
 
 
                                                 
73 This figure 7.64% is obtained by multiplying the coefficient estimate (0.054) by the standard deviation of 
decentralization (14.58) and dividing it by the standard deviation of HDI (0.103). That is 7.64 % = (0.054 * 
14.58) / 0.103. Note that the standard deviation is derived using the descriptive statistics based on the 
sample of the underlying regression estimation.  
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Table 2: Regression estimates for HDI using GMM–IV Panel Data 
 
 
Human Development Index (HDI) 
 
 
Dependant Variable 
 
Specifications 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
Fiscal decentralization b  0.054** 0.081*** 0.348*** 0.230*** 
                         (0.024) (0.021) (0.083) (0.077) 
Fiscal Decentralization ^2 b   -0.004** -0.003*** 
   (0.002) (0.001) 
Pro-poor expenditures b 0.078** 0.132*** 0.059*** 0.077*** 
 (0.032) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
Agricult value added per worker a 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Child mortality rate -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fertility rate -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Repeater Rate at Primary School 0.001 0.001** 0.002** 0.002** 
                               (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Decentralization b ×  SSA dummy  0.005***  0.004** 
             (0.001)  (0.002) 
Initial Value of Gini Coefficient a  -0.012  0.004 
  (0.016)  (0.012) 
Dummy for LAC  -0.014  -0.015 
  (0.011)  (0.013) 
Dummy for MENA  -0.036**  -0.017*** 
  (0.014)  (0.004) 
     
Observations 147 147 147 147 
Hansen Test : p-value 0.232 0.477 0.319 0.398 
     
 Robust Standard errors in parentheses    
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  Note:    In column 1 and 2, fiscal decentralization is expressed in logarithm form.   
  a Variable in logarithm 
  b Variable expressed as a ratio of total expenditure          
 
         
As illustrated earlier in Figure 9, the relationship between poverty and fiscal 
decentralization may not be linear, as we have assumed so far. To account for the 
quadratic fit suggested by Figures 9 and 10, we include the square term of fiscal 
decentralization (Subexpsq) as shown in equation (4.27). The results in columns 3 and 4 
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of Table 2 show a positive and statistical significant coefficient on the linear part while 
the sign on the quadratic term is negative and statistical significant at 5% level. These 
findings, indeed, confirm the inverted U-shape pattern observed in the graphical 
illustration, which suggests that fiscal decentralization is likely to improve human 
development (reduce poverty) up to a certain critical level, beyond which any increase in 
the share of subnational expenditures in total expenditures may actually lead to increases 
in poverty. Specifically, an increase in decentralization of expenditure responsibility 
increases the HDI up to a critical fiscal decentralization threshold equal to 40% 
approximately.74 Most developing countries are below this threshold.  
For completeness and robustness check, we also conducted the same analysis 
using three income measures of poverty; namely, the poverty headcount (H), the poverty 
gap (PG) and the square poverty gap (SPG) computed using the international poverty line 
of one US dollar a day per person. We also test for the presence of non-linearity in the 
relationship between decentralization and poverty using the Foster-Greer-Thorbeck 
(FGT) class of income poverty. Columns 1 through 3 of Table 3 report the results using 
our baseline equation (4.26).The findings are similar to those obtained using the HDI as 
the poverty indicator. The results seem to support a quadratic (U-shape) relationship 
between the two variables, which is statistically significant at 1% level. This indeed 
suggests that fiscal decentralization is likely to reduce poverty up to certain threshold 
level of fiscal decentralization equals to 25%, irrespective of the income poverty 
                                                 
74 This critical decentralization level is obtained by setting the partial derivative of equation (2.27) to zero 
and solving for fiscal decentralization (Dec) 
2
1
2β
β−=Dec . Solving for decentralization in column 3 and 4 in 
Table 2, yields a decentralization threshold of 43.5% and 38.33% respectively. Countries above this 
threshold are mostly higher income countries, except Argentina, Brazil, China and India.  
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indicator used.75 Similarly, pro-poor expenditures are important predictor of poverty 
reduction outcomes. A one standard deviation increase in pro-poor social expenditures 
(around 16 % point increase) reduces the proportion of people living below the 
international poverty line of one dollar a day per person (Headcount poverty) by 5% point 
approximately, holding everything else constant.  
 
Table 3: Regression estimates for FGT using GMM–IV Panel Data+
 
 Square Poverty 
Gap (SPG) 
Poverty 
Gap (PG) 
Headcount 
Poverty (H) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Pro-poor expenditures b -0.041** -0.097*** -0.306*** 
 (0.016) (0.027) (0.080) 
Fiscal decentralization b  -0.241*** -0.466*** -1.058*** 
 (0.076) (0.154) (0.393) 
Fiscal Decentralization ^2 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.021*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) 
Fertility rate 0.075 0.067 0.262 
 (0.144) (0.302) (0.827) 
Repeater Rate at Primary School 0.079** 0.139** 0.239 
 (0.033) (0.063) (0.204) 
Initial Value of Gini Coefficient a 0.075** 0.145** 0.297** 
 (0.032) (0.061) (0.147) 
Decentralization b ×  SSA  -0.049** -0.093** -0.189* 
 (0.022) (0.043) (0.111) 
LAC dummy 2.995** 6.410** 8.892*** 
 (1.261) (2.503) (2.363) 
MENA dummy 0.175 0.374 3.434* 
 (0.551) (0.982) (1.964) 
    
Observations 
Hansen test: p-value 
113 
0.441 
113 
0.348 
113 
0.313 
 Robust Standard errors in parentheses    
 * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  Note:    a Variable in logarithm 
  b Variable expressed as a percentage of total expenditure                  
  + Year dummy included 
 
                                                 
75 The fiscal decentralization thresholds obtained by using H, PG and SPG poverty indicators are 25.20%, 
25.88% and 24.10% respectively. These results are derived from columns 1 through column 3 of table 3. It 
is interesting to note that most Sub-Saharan countries except, South Africa are below this threshold; 
whereas countries around the threshold are Colombia, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Mexico and South Africa.   
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A similar proportion increase in fiscal decentralization leads to a 2% point 
reduction in the gap between the average income of the poor and the international poverty 
line (poverty gap), while reducing the inequality among the poor people (square poverty 
gap) by 1% point, ceteris paribus. Another point to notice is that the initial level of 
income inequality, defined as the initial value of Gini coefficient, has a positive and 
statistical significant effect on all three measures of poverty.  
We also introduce an interaction dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to assess 
the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty for Africa. The results are comparable to 
our previous findings that use HDI as the poverty indicator. In particular, we find that 
decentralization is likely to reduce poverty more in SSA compared to other developing 
countries and the difference in effects for SSA using the poverty headcount, poverty gap 
and square poverty gap are 0.20%, 0.10% and 0.05% respectively.  
Overall, three important observations can be made from these set of estimation 
results. First, the impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty reduction outcomes is 
statistically significant, though non-linear. This relationship holds irrespective of the type 
of poverty indicators (income or non-income) and specification used in our regression 
models. This is an indication that fiscal decentralization, if used adequately, can be an 
important policy tool for poverty reduction strategies in developing countries and 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, where poverty is more prevalent. Second, the non-
linear (quadratic) relationship between decentralization and poverty suggests that there is 
a critical threshold of fiscal decentralization beyond which poverty may be worsened.  
This quadratic pattern is statistically significant at 5% level and the critical 
threshold varies between 25%, when income poverty measures are used, to 40% when the 
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HDI, a much broader measure of poverty, is employed. In other words, the threshold is 
sensitive to the type of poverty indicators used. This leads us to the third observation; that 
the way one measures poverty seems to matter in the determination of the critical level of 
fiscal decentralization that needs to be pursued for a poverty reduction strategy.76  
As discussed in chapter 2 of this dissertation, poverty is multi-faceted and 
encompasses other non-income needs that significantly affect human life. In many 
developing countries, people have identified themselves as poor for lack of food, shelter, 
job opportunities, or physical asset bases such as livestock and land. For instance, in a 
survey conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, Chamber (1995) identifies the 
following criteria as lack of well-being in those regions: not having access to safe 
drinking water, health facilities when needed or not being able to read and write. Recent 
reports by the World Bank (2001 and 2004) and by the United Nation Development 
Program (2000, 2003, 2004, and 2005) also introduced being at risk, uncertainty about 
the future, vulnerability, powerlessness, lack of voice, representation or freedom as key 
components of poverty. Thus, it is not surprising to observe different fiscal 
decentralization thresholds when different types of poverty measures are used. However, 
what is important to notice is the robust non-linear relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and poverty reduction, irrespective of the poverty indicators or the 
decentralization measures (expenditure or revenue) employed.77 
Another important issue worth investigating is the possible channels through which this 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty may occur. In the next section, 
                                                 
76 As mentioned before, these critical levels of fiscal decentralization should be interpreted with caution and 
should not be taken with very exact meaning, given both the quality of the data and the   
77 Figure 17 through Figure 21 in appendix D shows a similar non-linear relationship between poverty and 
fiscal decentralization, when the revenue measure is used. 
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we explore three potential channels, basic education, basic healthcare and agricultural 
extension, which have been found in the literature on basic needs, to have significant 
bearing on the standard of living of the poor.       
 
Fiscal Decentralization and Poverty Reduction Outcomes:  
Exploring the Channels through Pro-poor Sectors 
 
In the previous section, fiscal decentralization is found to have a significant effect 
on different measures of poverty, Human Development Index (HDI), Headcount poverty 
(H), the Poverty Gap (PG) and the Square Poverty Gap (SPG). However, as discussed 
earlier, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty may be explained 
through indirect channels such as basic education, basic healthcare and agricultural 
productivity, referred to as pro-poor sectors. In this subsection, we empirically investigate 
these channels in turn and address some econometric issues raised in our empirical 
methodology.  
In Table 4 through Table 6, we present the main findings regarding potential 
channels trough which fiscal decentralization may impact poverty reduction outcomes. 
Table 4 shows the results for the education outcomes channels; Table 5 presents the 
findings for health outcomes channels; while in Table 6, we report the results for the 
agriculture productivity channel. In these analyses, we employ the GMM-IV estimation 
procedure presented in our previous discussion. We instrument for fiscal decentralization 
and pro-poor expenditures using their internal lag values. The results of the Sargan / 
Hansen test of joint significance and validity of the instruments are reported in each table.  
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In all specifications, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of validity of the instruments, as 
attested by the reported pvalue of the Sargan /Hansen test in the tables. 
We begin the discussions of our empirical results with the education outcome 
channel. Next, we analyze the health outcomes channel, and conclude this section with 
the analysis of the agriculture productivity channel. 
 
The Basic Education Channel  
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 reports results of the first pro-poor sectoral 
channel, the basic education outcomes, captured by youth literacy rate and repetition rate 
at the primary school level, respectively. We use the quadratic functional form suggested 
by the scatter plots in panel B of Figure 11 and include the square term of fiscal 
decentralization in the empirical estimation. 
In general, the results from Table 4 indicate a statistical significant relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and education outcomes, measured either by literacy rate 
among the young population or by repeater rate at primary school. Specifically, fiscal 
decentralization is likely to improve youth literacy rate, but at a decreasing rate. This 
implies that fiscal decentralization positively impact poverty outcomes up to a certain 
critical level beyond which more decentralization will have a negative impact on poverty 
outcomes. This is consistent with the belief that full decentralization of education sector 
may not always be the most efficient choice. Indeed, certain activities like the design of 
school curriculum, setting national standard and teachers’ training may be best 
undertaken and executed by sectoral ministries and department agencies at the central 
level. 
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Table 4:  GMM-IV Panel estimates for Education outcomes+  
 Education Outcomes 
Dependant Variables Youth Literacy 
Rate(% age 15-24) 
Repeater Rate at 
Primary School 
Specifications (1) (2) 
   
Pro-poor expenditure b  0.464** -3.524** 
 (0.215) (1.392) 
Fiscal decentralization b 1.906*** -0.493*** 
 (0.576) (0.112) 
Square of Fiscal Decentralization -2.600* 0.501** 
 (1.418) (0.223) 
Pupil – teacher ratio -1.248*** 0.060 
 (0.424) (0.067) 
Initial GDP per Capita a -5.186 1.822 
 (6.945) (1.654) 
Decentralization b ×  SSA dummy 0.999* 
(0.538) 
0.142** 
(0.072) 
Decentralization b ×  bureaucracy  0.243** 
(0.100) 
 
Decentralization b ×  corruption  
 
0.030 
(0.024) 
   
Hansen Test [Pvalue] 0.183 0.101 
Number of Observations 102 162 
 Robust Standard errors in parentheses    
 * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  Note:    a Variable in logarithm 
  b Variable expressed as a percentage of total expenditure                  
  + Year dummy included 
 
  
Similarly, pro-poor expenditures have a positive and statistically significant effect 
on youth literacy rate. Holding everything else constant, a 10%increase in pro-poor 
expenditures leads to an increase in literacy rate among young people by 4.6%. This 
result is consistent with previous studies by Barro (1990), Gupta et al. (2002)and others 
who found that public spending on social services (education and health) is likely to 
reduce poverty by increasing economic growth and promoting income equality. In the 
same line, Psacharopoulos (1994) justified the importance of public spending on basic 
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education as a result of the high social rate of return for primary education found in his 
study. Further, higher pupil-teacher ratio, a proxy for class size, leads to lower literacy 
rates among the young population. This finding is consistent with the general belief that 
reducing class size will be associated with high student performance. That is, teachers 
with smaller class size are expected to be more responsive to students’ needs and 
ultimately increase their school performance.78  
Moreover, fiscal decentralization is likely to improve youth literacy rate (% age 
15-24) more in Sub-Saharan Africa compared to other regions. The difference in effect 
between Africa and other regions is estimated to be approximately one percentage point. 
In other words, compared to other regions and holding everything else the same, the 
literacy rate among the population aged 15 to 24 years will increase by an additional 
percentage point in Sub-Saharan African countries relative to other regions. Our results 
also suggest that fiscal decentralization is more effective at reducing poverty when 
coupled with relatively better quality of bureaucracy. Specifically, an increase in the 
quality of bureaucracy by one point, improves the effect of fiscal decentralization on 
youth literacy rate by an additional 0.24% point.79  
When repeater rate in primary school is used as measure of basic education 
outcome, the result is similar. Public spending in pro-poor sectors is likely to reduce the 
primary school repetition rate. This finding is quite intuitive in the sense that we 
anticipate more resources available in the primary school system to be in principle 
                                                 
78 Although this line of argument seems appealing, recent empirical evidence have shown that there is little 
gain, in terms of students’ school performance, from reducing class size (Hanushek 1992, and Hanushek et 
al. 1998). They find the variations in students’ performance to be more explained by the variations in 
teachers’ quality. These findings also call for caution in using pupil-teacher ratio as an actual measure for 
class size.  
79 Recall that the quality of bureaucracy index varies between 0.56 and 6 in our sample, with higher number 
corresponding to better quality of bureaucracy practice.  
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associated with better qualified teachers, more personal assistance, and thereby better 
student performance. In other words, holding other things constant, this increase benefit 
will eventually retain the pupils in the primary school system up to completion. Again, 
the quadratic pattern observed earlier between fiscal decentralization and education 
outcome is persistent and statistically significant, even when we use a different measure 
of education outcome, repeater rate at primary schools. Fiscal decentralization is likely to 
reduce primary school repetition rate up to a certain critical threshold of fiscal 
decentralization beyond which the impact may diminish.  
According to our findings, the level of corruption does not seem to influence the 
outcome of fiscal decentralization on repeater rate at primary schools. However, there are 
regional differences in the outcome of fiscal decentralization on education outcome. In 
particular, Sub-Saharan African countries may experience a higher level of repetition rate 
at primary schools compared to other regions, as the level of fiscal decentralization 
increases. At first glance, this result seems contradictory, as one would expect fiscal 
decentralization to improve education outcome. But, this finding may be rationalized by 
the fact that repetition rate may not necessary correspond to poor educational outcome in 
majority of SSA countries.  For instance, in most Eastern and Western African countries, 
primary school pupils are not only required to take a qualification exam in order to 
proceed to secondary school, but the grading system is often too strict to favor a 
reasonable passing rate.80 In addition, this examination is overly competitive and tends to 
impede the progress of the majority of primary school pupils into secondary school 
                                                 
80 In Anglophone West African countries, this examination is called the West African Examination 
Council’s (WEAC) Common Entrance Exam, while in francophone Africa; it is the certificate of primary 
school education, called Certificat d’Etude Primaire (CEPE). 
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institutions. Thus, the negative coefficient on the interaction term between SSA and fiscal 
decentralization is not surprising. 
 Overall, our findings support our maintained hypothesis that fiscal 
decentralization improves education outcomes, though the impact for Sub-Saharan 
African countries is lower than other regions. These findings have some implications for 
poverty reduction and the two Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) directly related 
to education. Indeed, education, especially basic education, has proven to help reduce 
poverty. Improvement in the quality of human capital enhances productivity, broadens 
employment opportunities, increases growth and income levels of the poor 
(Psacharopolous and Woodhall 1985; Ranis et al. 2000). In addition, the two MDGs 
related to education (achieving universal primary education and promoting gender 
equality) are also found to help promote achievement of several other MDG goals, such 
as reducing poverty, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, lowering the 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS, and helping to ensure environmental sustainability. 
 
The Basic Health Care Channel 
Like basic education, access to basic health care services plays an important role 
in poverty reduction strategy. The health status of a country’s work force is a key 
determinant of its potential for economic growth and development. Columns (1) and (2) 
of Table 5 report results of the second pro-poor channel investigated in this dissertation, 
the basic health care outcomes, measured by child mortality and by immunization against 
preventive diseases. Again, we adopted a quadratic specification as suggested by the 
scatter plots in panel C of Figure 11. 
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  Table 5:  GMM-IV Panel Estimates for Health outcomes+  
 Health Outcomes 
Dependant Variable Child Mortality 
Rate 
Immunization 
Diphtheria 
Specifications (1) (2) 
   
Pro-poor expenditure b  -0.570*** 0.285*** 
 (0.201) (0.081) 
Fiscal decentralization b -2.057*** 0.139* 
 (0.483) (0.071) 
Square of Fiscal Decentralization 2.570*** -1.217** 
 (0.797) (0.487) 
Decentralization b ×  SSA dummy 2.586*** 0.028 
                                (0.610) (0.123) 
Birth attended by skilled staffs  /10^6 
 
-0.119 
(0.291) 
0.236** 
(0.098) 
Female schooling     
                                                                         
-0.845*** 
(0.268) 
 
Decentralization b ×  corruption  0.182*** 
(0.041) 
Decentralization b ×  civil liberty 0.190* 
(0.109) 
 
   
Hansen Test [Pvalue] 0.388 0.742 
Number of Observations 178 166 
 Robust Standard errors in parentheses    
 * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  Note:    a Variable in logarithm 
  b Variable expressed as a percentage of total expenditure                  
  + Year dummy included 
 
 
Overall, there is a strong and statistically significant evidence of non-linear 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and basic healthcare outcomes. In particular, 
fiscal decentralization is found to reduce child mortality or increase the coverage of 
immunization against preventive diseases such as diphtheria, measles and malaria. 
However, as shown by the sign on the quadratic term, the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and these health outcomes are non-linear. There is a critical threshold of 
fiscal decentralization beyond which these positive outcomes may be reversed. This may 
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explain the lack of consistent empirical evidence that exist to date on the study of the 
effect of decentralization on health care service delivery. Indeed, empirical investigation 
on the impact of decentralization on health outcomes for the poor are mixed. In some 
cases, the decentralization of health services performs positively and are pro-poor 
(Bossert 199; Hearse 2001), while in other cases there have been no significant impact on 
responsiveness to the poor and development orientation (Sekher 2005). Naturally, the 
incidence of decentralized health care services depends to a large extent on the design of 
the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations. When health care services are devolved 
in the absence of subsequent intergovernmental transfers, local authorities will be 
required to charge user fees and mobilize substantial own local resources to improve 
local services (Prudhomme 1995; Lubben et al. 2002). As such, decentralization of health 
care services can exert a substantial fiscal burden on poor areas and communities, unless 
the central government provides equalizing resources through the transfer mechanism.  
Likewise, pro-poor expenditures have a positive and statistically significant effect 
on reducing child mortality and increasing immunization coverage. Holding everything 
else the same, a 10 percent increase in pro-poor expenditures leads to a 5.7 percentage 
point reduction in child mortality rate (column1) and a 2.85 percentage point increase in 
immunization coverage against diphtheria (column2). These finding are in line with 
previous studies by Gupta et al. (2002) who found that public spending on social services 
(education and health) are likely to reduce poverty by increasing economic growth and 
promoting income equality. Younger (1999) also found that in Ecuador, health 
consultations for children at public facilities are more pro-poor in nature than health 
consultations for adults. Our results also suggest that female education (% female 
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population who completed primary education) is an important predictor of the reduction 
in child mortality. A one percentage increase in the proportion of female population who 
completed primary school is associated with a 0.85% point reduction in child mortality. 
This supports other empirical findings that have argued that improving literacy and 
education, particularly for girls and women, is one the most effective way to improve 
many human development indicators such as reduced fertility, better health and nutrition 
of children (World Bank 1995). Surprisingly, births attended by skilled staffs do not seem 
to matter in reducing child mortality, as evidenced by the statistically insignificant 
coefficient, though with the right sign, in column1 of table 5. Moreover, our results 
indicate that the effect of fiscal decentralization on immunization rate in Sub-Saharan 
African countries is not statistically different from regions of the globe. However, the 
results suggest that fiscal decentralization has a weaker effect in reducing child mortality 
in Sub-Saharan Africa than other regions. Specifically, the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on the reduction of child mortality rate is 2.6% lower in SSA countries 
than counties in other regions. This result in Sub-Saharan Africa has to be contrasted with 
not only the lack of knowledge for preventing and treating illnesses but also with the 
general lack of access to health services by the poor, compounded by a lack of 
accountability and performance by the health care sector (World Bank 2004). In addition, 
the particularly high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases in most African 
countries may explain this result. However, we found that greater civil liberties and lower 
level of corruption help improve the outcome of fiscal decentralization on health 
outcomes. For instance, in countries where there is high degree of civil liberties (i.e., civil 
liberty index =1), an increase in fiscal decentralization by 10 percent leads to a reduction 
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in child mortality by 1.9 percentage point, ceteris paribus. In contrast, holding every thing 
else the same, a 10% increase in fiscal decentralization will be associated with an 
increase in child mortality rate by 13.3 percentage point in countries with extremely low 
level of civil liberties (i.e., civil liberty index = 7).81 Similarly, countries with very low 
level of corruption (i.e., corruption index = 6) experience higher immunization coverage 
of 1.1 percentage point as a result of a 1% increase in decentralization, ceteris paribus.   
In conclusion, the results partially substantiate our hypothesis relative to the 
impact of fiscal decentralization on basic health care. Fiscal decentralization may 
improve basic health care service up to a certain threshold, beyond which any increase in 
fiscal decentralization may actually undermine this outcome. In addition, we found the 
effect of fiscal decentralization on health outcomes to be weaker in Sub-Saharan Africa 
compared to other regions.  However, the findings suggest that good quality of 
governance (i.e., using corruption index and the degree of civil liberty) has an 
unambiguously high impact on basic health care outcomes (i.e., child mortality and 
immunization coverage).  
 
The Agriculture Productivity Channel  
International trends suggest that the output and yield of staple foods has a large 
impact on poverty trends (IFAD 2001). These findings have some important implications 
for poverty strategy in the sense that three-quarters of the 1.2 billion people who live in 
extreme poverty are found in rural areas where they work (World bank 2005). Of these 
poor people residing in rural areas, around 75 percent make a living from agriculture, 
                                                 
81 Note that the civil liberty index varies from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating greater civil liberty and 7 lower 
degree of civil liberty.  
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which typically represent the largest economic sector in most developing countries 
(IFAD 2001). 
Thus, any decentralization policy that seeks to empower grassroots people 
through the empowerment of their local governments seems a natural avenue to promote 
poverty reduction in rural sector. In the context of agricultural development, the basic 
aim of decentralization should be to improve the delivery of basic local services like 
agricultural extension by assuring that the extension services that are provided respond to 
local needs. Here, we empirically investigate this premise by regressing fiscal 
decentralization and a set of control variables on agriculture productivity (i.e., agriculture 
value added per worker).  
We adopt a quadratic specification as suggested by the scatter plot in panel D of 
figure 11, in order to account for the potential non-linear relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and agriculture productivity. Our control variables include the use of 
agriculture machine per worker (a proxy for agriculture inputs), pro-poor expenditures, 
measure of quality of governance and regional disparity.  
The results suggest that fiscal decentralization has a statistically significant effect 
on agriculture productivity, though the relationship is non-linear. In particular, fiscal 
decentralization will improve the agriculture value added per worker up to a threshold 
beyond which more fiscal decentralization may reduce agriculture productivity. Indeed, 
fiscal decentralization may facilitate the use of local knowledge, local participation and 
ownership by utilizing local resources. Furthermore, decentralization has the potential to 
enhance transparency and accountability in the delivery of agricultural services, allowing 
local governments and community groups to more closely monitor service providers in 
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order to reduce shirking by extension workers and to ensure that extension services are 
actually delivered.  
 
Table 6:  GMM-IV Panel Estimates Agricultural Productivity outcomes+  
 Agriculture Outcomes 
Dependant Variables Agriculture Value 
Added Per Worker 
Specifications (1) (2) 
   
Pro-poor expenditure b  0.021*** 0.019*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Fiscal decentralization b 0.031** 0.065*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Square of Fiscal Decentralization -0.084*** -0.078*** 
 (0.025) (0.022) 
Decentralization b  SSA dummy × -0.039*** -0.034*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) 
Agriculture machinery  
                                          
1.400*** 
(0.235) 
1.293*** 
(0.230) 
Decentralization b  corruption × 0.005* 
(0.003) 
 
Decentralization b  civil liberty ×
 
 -0.007*** 
(0.002) 
   
Hansen Test [Pvalue] 0.634 0.668 
Number of Observations 169 178 
 Robust Standard errors in parentheses    
 * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  Note:    a Variable in logarithm 
  b Variable expressed as a percentage of total expenditure                  
  + Year dummy included 
 
However, as suggested by our findings, fiscal decentralization may not always 
produce satisfactory agricultural productivity outcomes. Like in any other sector, the 
design of fiscal decentralization policy and the sequence of the implementation in the 
agricultural sector, have to be done properly in order to ensure a positive agriculture 
productivity outcome. Indeed, to the extent that agriculture extension and livestock 
development focus on supporting agricultural production by poor subsistence farmers and 
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small-holders, the link between agricultural programs and poverty reduction will be often 
more direct than in the cases of education and health care.  
As expected, the use of agriculture machinery by farmers increases the agriculture 
productivity per worker. A one point increase in agriculture machinery leads to an 
increase in the agriculture productivity by 0.014 percentage point, ceteris paribus. Indeed, 
the dissemination of technical know-how to small farmers may improve the access to 
seed and fertilizer, increase the adoption of irrigation schemes, enhance market access, or 
improve the assistance of veterinary services for livestock owners, which are key 
determinant of good agriculture productivity outcomes. Thus, to the extent that 
agricultural extension and support programs are effective in increasing agricultural 
production, these programs directly increase the earning potential of poor rural 
households.   
The quality of governance is an important predictor of the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on agriculture productivity. In effect, lower level of corruption or greater 
level of civil liberties positively influences the impact of fiscal decentralization on 
agriculture productivity, holding everything else the same.82 This may be explained by 
the fact that decentralization has the potential to enhance transparency and accountability 
in the delivery of agricultural services, allowing local governments and community 
groups to be more pro-active in monitoring service providers in order to reduce potential 
shirking by extension workers and to ensure that extension services are effectively 
delivered. 
                                                 
82 Recall that the corruption index ranges between 0 and 6, with 6 indicating high corruption level; whereas 
civil liberties index fluctuates between 1 and 7, with 7 representing low level of civil liberty.   
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The results also indicate that the impact of fiscal decentralization on agricultural 
productivity is lower in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) compared to other regions. In 
particular, the difference in effect of the impact of fiscal decentralization on agricultural 
productivity is 0.35 percentage point lower in SSA countries compare to countries in 
other regions. Indeed, these results should be interpreted with caution, and should not be 
understood as evidence against fiscal decentralization; but rather the positive effect of 
fiscal decentralization on agricultural value added per worker is smaller in SSA relative 
to other regions. In fact, several reasons may explain this finding. Fist, agricultural 
extension programs in Africa are still at their infancy stage and farm productions in most 
African rural areas are done through traditional rudimentary methods.83 Thus, even 
though agriculture extension and agriculture machines are likely to improve agricultural 
productivity, their relative use in African countries are often too moderate or at an 
experimental stage to produce any substantially higher impact. Second, as shown above, 
the quality of government institutions is an important predictor of the increase effect of 
fiscal decentralization on agricultural productivity. However, in most African countries, 
government institutions are often weak and unstable (Gyimah-Brempong 2002). For 
instance, according to the 2005 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 
six of the ten most corrupt countries in the world are from SSA region, where 33% of the 
population is living with hunger or with insufficient food (UN 2006).84  
As a result, given the large scale of decentralization programs, including the 
agricultural sector, currently undergoing in different countries in SSA, more assessment 
                                                 
83 Recently, the Farmers Field School (FFS) approach, which emerged in Asia (Philippines) in 1970, has 
been implemented in some African countries (started with two pilots, Ghana in 1995 and Mali in 1997) in 
order to foster agricultural development by reinforcing adult education, agroecology and local 
organizational development (Simpson and Owens, 2002).   
84 The United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals Report 2006. 
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work may need to be undertaken with regards to the design and implementation of fiscal 
decentralization programs. This will ensure desirable outcomes for agricultural 
productivity, which has serious implication for rural poverty reduction. Indeed, a number 
of studies have shown that in many developing countries, the largest growth in poverty 
reduction has occurred as a result of agricultural growth (Binswanger and Von Braun 
1991; Ravallion and Datt 1995; Bourguignon and Morrison 1998, and Hazell et al. 2000). 
In the same line, Sarris and Markova (2001) demonstrated that improving farm 
production in rural areas helps spur a non-farm activity, which is critical to insulating 
rural families from poverty. 
 
 
 
    
 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In this dissertation we explored the link between decentralization and poverty 
reduction outcomes. We looked at two aspects of this link – the overall impact of 
decentralization on levels of poverty and potential channels through various poverty 
reduction outcomes. For the first aspect, we empirically estimate the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on four measures of income and non-income poverty levels. For the 
income measures, we use the three traditional measures – poverty headcount (H), poverty 
gap (PG) and the square poverty gap (SPG). However, poverty is a multifaceted concept 
and to account for this complexity, we also employ non-income measures of poverty 
proposed by the United Nation Development Program (UNDP), the Human Development 
Index (HDI).  
 We implement the empirical estimation using the Generalized Method of Moment 
Instrumental Variable (GMM-IV) methodology based on Baum et al. 
(2003).Furthermore, given Africa’s relatively poor performance with regards to 
attainment of their Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) targets, we investigate 
whether there is any potential differences in the impact of fiscal decentralization on 
poverty relative to other regions.  
Theoretically, we develop a simple framework to assess poverty reduction 
outcomes in a decentralized provision of pro-poor public goods and services. Our model 
is based on Kanbur and Feroni (1991), Faguet (2004) and Besley and Coate (2003), but 
explicitly introduces the poverty dimension. The model provides a generic theoretical 
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framework to understand the interaction between decentralization and poverty reduction 
outcomes. Our main conclusion from the theoretical model is that the impact of 
decentralization on poverty depends on the relative magnitude of the proximity advantage 
of subnational government and the superior technical capacity of the central government. 
 Our empirical results reveal a statistical significant non-linear relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and poverty. In all our estimations, fiscal decentralization 
improves poverty reduction outcomes. However, as mentioned above, the relationship is 
non-linear; that is, after a certain critical threshold, fiscal decentralization may have a 
negative impact on poverty reduction. This fiscal decentralization threshold is estimated 
to range from 25% to 38%. Further, we find that fiscal decentralization is likely to have a 
larger effect on poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA) relative to 
other regions.  
 Our empirical analysis also indicates a potential transmission of the effect of 
fiscal decentralization on poverty through three pro-poor sectoral outcomes – basic 
education, basic health and agricultural productivity. The empirical results on these 
outcomes are mixed for the Sub-Saharan Africa sample, but hold for the full sample.  
 These results may have a number of implications in regard to policy making. 
First, it might help to evaluate decentralization policies, especially in developing 
countries where substantial public sector reforms are being implemented. Second, it is 
also important to realize that very high level of fiscal decentralization may not 
necessarily serve the interest of the poor, as evidenced by the non-linear relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and poverty. This might have implication on the 
structuring of decentralization policy.  
 
 
    120
 
APPENDIX A: 
 
THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT OF POVERTY REDUCTION 
 
Evolution of Thinking about Poverty and Poverty Reduction Policies 
Poverty Reduction has become a key challenge facing the world community. 
Poverty Reduction policies have evolved over the years according to the evolution of 
thinking about poverty. As discussed in section 2.1, the definition and measurement of 
poverty has broadened over the past quarter of a century, and as it has broadened, so have 
the relevant set of policies expanded. A deeper understanding of poverty has been critical 
to the design and implementation of specific programs and projects to help people escape 
poverty.  
 During the 1970s and 1980s, poverty was viewed mainly as a lack of income or 
commodities. Consequently, policies turned their attention to the expansion of per capita 
income through economic growth as the key strategy to reduce poverty. In other words, 
poverty reduction strategies during those two decades focused on an indirect approach: 
through growth-led policies the flow of benefits to the poor would be enhanced 
(Ahluwalia 1990 and Bhagwati 1988). During this time, governments heavily intervened 
in the national economy pursuing macroeconomic stability and growth, encouraging 
private sector development, promoting good governance, investing in social 
development, accelerating trade liberalization, and strengthening financial sectors with 
the hope that all this would indirectly, but significantly, affect poverty. 
 However, the empirical evidence has shown that economic growth is on average 
not pro-poor or distribution neutral, unless it is combined with the right policies to assure 
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that the poor can participate fully in the opportunities brought in by that growth 
(Ravallion 2004). 
 During the late 1980s and 1990s, the concept of poverty was broadened, as was 
seen in section 2.1, to include, in addition to income, a wide set of non-income basic 
needs, such as primary education, basic health and access to social services. The United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) played a leading role in re-defining poverty in 
terms of human development, and introducing several new measures including the 
Human Development Index and the Human Poverty Index, also reviewed above. 
 As the new dimensions of poverty were incorporated into these indexes, the range 
of policy instruments to reduce poverty also expanded. Economic growth was not viewed 
any longer as the sole tool for poverty reduction but rather as a necessary condition. 
During this time, the focus turned to policies and programs to improve health, expand 
education and other sectoral spending, supplementing other government actions designed 
to promote investment and broad-based growth. This strategy of targeted spending 
became known as the “direct approach,” which relies on targeted programs aimed 
directly at increasing the welfare of identified poverty groups. Besides expenditure 
policies on services that directly benefit the poor, other targeted programs include wage-
employment and financial assistance programs, better known as safety net programs.  
 As we have seen in Section 2.1 above, in recent years the concept of poverty has 
been broadened even further to include other aspects such as vulnerability, 
powerlessness, voice, and participation.  This calls for the active participation of different 
sections of society, especially the poor, in the design of public policies (for example in 
the context of decentralization) for poverty reduction. The new architecture of 
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international aid to fight poverty, such as PRSPs, prescribes participation as an integrated 
part of the approach. 
  
Current Trends in International Development Strategies and Practice 
A number of recent innovations in aid practice spring out of lessons learned from 
now a long history of Development Cooperation. Table A1 provides a schematic history 
of development strategies and policy practices during the past five decades. The new aid 
mechanisms that have emerged in response to past experience focus on three issues: 
country ownership, sound policy and institutional environment, and cooperation between 
government and donors (Foster 2000).  
 
 
Table A1: Historical Trends in Development Cooperation 
 
1960s: With donor support, governments to displace private sector: National 
Development Plans, government-led industrialization, nationalization. 
 
1970s: Donors to displace government: donor driven projects with own 
management structures outside government, such as integrated rural 
development. 
 
1980s: Governments, responding to donor/IFI stipulations, return ownership to 
private sector: Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) and privatization. 
 
1990s: Donors begin to return ownership to government: Sector wide programs 
(SWAPs), direct budget support, HIPC. 
 
2000s: Emphasis on increasing voice and accountability: governance, 
participation, Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and 
PRSPs. 
 
Source: compiled from various source, including Foster (2000). 
 
Although significant progress has been made in designing and implementing 
poverty reducing policies, there is still an important ongoing debate on what policies may 
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be most effective in achieving poverty reduction, and how international financial 
institutions, bilateral donors and other actors can best contribute towards this goal. Just as 
poverty reducing policies have evolved adapting to the changes in the prevailing concept 
of poverty, so have the general approaches to international development strategies and 
practices. The 1980s and 1990s were decades of growth in the wealth of many nations, as 
the world’s economy grew, benefiting from growth in trade, liberalization, and 
technological innovations. However, in this era of globalization the situation of many 
poor countries and the poor people within those countries did not improve.  
 In the early 1980s the IMF introduced “structural adjustment policies” (or SAPs) 
as a way to help poorer countries join the global boom. The SAPs were meant to stabilize 
national finances and to open the national economies to international trade, both of which 
were regarded as the fundamental basis for sustainable economic growth. Yet the SAPs 
appeared not to have been successful. Critics of the SAPs argue that they actually 
increased poverty, in part because in order to ensure debt repayment and economic 
restructuring SAPs required poor countries to reduce spending on items such as health, 
education and development, while debt repayment and other economic policies were 
made the priority.  
 By the 1990s, it was clear that a new strategy was needed for reducing poverty 
among developing countries. Several policy innovations followed. One of such policies 
was the “sector wide approaches” (or SWAPs), which essentially are mechanisms for 
coordinating support to public expenditure programs. Another policy innovation during 
the 1990s was the “Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative” (or the HIPC) launched by 
the World Bank and the IMF with the objective of reducing the poorest countries’ debt to 
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multilateral institutions. By the late 1990s, the World Bank launched the Comprehensive 
Development Framework (or CDFs) to provide a framework for key stakeholders 
(developing countries and donors) to identify national priorities for each sector. CDFs 
were to be country-led strategy involving all development actors in the country. Later, 
these would become the basis for the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) under 
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) initiated in 1999. The PRSP 
approach results in a comprehensive country-based strategy for poverty reduction aiming 
to provide the crucial link between national public actions, donor support, and the 
development outcomes needed to meet the United Nations' Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) have provided the 
operational basis for the IMF and the World Bank concessional lending and for debt 
relief under the HIPC Initiative. 
In the beginning of the new century, development strategies have become the 
center of the policy agenda at the international, national and regional level. The United 
Nations, for example, has adopted a number of declarations to reduce poverty, the latest 
being in 2000, through the MDGs, in which a global commitment was made to reduce 
poverty around the world by 50 percent by the year 2015, and which has become the 
overarching objective for both national and international stakeholders.  
 Currently, poverty reduction policies revolve around the Millennium Goals and 
the PRSP approach, as world leaders promised to work together to meet eight specific 
and measurable development goals and concrete targets for advancing development and 
reducing poverty by 2015 (see Table A2 for the list of goals and targets).  
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Table A2: United Nations Millennium Development Goals 
 
In September 2000, the member states of the United Nations unanimously adopted the 
Millennium Declaration. Following consultations among international agencies, including 
the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD, and the specialized agencies of the United Nations, the 
General Assembly recognized the Millennium Development Goals as part of the road map 
for implementing the Millennium Declaration. The Millennium Development goals and 
targets to be achieved by 2015 are: 
 
 Goal Target 
Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a 
dollar a day 
 
1 
 
Eradicate extreme poverty 
and hunger Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from 
hunger 
 
2 
Achieve universal primary 
education 
Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of 
primary schooling 
3 Promote gender equality 
and empower women 
Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary 
education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015 
4 Reduce child mortality Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children 
under five 
5 Improve maternal health Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio 
Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS 6 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria 
and other diseases 
Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other 
major diseases 
Integrate the principles of sustainable development into 
country policies and programs; reverse loss of 
environmental resources 
Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable 
access to safe drinking water 
 
7 
 
Ensure environmental 
sustainability 
Achieve significant improvement in lives of at least 100 
million slum dwellers, by 2020 
8 Develop a global 
partnership for development 
Open trading systems, special needs of least developed 
countries, debt, employment, access to medicines, etc. 
 
Source: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (accessed February 2003). 
 
The first seven goals focus on eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving 
universal primary education; promoting gender equality and empowering women; 
reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
other diseases; and ensuring environmental sustainability.  
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The eighth goal calls for the creation of a global partnership for development, 
with targets for aid, trade, and debt relief. People, government, and external actors are 
encouraged to embrace the Goals and to own the PRSP process and take action. 
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APPENDIX B: 
A TYPOLOGY OF POVERTY MEASURES 
 
The multidimensional nature of poverty raises the question of how to measure and 
compare it over time and across communities. In this subsection we consider the 
strengths and shortcomings of the ways in which different aspects of poverty are 
measured and quantified. 
 
Income-poverty Measures 
 
Headcount Ratio 
The poverty headcount ratio has been for decades one of the most widely used 
poverty indicators because of its computational and interpretation ease. The headcount 
ratio (H) is simply the proportion of population that is poor. In a sense, it is the 
percentage of the population living below the poverty line (see Table B1). 
 Though, computationally simple, the headcount ratio suffers from major 
limitations. This measure does not reflect the intensity or degree of poverty nor the 
distribution of the poor among themselves. For instance, a simple but very relevant 
question that the headcount measure fails to address is how far are the poor from the 
poverty line? 
 
Poverty Gap Ratio and the FGT Index of Poverty 
 An alternative measure proposed to account for the issues just mentioned above is 
the poverty gap ratio (PG). It accounts for the shortfall of incomes of the poor from the 
poverty line (see Table B1 for the explicit expression).  
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Table B1: Income-Based Poverty indicators 
¾ Headcount ratio index (Incidence of Poverty) 
n
qH = ; Where (q): Number of poor and (n) the total population. 
 
¾ Poverty Gap (Depth of Poverty) 
∑
=
−=
q
i
i
z
z
n
PG
1
1 µ
; for iµ < z; Where ( iµ ): Income of the ith poor person and (z) poverty line. It 
can also be expressed  in terms of the headcount ratio as: HIPG =   
Where 
z
zI
*µ−=  is the income gap of the poor; in which ( ) is the mean income among the 
poor.  
*µ
 
¾ Square Poverty Gap index,  SPG ( Severity of Poverty) 
2
1
1∑
= ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=
q
i
i
z
yz
n
SPG ;  
Where, y: income of the ith individual ranked in increasing value of income, (q) number of poor in the 
total population (n), and (α =2) the aversion for poverty. 
 
¾ Foster Greer Thorbecke (FGT) index of poverty  
α
α ∑
= ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=
q
i
i
z
yz
n
P
1
1
;  
(α ) is the aversion for poverty. Note that when  
• α =0, = H (Head Count Ratio) αP
• α =1, = PG (Poverty Gap Ratio) αP
• α =2, = SPG (Square Poverty Gap ratio) αP
 
¾ Sen’s poverty index 
*])1([ GIIHP −+=  
Where, H: is the headcount ratio as defined early; 
 I: is a per-person percentage gap (income-gap ratio) defined above;  
G*: is the Gini coefficient of the income distribution of the poor. 
 
¾ Watt’s poverty Index 
Watts (1968) has been widely used in the past. It includes in its formulation both the notion of income 
and non-income attributes of welfare. It is given by: ∑ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
i
iy
z
N
W log1 , where (z) poverty line 
and (y) a composite of human and non-human wealth 
 
This measure can also be expressed in terms of the headcount ratio as follows: 
; Where, (H) is the poverty headcount ratio and IHPG *=
z
zI
*µ−=  is the income gap 
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of the poor; in which ( ) is the mean income among the poor and (z) is the poverty line. 
To answer the question of how the poor are compared to their peers, also below the 
poverty line, Foster, Greer and Thorbecke-FGT (1984), propose another index, known as 
(P
*µ
α), that encompasses the three fundamental elements that should be measured by 
poverty indices: (i) the incidence, or the number of persons falling under a predefined 
poverty line; (ii) the intensity, which accounts for “depth” of poverty as well as 
incidence; and (iii) the severity, which reflects inequality among the poor. The general 
expression is given by: 
α
α ∑
= ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=
q
i
i
z
yz
n
P
1
1 ; Where (yi) represents the income of the (i) individual, ranked in 
increasing value of income, (q) is the number of poor in the total population (n), and (α) 
is the aversion for poverty. As α increases, more and more weight is given to the poorest 
of the poor. In addition, the FGT poverty index is decomposable or additive.85  Note that 
when α = 0,  yields the headcount poverty measure (H). And when α =1,  becomes 
the poverty gap (PG). (See Table B1). 
αP αP
 
Sen’s Poverty Index 
Sen (1976) proposed an alternative poverty index that is sensitive to the 
distribution of income among the poor, as opposed to the “crude” headcount ratio (H). As 
he argued, the headcount ratio is a crude index completely insensitive to income 
distribution: a pure transfers of income from the poorest poor to those who are better off 
will either keep (H) unchanged or make it go down.  Thus he maintained that a poverty 
                                                 
85 Additive decomposability, require that aggregate poverty be equal to the population weighted sum of 
poverty levels in the various sub-groups of society (Ravallion 1996). 
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index to overcome these problems should simultaneously satisfy the following two 
criteria: 
i. Monotonicity: given other things equal, a reduction in income of an 
individual below the poverty line must increase the poverty measure and; 
ii. Transfer: given other things equal, a pure transfer from a person below the 
poverty line to anyone who is richer must increase the poverty measure.    
  
 Acknowledging these axioms, Sen proposed a poverty index that introduces the 
distribution of income among the poor (or the Gini coefficient for the poor).86 However, 
Sen’s poverty index was later shown to be also problematic with respect to two different 
issues. First, it is not replication invariant, meaning that merging two populations with 
identical characteristic may change the value of the index. Second, it does not represent a 
continuous function of individual incomes.  
 
Watts’ Poverty Index 
Another poverty measure that has been widely used since its introduction in 1968 
is the Watts poverty index, though it remains less popular than the (Pα) class of poverty 
measures. Watts (1968) stipulates that the wealth of the individual or the household 
required for the computation of this index should normally be divided into two parts: 
“human wealth” and “non-human wealth.” The latter category refers mostly to the usual 
income sources, such as income transfers, salaries, and all “real-money sources of 
                                                 
86 It is interesting to note that the poverty gap measure (PG), commonly used by the United States Social 
Security Administration, also violates the transfer axiom, though it satisfies the monotonicity axiom. 
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income.” The former category pertains to the skills and the social condition of an 
individual in general. 
 A correct implementation of the Watts index should therefore include values that 
reflect both of these categories. See Table B1 for the general formulation of this index. 
One technical issue with the Watts index is that it does not work with zero values, since 
its computation relies on the use of a logarithmic function.  Therefore, the inclusion of 
“human wealth” in the computation ensures that there will be only positive values 
associated with individuals’ wealth. Interestingly, the Watts poverty index has also the 
desirable property of decomposability. 
 
Non-income-based Measures of Poverty 
  
               The concept of human development is motivated by the process of widening 
people’s choices and the level of well-being they can achieve. Such choices are neither 
finite nor static. But regardless of the level of development, the three essential choices for 
people are to live a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge, and to have access to the 
resources needed for a decent standard of living. Human development does not end there, 
however. Other choices, highly valued by many people, range from political, economic 
and social freedom to opportunities for being creative and productive and enjoying self-
respect and guaranteed human rights. Income clearly is only one option that people would 
like to have, and although an important one, it is not, in this view, the sum total of the 
lives of individuals. Indeed, income is seen as a means, with human development being 
the end. The most commonly used measures of human development in the literature are 
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the HDI, the HPI and the GDI discussed below (see Table B2 for a summary of these 
non-income measures of poverty). 
 
The Human Development Index (HDI)87
The Human Development Index (HDI) developed by the UNDP measures the 
average overall achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human 
development:  
1. A long and healthy life (longevity), as measured by life expectancy at birth. 
2. Knowledge, as captured by educational attainment, the adult literacy rate (with 
two-thirds weight) and the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross 
enrollment ratio (with one-third weight). 
3. A decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita (in PPP US$). 
Before the HDI itself is calculated, an index needs to be created for each of these 
dimensions. Once the dimension indices have been calculated, the HDI is calculated as 
the simple average of the three dimension indices: 
HDI = 1/3 (life expectancy index) + 1/3 (education index) + 1/3 (GDP index). 
 
The Human Poverty Index (HPI)88
The HPI was first proposed by Anand and Sen (1996), and later implemented in 
UNDP’s Human Development Report (1997). This concept aims at capturing deprivation 
with respect to the key non-income dimensions of well-being.  
 
 
                                                 
87 For more detailed information see UNDP Report (1990).  
88 For more details see UNDP Report (1997).  
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Table B2: Non-Income-Based Poverty indicators 
 
¾ The Human Development Index (HDI) 
              The UNDP (1990) defines the HDI as follows: 
 
HDI = 1/3 (life expectancy index) + 
            1/3 (education index) + 1/3 (GDP index) 
 
 The dimension indices, (X1) = Life expectancy 
(X2) = Literacy and (X3) = Logarithm of GDP per capita, are computed by looking across a range of 
countries and established the maximum and the minimum value for each indicator. Then a deprivation 
index for the ith indicator and the jth country is defined as: 
Iij =
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−
−
ij ij
ijij
minX X max
X X max , where lies between 0 and 1. ijI
So the deprivation index for country j as the average of the 3 deprivation indexes for the country: jI  = 
∑
=
3
13
1
i
ijI  
Such that: . A country’s human development is high if its HDI is more than 0.5.  ( ) jIHDI −=1
 
The Human Poverty Index (HPI) 
The HPI measures deprivation in the three basic dimensions of human development captured in the 
HDI: 
• Vulnerability to death at early age, measured by the probability at birth of not surviving to age 
40 (P1). 
• Exclusion from reading and communications, as measured by the adult illiteracy rate (P2). 
• Lack of access to basic economic provisions (P3), measured by proportion of people without 
(i) access to safe drinking water, (ii) percentage of people without access to health services, and (iii) 
percentage of children under 5 who are moderately and severely underweight. Formally,  
HPI = [ ] αααα 132131 )( PPP ++ , where 3=α  
 
o    The gender-related development index (GDI) 
Similar to the HDI, the GDI is computed as the unweighted average of three component indices: 
– the equally distributed life expectancy index, 
– the equally distributed education index and  
– the equally distributed income index:  
GDI = 1/3 (life expectancy index) +  
           1/3 (education index) + 1/3 (income index) 
 
 
o The Gender Empowerment measure (GEM) 
GEM focuses on women’s opportunities and captures gender inequality in three key areas: 
 Political participation and decision-making (1); 
 Economic participation (2); 
 Power over economic resources (3). 
For each of these 3 dimensions, an Equally Distributed Equivalent Percentage (EDEP) is computed as 
follows: 
[ ] ∈−∈−∈− += 1111 )()( indexMaleindexfemaleEDEP , Where 2∈=  
Finally, the GEM=
3
321 EDEPEDEPEDEP ++  
 
 
 
    134
The difference between HDI and HPI lies in the fact that the HDI emphasizes the 
average economic and social achievements for the entire population, while the HPI 
focuses on the deprived segments of the population of the country. This is consistent with 
the standard practice of confining poverty measures exclusively to the deprived segments. 
Another difference between the HDI and the HPI is that HPI exclusively concentrates on 
education and health, while the HDI also contain the additional component of GDP per 
capita (adjusted for the purchasing power parity). 
Typically two different types of human poverty index are used to assess 
deprivation in human well-being. The first one, HPI-1 is used for developing countries 
and the second one, HPI-2, for selected OECD countries (UNDP 1997).    
The HPI-1 measures deprivations in the three basic dimensions of human development 
captured in the HDI: 
1. A long and healthy life—vulnerability to death at a relatively early age, as 
measured by the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40. 
2. Knowledge—exclusion from the world of reading and communications, as 
measured by the adult illiteracy rate. 
3. A decent standard of living—lack of access to basic economic provisions, 
as measured by (i) percentage of people without access to safe drinking 
water, (ii) percentage of people without access to health services, and (iii) 
percentage of children under 5 who are moderately and severely 
underweight.89 
                                                 
89 Note that due to lack of reliable data on access to health services for recent years, often deprivation in a 
decent standard of living is measured by two rather than three indicators – the percentage of the population 
not using improved water sources and the percentage of children under five who are underweight. An 
unweighted average of the two is used as an input to the HPI-1. 
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The computation of HPI-1 is more straightforward than the HDI since there is no 
need to generate dimension indices, as the indicators used to measure the deprivations are 
already normalized between 0 and 100.  
The HPI-2 measures deprivations in the same dimensions as the HPI-1 and also 
captures social exclusion. Thus it reflects deprivations in four dimensions: 
1. A long and healthy life—vulnerability to death at a relatively early age, as 
measured by the probability at birth of not surviving to age 60. 
2. Knowledge—exclusion from the world of reading and communications, as 
measured by the percentage of adults (aged 16 - 65) lacking functional literacy 
skills. 
3. Adecent standard of living—as measured by the percentage of people living 
below the income poverty line (50% of the median disposable household income). 
4. Social exclusion—as measured by the rate of long-term unemployment (12 
months or more). 
 
The Gender-related Development Index (GDI) 
While the HDI measures average achievement, the GDI adjusts the average 
achievement to reflect the inequalities between men and women in the following 
dimensions: 
1. A long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth. 
2. Knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined primary, 
secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio. 
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3. A decent standard of living, as measured by estimated earned income (PPP 
US$). 
The GDI is computed as the unweighted average of three component indices—the 
equally distributed life expectancy index, the equally distributed education index and the 
equally distributed income index (see Table B2 for more detail on the computation 
process):90
GDI = 1/3 [life expectancy index + education index + income index]. 
 
The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) 
The GEM focuses on women’s opportunities in a given society by looking at 
gender inequality in three key dimensions:  
1. Political participation and decision-making power, as captured by the percentage 
of parliamentary seats occupied by men and women. 
2. Economic participation and decision-making power, as captured by two 
indicators, the percentage shares of positions as legislators, senior officials and 
managers occupied by men and women; and the percentage share of professional 
and technical positions occupied by men and women.  
3. Power over economic resources, as measures by men and women estimated 
income (PPP US$). 
                                                 
90 For a more detailed analysis of the GDI’s mathematical formulation see Anand and Sen’s (1996) 
“Gender Inequality in Human Development: Theories and Measurement,” Bardhan and Klasen’s (1999) 
“UNDP’s Gender-Related Indices: A Critical Review” and the technical notes in Human Development 
Report (1995) and Human Development Report (1999). 
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For each of these three areas, an Equally Distributed Equivalent Percentage 
(EDEP) is computed and the GEM is then calculated as the simple average of the three 
EDEPs: 
 GEM = 1/3 [parliamentary representation + economic participation + income index]. 
 
Linking Poverty and Income Inequality 
 
Whereas poverty emphasizes different forms of deprivation expressed as income 
or human capabilities, inequality is concerned with distribution within a population. 
Thus, unlike poverty which is defined only for the population below a certain threshold, 
inequality is defined over the entire population and does not necessary depend on the 
mean of the distribution. One way to assess inequality is to arrange individuals or 
households in ascending order of income or expenditures. The common method is to 
divide the population into successive deciles (tenths) or quintiles (fifths) from poorest to 
richest, and then associate the corresponding proportion of income or expenditures to 
each stratum.  The most used measures of inequality are the Dalton-Atkinson indices, 
Theil’s entropy measure and the Gini coefficient, all of which are briefly reviewed in the 
following sections, but before we do that we take a look at general relationship between 
poverty and inequality.  
 Poverty and inequality are closely linked: for any given mean income, the more 
unequal the income distribution, the larger the percentage of the population, living in 
income-poverty. Inequality can be conceptualized as the dispersion of a distribution, 
whether that is income, consumption or some other welfare indicator or attribute of a 
population. Inequality is often studied as part of broader analyses covering poverty and 
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welfare, although these three concepts are distinct. As mentioned earlier, inequality is a 
broader concept than poverty in that it is defined over the whole distribution, not only the 
censored distribution of individuals or households below a certain poverty line. Indeed 
some measures of inequality can be driven largely by incomes in the upper tail as well as 
in the lower tail of the distribution. Inequality is also a much narrower concept than 
welfare. Although both of these capture the whole distribution of a given indicator, 
inequality is independent of the mean of the distribution (a desirable property of an 
inequality measure), and instead solely concerned with the second moment, the 
dispersion, of the distribution.  
 
Figure B1: Correlation between Poverty (HDI) and Inequality (Gini) 
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To illustrate these points, Figure B1 above shows the relationship between 
poverty (measured by the HDI) and inequality outcomes (measured by Gini coefficient) 
for a sample of countries over the period 1975-2000.  As noted earlier, there seems to be 
a tradeoff between inequality and human development, so that for a given mean of 
income, the more unequal the income distribution (higher Gini coefficient), the higher the 
poverty rate (alternatively, the lower the human development index, HDI).This 
relationship is captured by the downward sloping fitted line on the left panel of Figure B1 
above. 
 
The Gini Coefficient 
This is a measure of inequality developed in 1912 by the Italian statistician 
Corrado Gini. It is one of the most widely used indicators of income inequality, though it 
can be used to measure any other type of unequal distribution. The Gini coefficient (Gini 
1912) is mainly derived from the Lorenz curve, a graphic device used to display the 
relative inequality in a distribution of income scale (Figure B2). Typically, the Lorenz 
curve is derived by plotting the cumulative share of total income (expenditure) earned by 
households ranked from bottom to top. The closer the Lorenz curve gets to the 45° 
diagonal (the egalitarian line), the more equal the distribution of incomes in the society. 
As the degree of inequality increases, the wider the curvature of the Lorenz curve 
becomes, and thus the area between the curve and the 45° line becomes larger.  
The Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the Lorenz curve departs from 
the egalitarian line (the 45° diagonal). It is calculated as the ratio of the area between the 
Lorenz curve and the 45° line, to the whole area below the 45° line. Formally, if A is the 
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area between the line of perfect equality and the Lorenz curve, and B, is the area 
underneath the Lorenz curve, then the Gini coefficient is the ratio G = A/(A+B) (see 
Figure B2). This ratio is expressed as a percentage or as the numerical equivalent of that 
percentage, which is always a number between 0 and 1, where, 0 corresponds with 
perfect equality (everyone has the same income) and 1 corresponds with perfect 
inequality (where one person has all the income and everyone else has zero income). (See 
Table B3 for the algebraic formulation). 
 
Figure B2: Gini Coefficient (G) 
 
 
 
 The Gini coefficient presents several advantages. First, it is a measure of 
inequality, not a measure of average income or some other variable which is 
unrepresentative of most of the population such as GDP. Indeed, GDP statistics are often 
criticized as they do not represent changes for the whole population, the Gini coefficient 
demonstrates how income has changed for poor and rich. If the Gini coefficient is rising 
as well as GDP, poverty may not be improving for the vast majority of the population. 
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 Second, the Gini coefficient is sufficiently simple that it can be compared across 
countries and over time, and be easily interpreted. It can also be used to compare income 
distributions across different population sectors, for example the Gini coefficient for 
urban areas differs to that of rural areas. The Gini coefficient can be used to indicate how 
the distribution of income has changed within a country over a period of time, thus it is 
possible to see if inequality is increasing or decreasing.  
 Third, the Gini coefficient satisfies four important principles: Anonymity, it 
doesn’t matter who the high and low earners are; Scale interdependence, the Gini 
coefficient does not consider the size of the economy, the way it is measured, or whether 
it is a rich or poor country on average; Population interdependence, it does not matter 
how large the population of the country is;  Transfer principle, meaning that if we 
transfer income from a rich person to a poor person, the resulting distribution is more 
equal. 
 However, the Gini coefficient is far from a perfect measure as it presents some 
important limitations. The first disadvantage is that it ignores the fact that comparing 
income distributions among countries may be difficult because redistribution and benefits 
systems may be different across countries. For example, some countries provide benefits 
in the form of money and others do it in kind (for example, food stamps). The latter are 
not counted as income in the Lorenz curve and therefore not taken into account in the 
Gini coefficient. In this same vein, the Lorenz curve may understate the actual amount of 
inequality if it is the situation is that richer households are able to use income more 
wisely than lower income households.  
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Table B3: Selected Inequality measures 
 
¾ The Gini coefficient  
The Gini coefficient is calculated algebraically by: ∑ ∑ −= i j ji yynG µ22 1   
It is often calculated using the more practical Brown Formula ))((1 11 ii iii yyxxG ∑ +−−= ++ ;  
Where G: Gini coefficient; X: cumulated proportion of the population variable; Y: cumulated 
proportion of the income variable;  
The Gini coefficient takes on values between 0 and 1, with (0) interpreted as no inequality and (1) 
perfect inequality.  
 
¾ The Atkinson class of inequality measure 
Atkinson (1970)proposed an inequality measure defined as: 
µ
EyA −= 1 ;  where ( Ey ) is the equally 
distributed equivalent level of income and (µ) is the actual mean income.  
The more equal the income distributions, the lower the value of the Atkinson Index, since yE becomes 
identical to µ.The index A lies between 0 and 1, for any given income distribution. Using a weighting 
parameter ε (measure of aversion to inequality), the Atkinson class of inequality measure can be express 
as: 
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¾ The general entropy measure 
The general entropy measure is formally given by:  
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−= ∑ i iynT 11)1( 1)(
α
µααα
; Where 
 n is the number of individuals in the sample, yi is the income of individual i, and µ is mean income. 
)(αT ranges from 0 to , with (0) representing an equal income distribution and higher values 
representing higher levels of income inequality. 
∞
 
• T(0) gives more weight to distances between incomes in the lower tail, it is also refers to as mean 
log deviation measure. It is given by: 
∑∑ −== i ii
i
y
nyn
T log1loglog1)0( µµ  
Typically, T(0) represent the inequality that would prevail if the mean income is substituted by the 
observed income within a group sharing the same characteristic.  
 
• T(1) is the Theil’s inequality measure (Theil  (1967)). It applies equal weights across the 
distribution of income and is given by : 
 µµµµ loglog
1log1)1( −=⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∑∑ ii iii i yynyynT  
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A second limitation of this measure comes from the fact that when collecting the 
income data initially, there will always be systematic and random errors. If the data are 
less accurate, then the Gini coefficient has less meaning. Also, countries may measure the 
statistics differently, thus it is not always possible to compare statistics between 
countries. Economies with similar incomes and Gini coefficients can still have very 
different income distributions. This is because the Lorenz curves can have different 
shapes and yet still yield the same Gini coefficient. As an extreme example, an economy 
where half the households have no income and the other half share income equally has a 
Gini coefficient of ½; but an economy with complete income equality, except for one 
wealthy household that has half the total income, also has a Gini coefficient of ½. This 
limitation exists whenever economies whose Lorenz curves intersect are compared. 
  Thirdly, the Gini coefficient is more sensitive to the income of the middle classes 
than to that of the extremes. That is, the Gini is more sensitive to income transfers 
between households if they lie near the middle of the income distribution compared to the 
tails.91   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 A more technical point is that the small sample variance properties of G are not known, and large sample 
approximations to the variance of G are poor. In order for G to be an unbiased estimate of the true 
population value, it should be multiplied by n/(n-1). 
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APPENDIX C 
 
VARIABLES APPENDIX 
 
 
Table C1: Descriptive Statistic: All Sample 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Agriculture machinery 464 0.231 0.366 0.000 1.759 
Agriculture value added per worker 434 5.9E+03 8763.5 77.197 49127.7 
Births attended by skilled staffs 491 44700000 1.E+08 212000 1.E+09 
Child Mortality rate 484 54.744 58.9 4.000 319 
Civil Liberty 417 3.065 1.708 1.000 7.000 
English Legal origin  491 0.342 0.475 0.000 1.000 
Ethnic Fractionalization  487 0.387 0.245 0.002 0.930 
Fertility rate 446 4.081 1.923 0.948 9.274 
Fiscal decentralization (expenditure) 491 19.458 15.358 0.823 58.822 
Fiscal decentralization (revenue) 487 15.090 13.700 0.235 53.150 
French Legal Origin 491 0.456 0.499 0.000 1.000 
GDP per capita (PPP) 474 9.2E+03 7886.0 5.1E+02 45582.6 
German Legal Origin 491 0.024 0.155 0.000 1.000 
Hospital beds 447 5.641 4.6 0.185 23.275 
Human Development Indicator (HDI) 491 0.729 0.160 0.210 0.960 
Immunization against diphtheria 433 73.627 24.1 1.200 99.938 
Immunization against measles 427 69.337 25.5 1.000 99.994 
Index of Corruption 364 3.831 1.485 0.000 6.000 
Index of quality of bureaucracy 366 3.732 1.696 0.010 6.000 
Initial value of GDP per capita 421 9060.408 7657.8 238.2 37081 
Initial value of Gini coefficient of Income 417 39.529 11.197 16.630 70.254 
Language Fractionalization 482 0.336 0.270 0.002 0.923 
latitude to the equator 467 0.284 0.205 0.011 0.722 
Life expectancy at birth 461 63.959 11.094 37.544 83.555 
Literacy of youth 343 87.582 17.3 19.546 99.807 
political right 415 2.902 1.912 1.000 7.000 
Population density 450 173.231 620.0 1.060 6502.9 
Poverty Gap (PG) 240 5.038 8.157 0.010 56.083 
Poverty Headcount (H) 240 14.214 17.871 0.018 92.827 
Pro-poor social expenditures 307 45.486 15.607 8.202 85.300 
Female schooling 404 16.413 10.738 0.200 63.100 
Schooling  404 16.847 9.780 0.500 64.700 
Religious Fractionalization 487 0.415 0.226 0.005 8602599 
Repeater rate at primary school (%) 383 6.908 6.486 0.000 35.000 
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Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Risk of expropriation 366 7.291 2.318 1.400 10.000 
Risk of repudiation  366 6.949 2.199 1.560 10.000 
Scandinavian Legal Origin 491 0.022 0.148 0.000 1.000 
Socialism legal origin 491 0.155 0.362 0.000 1.000 
Square Poverty Gap (SPG) 240 2.690 5.165 0.010 40.067 
Teacher - pupil ratio (in %) 475 26.126 11.321 6.100 64.600 
 
  
Table C2: Descriptive Statistic: Developing Countries Sample 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Agriculture machinery 314 0.039534 0.070812 3.39E-05 0.569364 
Agriculture value added per worker 312 1776.681 2041.499 77.1972 21821.88 
Births attended by skilled staffs 329 5.31E+07 1.70E+08 439000 1.24E+09 
Child Mortality rate 323 75.35769 62.3502 5 319 
Civil Liberty 255 3.92549 1.397621 1 7 
English Legal origin  329 0.325228 0.469174 0 1 
Ethnic Fractionalization  325 0.463229 0.228387 0.0394 0.930175 
Fertility rate 298 3.979792 1.888294 0.948333 9.274 
Fiscal decentralization (expenditure) 329 15.87664 13.89102 0.822527 55.14581 
Fiscal decentralization (revenue) 325 13.07383 12.83752 0.235019 52.25053 
French Legal Origin 329 0.486322 0.500574 0 1 
GDP per capita (PPP) 316 4591.243 2997.521 513.7574 15270.89 
German Legal Origin 329 0.018237 0.134012 0 1 
Hospital beds 292 3.84996 3.591957 0.18545 14.3086 
Human Development Indicator (HDI) 329 0.656238 0.145927 0.209667 0.884 
Immunization against diphtheria 293 68.99413 24.89848 1.2 99 
Immunization against measles 290 67.76694 26.086 1 99.99445 
Index of Corruption 215 2.990735 1.054239 0 6 
Index of quality of bureaucracy 217 2.671091 1.180696 0.01 6 
Initial value of GDP per capita 279 4514.298 2964.032 539.8337 14549.77 
Initial value of Gini coefficient of Income 279 42.97411 11.48712 18.6 70.25407 
Language Fractionalization 320 0.378201 0.288643 0.012422 0.92268 
latitude to the equator 311 0.282876 0.209008 0.0111 0.7222 
Life expectancy at birth 305 64.59439 10.57952 37.54415 83.55512 
Literacy of youth 300 86.08581 17.96615 19.54575 99.80708 
political right 254 3.77769 1.738728 1 7 
Population density 299 206.6742 751.1381 1.060229 6502.879 
Poverty Gap (PG) 240 5.038245 8.156947 0.01 56.08333 
Poverty Headcount (H) 240 14.214 17.87137 0.018333 92.82667 
Pro-poor social expenditures 164 40.677 15.62336 8.201923 76.81545 
Female schooling 248 12.59194 9.443744 0.2 61.5 
Schooling  248 13.99153 8.352098 0.5 57 
Religious Fractionalization 325 0.406004 0.220627 0.004861 0.86026 
Repeater rate at primary school (%) 256 8.552344 6.819528 0 35 
Risk of expropriation 217 6.21479 2.140794 1.4 10 
Risk of repudiation  217 5.789019 1.859708 1.56 9.493 
Scandinavian Legal Origin 329 0.015198 0.122524 0 1 
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Socialism legal origin 329 0.155015 0.362471 0 1 
Square Poverty Gap (SPG) 240 2.689617 5.164733 0.01 40.06667 
Teacher - pupil ratio (in %) 317 29.90076 11.21175 10.4 64.6 
 
 
Table C3: Descriptive Statistic: Higher Income OECD and Non-OECD Countries  
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Agriculture machinery 150 0.63321 0.408229 0.000057 1.759393 
Agriculture value added per worker 122 16391.32 10454.69 2316.474 49127.73 
Births attended by skilled staffs 162 2.77E+07 4.79E+07 212000 2.75E+08 
Child Mortality rate 161 13.38872 8.475993 4 54 
Civil Liberty 162 1.709959 1.196837 1 6.4 
English Legal origin  162 0.376543 0.486021 0 1 
Ethnic Fractionalization  162 0.233342 0.203208 0.001998 0.71242 
Fertility rate 148 4.286258 1.981967 1.218 7.3 
Fiscal decentralization (expenditure) 162 26.72987 15.66391 1.049501 58.82211 
Fiscal decentralization (revenue) 162 19.1357 14.50029 0.616333 53.15038 
French Legal Origin 162 0.395062 0.49038 0 1 
GDP per capita (PPP) 158 18551.29 6211.615 3498.313 45582.56 
German Legal Origin 162 0.037037 0.189438 0 1 
Hospital beds 155 9.015557 4.425847 0.712 23.275 
Human Development Indicator (HDI) 162 0.875409 0.046251 0.707 0.96 
Immunization against diphtheria 140 83.3223 18.88381 11 99.93777 
Immunization against measles 137 72.6594 23.86579 4 98.8 
Index of Corruption 149 5.042849 1.140653 1 6 
Index of quality of bureaucracy 149 5.277372 1.004342 2.124 6 
Initial value of GDP per capita 142 17992.55 6009.283 238.1537 37081.04 
Initial value of Gini coefficient of Income 138 32.56495 6.318001 16.63 53.2 
Language Fractionalization 162 0.25134 0.204813 0.002113 0.643954 
latitude to the equator 156 0.286126 0.197966 0.0111 0.6889 
Life expectancy at birth 156 62.71756 11.97581 40.5122 79.75935 
Literacy of youth 43 98.0175 3.1518 83.52361 99.8 
political right 161 1.520973 1.243168 1 7 
Population density 151 107.0074 151.8584 1.921202 972.6802 
Poverty Gap (PG) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Poverty Headcount (H) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pro-poor social expenditures 143 51.00115 13.6879 18.83826 85.2998 
Female schooling 156 22.48718 9.85924 3.6 63.1 
Schooling  156 21.38718 10.18594 3.7 64.7 
Religious Fractionalization 162 0.434472 0.236745 0.091095 0.824078 
Repeater rate at primary school (%) 127 3.594488 4.107857 0 19 
Risk of expropriation 149 8.859201 1.546642 1.5115 10 
Risk of repudiation  149 8.639272 1.42285 3.282 10 
Scandinavian Legal Origin 162 0.037037 0.189438 0 1 
Socialism legal origin 162 0.154321 0.362376 0 1 
Square Poverty Gap (SPG) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Teacher - pupil ratio (in %) 158 18.55295 6.889371 6.1 51.8 
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   Table C4: Correlation Matrix of Selected Variables 
                     
                                        
    (a) (b)  (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) 
  (a) 1.00                                   
  (b) -0.53 1.00                                 
  (c) -0.45 0.95 1.00                               
  (d) -0.49 0.87 0.96 1.00                             
  (e) 0.70 -0.58 -0.61 -0.62 1.00                           
  (f) -0.15 0.21 0.24 0.24 -0.33 1.00                         
  (g) -0.89 0.43 0.34 0.37 -0.64 0.29 1.00                       
  (h) 0.68 -0.39 -0.34 -0.34 0.54 -0.39 -0.77 1.00                     
  (i) 0.74 -0.55 -0.42 -0.37 0.43 -0.14 -0.64 0.46 1.00                   
  (j) 0.12 -0.07 -0.15 -0.18 0.15 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.08 1.00                 
  (k) 0.25 -0.08 -0.13 -0.18 0.19 0.04 -0.08 0.04 0.21 0.93 1.00               
  (l) 0.72 -0.33 -0.19 -0.18 0.43 -0.02 -0.61 0.51 0.68 -0.06 0.13 1.00             
  (o) 0.16 0.19 0.27 0.26 -0.18 0.24 -0.10 0.04 0.05 0.27 0.25 0.22 1.00           
  (r) -0.10 0.09 -0.02 -0.07 0.08 -0.07 0.10 0.05 -0.27 0.50 0.51 -0.21 -0.24 1.00         
  (s) 0.56 -0.37 -0.30 -0.26 0.34 0.04 -0.39 0.35 0.81 0.21 0.33 0.53 -0.07 -0.12 1.00       
  (t) 0.33 -0.20 -0.18 -0.21 0.08 -0.09 -0.39 0.37 0.21 0.04 0.03 0.24 0.26 -0.18 0.08 1.00     
  (u) -0.44 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.17 -0.09 0.33 -0.23 -0.40 0.07 0.04 -0.49 -0.32 0.39 -0.26 -0.42 1.00   
  (v) 0.32 -0.32 -0.42 -0.47 0.28 -0.03 -0.34 0.33 0.14 0.35 0.27 0.01 0.25 0.08 0.06 0.63 -0.09 1.00 
                                        
   Variables Definitions 
                                        
  (a) Human Development Indicator (HDI) (g) Child Mortality rate (m) Initial value of Gini coefficient 
  (b) Poverty Headcount (H)     (h) Immunization diphtheria  (n) Births attended by skilled staffs 
  (c) Poverty Gap (PG)       (i) Agriculture value added per worker  (o) agriculture machinery 
  (d) Square Poverty Gap (SPG)   (j) Fiscal decentralization (expenditure) (p) Index of Corruption 
  (e) Literacy of Youth       (k) Fiscal decentralization (revenue) (q) Index of Civil liberty 
  (f) Repeater rate at primary school (l) Pro-poor social Expenditures   (r) Index of quality of bureaucracy 
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Table C5: Description of Variables and Data Source 
 
 
Variables Description and Data Source 
 
Human 
Development 
Index (HDI) 
 
 
 
 
 
Human Development Index (HDI) measures the average overall achievements in 
three basic dimensions: longevity measured by life expectancy, knowledge, 
captured by educational attainment (adult literacy and combined primary, 
secondary and tertiary enrolment), and a decent standard of living, by adjusted 
income, real GDP per capita (in PPP$). 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report (2004) 
 
Poverty 
Headcount (H) 
The poverty headcount ratio (%), set at the international $1 (1993 PPP US$) per 
person per day, measures the percentage of the population living beneath that 
poverty line. It is also referred to as the “incidence” of poverty 
Source: World Bank’s PovCalNet: 
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp (accessed March 2004). 
Poverty Gap 
(PG) 
The poverty gap ratio (%), measures in percentage terms how far the average 
expenditure (income) of the poor falls short of the international poverty line of  $1 
(1993 PPP US$) per person a day. The average is taken over the entire population, 
counting the non-poor as having zero poverty gap. The measure reflects the 
“depth” of poverty.   
Source: World Bank’s PovCalNet: 
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp (accessed March 2004). 
 
Square Poverty 
Gap (SPG) 
The square poverty gap ratio (%) of James Foster, J. Greer, and Eric Thorbecke 
(FGT), measures the average of the squared proportionate poverty gap, where the 
average is taken over the entire population with zero value of poverty gap to the 
non-poor. By squaring the poverty gap, more weight is given to larger gaps, thus 
capturing the inequality among the poor. The square poverty is also referred to as 
the “severity” of poverty.  
Source: World Bank’s PovCalNet: 
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp (accessed March 2004). 
 
Expenditure 
decentralization 
 
Share of expenditures of all subnational governments (net of transfers to other 
levels of government) in total expenditures of consolidated central budget 
measured in percents. Scale from 0 to 100. Source: Database on Fiscal Indicators, 
by the World Bank, based on IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (2005). 
Revenue 
Decentralization 
 
Share of revenues of all subnational governments in total revenues of consolidated 
central budget measured in percents. Scale from 0 to 100. Source: Database on 
Fiscal Indicators, by the World Bank, based on IMF’s Government Finance 
Statistics (2005). 
Pro-poor Public 
Expenditure 
 
 
Index that measure categories of public spending on ‘social services’ that are more 
likely to benefit the poor and contribute to welfare indicators. They generally 
include public expenditures on basic health, primary education, sanitation, housing 
and welfare programs. 
Source: IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (2005) and World Development 
Indicator (2005).  
Life expectancy 
 
 
Life expectancy is the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing 
patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its 
life. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank 
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Variable 
 
Description and Data Source 
 
 
 
Immunization  
against 
Diphtheria 
 
Immunization, DPT (% of children under 12 months). Child immunization 
measures the rate of vaccination coverage of children under one year of age. A 
child is considered adequately immunized against diphtheria, pertussis (or 
whooping cough), and tetanus (DPT) after receiving three doses of vaccine. Scale 
from 0 to 100.  
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank  
 
Latitude 
 
The absolute latitude of the country, scaled to take values between 0 and 1.  
Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
 
Population 
density 
 
Population density is midyear population divided by land area in square 
kilometers. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank 
 
Immunization 
against Measles 
 
Immunization, Measles (% of children under 12 months). Child immunization 
measures the rate of vaccination coverage of children under one year of age. A 
child is considered adequately immunized against measles after receiving three 
doses of vaccine. Scale from 0 to 100.  
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank  
 
 
Child Mortality 
Rate 
Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching the age of five, 
per 1000 live births in a given year.  
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank 
 
 
Literacy Rate, 
Youth 
Literacy rate, is the literacy rate among people ages 15–24 
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank 
 
 
Openness 
 
Error term from the linear regression of the share of export and import in GDP 
(measured in percent) on the area and population of the country.  
Source: Based on data from World Development Indicators (2005), by the World 
Bank 
 
 
Pupil-teacher 
ratio (Primary 
school) 
 
Primary school pupil-teacher ratio is the number of pupils enrolled in primary 
school divided by the number of primary school teachers (regardless of their 
teaching assignment), expressed in percentage.  
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank 
  
 
 
Fertility 
 
Total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to a 
woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in 
accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank 
 
 
 
Legal origin 
 
Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of the country. 
There are five possible origins: (1) English Common Law; (2) French Commercial 
Code; (3) German Commercial Code; (4) Scandinavian Commercial Code; (5) 
Socialist/Communist laws. 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
 
 
 
Index of 
Corruption  
 
The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Indexes for years 2000 and 
2001 respectively. Scale from 0 to 10, with higher values corresponding to better 
governance outcomes.  
Source: The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Political Risk Group 
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Variable 
 
Description and Data source 
 
 
 
 
Political Rights 
A country rating on a scale of 1 to 7 that indicates the degree of political rights in 
regard to existence of free and fair elections, competitive parties or other political 
groupings, an opposition that plays a significant role in political decision-making, 
and the rights of minority groups to self-government. A rating of 1 indicates 
highest level of political rights (closest to the ideals) suggested in the survey. 
Source: Freedom in the World 2003; Freedom House 
 
 
Civil Liberties 
A country rating on a scale of 1 to 7 that indicates the degree of civil liberties in 
regard to aspects such as the degree of freedom of expression, assembly, 
association, education, religion, and an equitable system of rule of law. A rating of 
1 indicates the highest level of civil liberties. 
Source: Freedom in the World 2003; Freedom House 
 
 
 
Index of 
Corruption 
An index on a scale of 0 to 6 that measures perceptions of corruption. Corruption 
in this context is defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. A higher 
score indicates lower expectations of corruption.  
Source: The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Political Risk Group  
 
 
Index of 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
An index on a scale of 0 to 6 that measures bureaucratic delays and the general 
effectiveness of the government bureaucracy. A higher score indicates a more 
effective bureaucracy. 
Source: The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Political Risk Group 
 
 
Risk of 
Repudiation 
An index on a scale of 0 to 10 that measures the risk that government will renege 
on their contracts by modifying the terms due to budget cuts resulting from 
revenue drops or any political reasons. 
Source: The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Political Risk Group 
 
 
Risk of 
Expropriation 
This is an index on a scale of 0 to 10 that measures the risk of expropriation of 
private property by government through confiscation or nationalization. 
Source: The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Political Risk Group 
 
Developing 
countries 
dummy 
 
Dummy equal to 1 if country does belongs to developing countries. Equal to 0 if 
country belongs to high Income OECD or Non-OECD. 
Source: Based on World Bank’s countries classification  
 
Agriculture 
Value Added 
per worker 
 Agriculture value added per worker is a measure of agricultural productivity. 
Value added in agriculture measures the output of the agricultural sector less the 
value of intermediate inputs. Agriculture comprises value added from forestry, 
hunting, and fishing as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Data 
are in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. Source: World Development Indicators (2005), 
by the World Bank 
 
 
Agricultural 
machinery, 
(tractors per 100 
hectares of 
arable land) 
Agricultural machinery refers to the number of wheel and crawler tractors 
(excluding garden tractors) in use in agriculture at the end of the calendar year 
specified or during the first quarter of the following year. Arable land includes 
land defined by the FAO as land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas are 
counted once), temporary meadows for mowing or for pasture, land under market 
or kitchen gardens, and land temporarily fallow. Land abandoned as a result of 
shifting cultivation is excluded. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank 
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Variable 
 
Description and Data source 
 
Births attended 
by skilled staffs 
The proportion of births attended by skilled health staff (% of total) is the 
percentage of deliveries attended by personnel trained to give the necessary 
supervision, care and advice to women during pregnancy, labor and the post-
partum period; and to care for newborns.  
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank 
 
Repeaters rate in 
primary school 
Repeaters in primary school refer to the total number of pupils who are enrolled in 
the same grade as in a previous year, expressed as a percentage of the total 
enrollment. It is calculated by taking the total number of students in the last grade 
of primary school, minus the number of repeaters in that grade, divided by the total 
number of children of official graduation age. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank 
 
Female 
schooling 
The Percentage of "primary school complete" in the female population. 
Schooling  The percentage of primary school complete" in the total population. 
Ethnic 
 
Fractionalization 
Ethnic fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly selected 
people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnic group. 
Source: Alesina et al. (2003). 
Religion 
Fractionalization 
Religion fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly selected 
people from a given country will not belong to the same religion.   
Source: Alesina et al.  (2003). 
Language 
Fractionalization 
Language fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly selected 
people from a given country will not speak the same language. 
Source: Alesina et al.  (2003). 
 
Hospital Beds 
(per 1000 
people) 
Hospital beds include inpatient beds available in public, private, general, and 
specialized hospitals and rehabilitation centers. In most cases beds for both acute 
and chronic care are included. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank 
 
 
 
GDP per Capita 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is 
the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It 
is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for 
depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant U.S. dollars 
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank 
 
 
 
 
Gini Coefficient 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some 
cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an 
economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the 
cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of 
recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index 
measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute 
equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a 
Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect 
inequality.  
Source: the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID), UNU-
WIDER, (2005). This new Version 2.0a of June 2005, also referred to as WIID2a 
consists of a checked and corrected WIID1, a new update of the Deininger & 
Squire database from the World Bank, new estimates from the Luxembourg Income 
Study and Transmonee, and other new sources as they have became available.  
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APPENDIX D 
 
 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
 
 
Optimal Weighting Matrix 
A key feature of the GMM procedure is the use of optimal weighting matrix to 
generate efficient estimator when there is an excess of instruments or when there is 
presence of an arbitrary form of heteroskedasticity. Thus, a natural question that comes to 
mind is how to derive an optimal weighting matrix?   
 The efficient GMM estimator is obtained by choosing the optimal weighting 
matrix that minimizes the asymptotic variance of the estimator. This is equivalent to 
setting the weighting matrix W in equation (4.6b) equal to the inverse of the covariance 
matrix of the orthogonality conditions. Let’s denote ][ LL×S  this covariance matrix.  
ZZZuuZS i
N
i
iiii
N
i
iN NN
Ω′=′′= ∑∑
== 11
11 ,      (1D) 
Where  is the covariance matrix of the disturbance term . The efficient 
GMM estimator is then derived substituting  in the equation (4.6b). 
iΩ iu
1−= SW
yZSZXXZSZX ′′′′= −−− 111 ][ NNEPGMMβ)       (2D) 
The associated asymptotic variance of the efficient GMM estimator is given by: 
11 ])([)( −− ′′= XZSZX NEPGMM NAVar β
)
      (3D) 
Baum et al. (2003) note that to get the feasible efficient panel GMM estimator, 
one need to make some assumption about the covariance matrix of the disturbance term 
 in order to be able to estimate the matrix . The consistent estimator of  is iΩ S S S
)
 
expressed as: 
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][1 ZZS Ω′= ))
N
         (4D) 
A feasible efficient two-step Panel GMM can be obtained using the following 3 
stages: 
First, estimate a standard IV model and save the residual. Next, construct an 
optimal weighting matrix using the estimated residual such that 
1
1 ][1
−
− ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ Ω′== ZZSW )))
N
. Finally, use the estimated optimal weighting matrix to derive 
the efficient panel GMM estimator EPGMMβ)  and its corresponding asymptotic variance 
)( EPGMMAVar β
)
. This yield 
yZZZZXXZZZZX ′Ω′′′Ω′′= −−− 111 )(])([ )))EPGMMβ                  (5D) 
11 ])([)( −− ′Ω′′= XZZZZX ))EPGMMAVar β                    (6D) 
Different results for EPGMMβ
)
and )( EPGMMAVar β
)
 could be obtained depending on 
the restrictions imposed on iΩ
)
, may it be conditional homoskedasticity, 
heteroskedasticity-consistent or allowing for intra-cluster correlation. 
 
Test of Exogeneity / Endogeneity of Subset of Instruments 
Another statistic used to test a subset of the original overidentifying restrictions or 
orthogonality conditions is called the “C test” or the “difference-in-sargan” test. This is 
equivalent to testing exogeneity or endogeneity of a set of regressors in a model. In the 
context of efficient GMM estimator, this test is calculated as a difference in two J-
statistics, whereas in standard IV models, it uses the difference between two Sargan test 
statistics. The basic idea of this test is to compare two J statistics from two separate 
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GMM estimators of the same coefficient vectorβ) , one using only the instruments 
included in the unrestricted model (inefficient but consistent, in which a specified set of 
suspected instruments are excluded) and the other using the restricted and fully efficient 
model (containing the entire set of overidentifying restrictions, including the specified set 
of instruments). If the inclusion of the suspected instruments increases the J-statistic 
substantially, it is interpreted as evidence against these specified instruments to satisfy 
the orthogonality conditions (Hayashi 2000; Baum et al. 2003). Under the null hypothesis 
that the specified variables are proper instruments (orthogonal), the C-statistic has 
a distribution with the degree of freedom equals the number of suspected instrument 
being tested. Formally, the C-statistic can be expressed as 
,                     (7D) 
2χ
2
11 1
~)()( KK −−= χββ JJC
Where is the difference between restricted, fully efficient Hansen J statistics 
and the unrestricted inefficient but consistent Hansen J-statistic.   is the number 
of suspected instruments to be tested. It is worth noting that in the context of efficient 
GMM or IV with heteroskedasticity-robust standard deviation, using the traditional 
Hausman (1978) test to examine the endogeneity of the regressors may produce negative 
test statistic with an incorrect degree of freedom.
1JJ −
1KK −
92 However, these shortcomings can 
easily be overcome using the C-test, which test for endogeneity by estimating the 
restricted and fully efficient model, while indicating the set of suspected regressors to be 
examined.   
                                                 
92 In the case of conditional homoskedasticity, the standard Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and the C-test are 
numerically the same in the IV context since they are all tests for the validity of set of orthogonality 
conditions. These tests differ when the number of orthogonality conditions being tested is greater than the 
number of endogenous regressors in the unrestricted regression (Baum et al. 2003).  
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Table D1: Random versus Fixed effect model+  
 
Model  Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model 
Dependant Var. H PG SPG H PG SPG 
       
Decentralization  -0.187* -0.090 -0.069 -0.160** -0.086** -0.060** 
(Expenditure) (0.104) (0.056) (0.046) (0.075) (0.039) (0.029) 
       
Repetition rate  0.124 -0.010 -0.017 0.156 0.018 0.006 
 (0.152) (0.074) (0.066) (0.118) (0.065) (0.058) 
       
Population  -1.355 -1.935 -2.533* 0.175 -0.108 -0.178 
Density a (3.933) (1.791) (1.313) (0.911) (0.489) (0.285) 
       
Immunization  -0.008 -0.012 -0.019 -0.004 -0.013 -0.023* 
Diphtheria  (0.027) (0.012) (0.013) (0.025) (0.013) (0.012) 
       
Agriculture Value  -4.499 -0.545 0.760 -8.210*** -2.703*** -1.432** 
Added  per Worker a (3.150) (1.332) (0.937) (1.732) (0.852) (0.659) 
       
Initial Value of  0.133 0.014 -0.005 0.124 0.016 -0.007 
Gini Coefficient (0.105) (0.050) (0.047) (0.084) (0.041) (0.034) 
       
Observations 163 163 163 163 163 163 
 Robust Standard errors in parentheses    
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 Note  a Variable in Logarithm 
  b Variable expressed as a percentage of total expenditure                  
   +Year dummy included 
 
Table D2: GMM-IV First Stage Estimates 
 
 
Dependant Variables 
Fiscal 
decentralization 
Square of Fiscal 
decentralization 
 (1) (2) 
   
First lag Fiscal decentralization 0.877***  
 (0.059)  
Second lag Fiscal Decentralization 0.099*  
 (0.058)  
French Legal Origin  0.362  
 (0.411)  
First lag square of Fisc. Decent.  0.802*** 
  (0.057) 
Second lag square Fisc. Decent.  0.137** 
  (0.055) 
 
Number of Observations 306 306 
R-Square 0.86 0.85 
   
 Robust Standard errors in parentheses    
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Figure D1: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization (Expenditure) and Human 
Development Indicators (HDI) by Income Level 
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Figure D2: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization (Expenditure) and Poverty  
  Headcount (H) by Income Level 
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Figure D3: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization (Expenditure) and   
  Poverty Gap (PG) by Income Level 
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Figure D4: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization (Expenditure) and   
 Square Poverty Gap (SPG) by Income Level 
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Figure D5: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization (Revenue) and   
  Human Development Indicators (HDI) by Income Level 
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Figure D6: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization (Revenue) and   
  Poverty Headcount (H) by Income Level 
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Figure D7: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization (Revenue) and   
  Poverty Gap (PG) by Income Level 
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Figure D8: Correlation between Fiscal Decentralization (Revenue) and   
  Square Poverty Gap (SPG) by Income Level 
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Table D3: List of Countries in the Sample by Region 
 
  Economy Code Region Freq. Percent Cum. 
Developing Countries           
East Asia & Pacific 
 China CHN East Asia & Pacific 5 1.02 1.02 
 Fiji FJI East Asia & Pacific 6 1.22 2.24 
 Indonesia IDN East Asia & Pacific 6 1.22 3.46 
 Malaysia MYS East Asia & Pacific 6 1.22 4.68 
 Mongolia MNG East Asia & Pacific 4 0.81 5.49 
 Papua New Guinea PNG East Asia & Pacific 5 1.02 6.51 
 Philippines PHL East Asia & Pacific 5 1.02 7.53 
 Thailand THA East Asia & Pacific 6 1.22 8.75 
Europe & Central Asia 
 Argentina ARG Europe & Central Asia 5 1.02 9.77 
 Belarus BLR Europe & Central Asia 4 0.81 10.58 
 Bulgaria BGR Europe & Central Asia 4 0.81 11.39 
 Croatia HRV Europe & Central Asia 5 1.02 12.41 
 Czech Republic CZE Europe & Central Asia 4 0.81 13.22 
 Estonia EST Europe & Central Asia 5 1.02 14.24 
 Hungary HUN Europe & Central Asia 5 1.02 15.26 
 Kazakhstan KAZ Europe & Central Asia 2 0.42 15.68 
 Kyrgyz Republic KGZ Europe & Central Asia 2 0.42 16.1 
 Latvia LVA Europe & Central Asia 4 0.81 16.91 
 Lithuania LTU Europe & Central Asia 4 0.81 17.72 
 Moldova MDA Europe & Central Asia 4 0.81 18.53 
 Poland POL Europe & Central Asia 5 1.02 19.55 
 Romania ROM Europe & Central Asia 6 1.22 20.77 
 Russian Federation RUS Europe & Central Asia 5 1.02 21.79 
 Slovak Republic SVK Europe & Central Asia 2 0.42 22.21 
 Tajikistan TJK Europe & Central Asia 3 0.61 22.82 
 Turkey TUR Europe & Central Asia 2 0.43 23.25 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 Benin BEN Sub-Saharan Africa 1 0.2 51.53 
 Botswana BWA Sub-Saharan Africa 2 0.42 51.95 
 Burkina Faso BFA Sub-Saharan Africa 2 0.42 52.37 
 Cameroon CMR Sub-Saharan Africa 2 0.42 52.79 
 Congo, Dem. Rep. ZAR Sub-Saharan Africa 2 0.42 53.21 
 Ethiopia ETH Sub-Saharan Africa 5 1.02 54.23 
 Gambia, The GMB Sub-Saharan Africa 5 1.02 55.25 
 Kenya KEN Sub-Saharan Africa 6 1.22 56.47 
 Madagascar MDG Sub-Saharan Africa 5 1.02 57.49 
 Malawi MWI Sub-Saharan Africa 6 1.22 58.71 
 Mauritius MUS Sub-Saharan Africa 6 1.22 59.93 
 Senegal SEN Sub-Saharan Africa 6 1.22 61.15 
 South Africa ZAF Sub-Saharan Africa 6 1.22 62.37 
 Swaziland SWZ Sub-Saharan Africa 6 1.22 63.59 
 Uganda UGA Sub-Saharan Africa 4 0.81 64.4 
 Zambia ZMB Sub-Saharan Africa 2 0.42 64.82 
 Zimbabwe ZWE Sub-Saharan Africa 6 1.22 66.04 
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Developing Countries (Continued)  Freq. Percent Cum. 
 
South Asia 
 Bangladesh BGD South Asia 3 0.61 47.87 
 India IND South Asia 6 1.22 49.09 
 Pakistan PAK South Asia 5 1.02 50.11 
 Sri Lanka LKA South Asia 6 1.22 51.33 
 
Middle East & North Africa 
 Iran, Islamic Rep. IRN Middle East & North Africa 5 1.02 45.84 
 Jordan JOR Middle East & North Africa 1 0.2 46.04 
 Tunisia TUN Middle East & North Africa 6 1.22 47.26 
 
Latin America & Caribbean 
 Albania ALB Latin America & Caribbean 5 1.02 24.27 
 Bolivia BOL Latin America & Caribbean 5 1.02 25.29 
 Brazil BRA Latin America & Caribbean 5 1.02 26.31 
 Chile CHL Latin America & Caribbean 6 1.22 27.53 
 Colombia COL Latin America & Caribbean 6 1.22 28.75 
 Costa Rica CRI Latin America & Caribbean 6 1.22 29.97 
 Dominican Republic DOM Latin America & Caribbean 6 1.22 31.19 
 Ecuador ECU Latin America & Caribbean 4 0.81 32 
 El Salvador SLV Latin America & Caribbean 5 1.02 33.02 
 Guatemala GTM Latin America & Caribbean 5 1.02 34.04 
 Honduras HND Latin America & Caribbean 5 1.02 35.06 
 Mexico MEX Latin America & Caribbean 6 1.22 36.28 
 Nicaragua NIC Latin America & Caribbean 5 1.02 37.3 
 Panama PAN Latin America & Caribbean 6 1.22 38.52 
 Paraguay PRY Latin America & Caribbean 6 1.22 39.74 
 Peru PER Latin America & Caribbean 6 1.22 40.96 
 Trinidad and Tobago TTO Latin America & Caribbean 6 1.22 42.18 
 Uruguay URY Latin America & Caribbean 6 1.22 43.4 
 Venezuela, RB VEN Latin America & Caribbean 7 1.42 44.82 
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Developed Countries   Freq. Percent Cum. 
High income: OECD 
 
 Australia AUS High income: OECD 6 1.22 67.26 
 Austria AUT High income: OECD 6 1.22 68.48 
 Belgium BEL High income: OECD 5 1.02 69.5 
 Canada CAN High income: OECD 7 1.42 70.92 
 Denmark DNK High income: OECD 6 1.22 72.14 
 Finland FIN High income: OECD 7 1.43 73.57 
 France FRA High income: OECD 7 1.42 74.99 
 Germany DEU High income: OECD 6 1.22 76.21 
 Greece GRC High income: OECD 6 1.22 77.43 
 Iceland ISL High income: OECD 6 1.22 78.65 
 Ireland IRL High income: OECD 7 1.42 80.07 
 Italy ITA High income: OECD 6 1.22 81.29 
 Japan JPN High income: OECD 1 0.2 81.49 
 Korea, Rep. KOR High income: OECD 6 1.22 82.71 
 Luxembourg LUX High income: OECD 6 1.22 83.93 
 Netherlands NLD High income: OECD 6 1.22 85.15 
 New Zealand NZL High income: OECD 6 1.22 86.37
 Norway NOR High income: OECD 6 1.22 87.59
 Portugal PRT High income: OECD 6 1.22 88.81
 Spain ESP High income: OECD 7 1.42 90.23
 Sweden SWE High income: OECD 6 1.22 91.45
 Switzerland CHE High income: OECD 6 1.22 92.67
 United Kingdom GBR High income: OECD 7 1.43 94.1
 United States USA High income: OECD 6 1.22 95.32
 
High income: nonOECD 
 Bahrain BHR High income: nonOECD 6 1.22 96.54
 Cyprus CYP High income: nonOECD 6 1.22 97.76
 Israel ISR High income: nonOECD 6 1.22 98.98
 Slovenia SVN High income: nonOECD 5 1.02 100
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